Evolving Female Participation in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood by Farag, Mona Kamal
 1 
 
 
Evolving Female Participation in 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood 
 
 
 
Submitted by Mona Kamal Farag to the University of Exeter  
as a thesis for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Arab and Islamic Studies 
 In April 2013. 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for 
the award of a degree by this or any other University. 
 
 
 
Signature: ………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Abstract 
 
This research effort will analyze the level of female political participation within 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) before and after the January 25 revolution, and 
whether it has changed with the transformation of Egypt’s political climate, 
governing system and ruling elite. An assessment of the level of female 
participation within the MB and its political party will occur to determine which 
significant factors - such as governing regime, cultural influences, security issues 
- have attributed to the magnitude and level of the Muslim Sisters’ political 
exposure and electoral activities. More specifically, this research aims to 
ascertain if the Muslim Sisters experience their full rights as citizens under the 
leadership of the MB, and whether the MB’s willingness to nominate women is a 
step towards achieving equality or ‘complementarity’ within its ranks, or the 
process of fielding female candidates is nothing more than a “democratic 
façade.” Or is the issue more deeply rooted within the Egyptian, and 
predominantly Muslim, state and society, and its social norms and existing 
political structures? The historical context of post-colonial politics and the crisis of 
authoritarian secular politics will be reviewed as well, as it has contributed to the 
phenomenon of reinventing the rigid influence of tradition and religion.  
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Abbreviations 
 
AEFL     Association for Egyptian Female Lawyers 
ASU    Arab Socialist Union  
CA     Constituent Assembly   
CEDAW    Convention on the Elimination of all forms of  
Discrimination Against Women  
CRC     Committee on the Rights of the Child 
 EFU    Egyptian Feminist Union  
FGM    Female Genital Mutilation 
FJP    Freedom and Justice Party  
MARAM    Egyptian Center for Monitoring Women’s Priorities 
MB    Muslim Brotherhood 
MLA    Muslim Ladies Association  
MP    Member of Parliament  
NCW    National Council for Women 
NDP    National Democratic Party 
NGOs    Non-governmental Organizations 
PA    People’s Assembly 
SC    Security Council 
SCAF    Supreme Council for the Armed Forces 
SCC     Supreme Constitutional Court  
UN    United Nations  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the context of Egypt’s history of Islamist influence and an authoritarian 
regime known for its human rights violations, gender issues have often been 
used as both scapegoat and marketing ploy to win over the Western community. 
This was done to ease some of the persisting concerns relating to women’s 
rights in a predominantly patriarchal and culture-driven society. The Muslim 
Sisters have faced similar obstacles to gaining their rights within the stronghold 
of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
The Aim of This Research  
This research investigates whether the female members of Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB)1 are presented with equal opportunities as the MB’s male 
members and are granted their full rights as citizens, irrespective of the 
organization’s personal agenda as an Islamist movement or its political outlooks 
on equal rights, versus their views on complementarity. More importantly, this 
research effort sets out to assess how the Muslim Sisters define and understand 
that concept of women’s empowerment and the attainment of their rights as 
Muslim women within an Islamist movement, and in Egypt’s traditional and 
largely patriarchal society and state. Also, this research effort analyzes whether 
the Muslim Sisters themselves are invested in achieving greater representation 
within the MB and its political party.  
                                            
1 This research will focus on the original and the oldest MB organization due to the fact that it has 
had decades of political exposure and experience with an oppressive and corrupt government. 
Operating as a banned organization, the MB has engaged with the powerful governments of 
Mubarak and has recruited its female cadres to become politically active since the 2000 elections.  
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 Research will also discuss and analyze the Muslim Sisters’ descriptive vs. 
substantive representation within Egypt’s society in large and in Parliament. With 
the majority presence of the MB and Islamist parties in Egypt’s current 
Parliament, this research effort will assess whether or not the MB will curtail vital 
human rights in the long run, especially those pertaining to the Coptic and female 
population in Egypt.  
Investigating women’s participation in politics within the fold of the MB is 
not a new practice. The appearance of Ms. Jihan el-Halafawy, as a MB candidate 
in 2000 for al-Raml district in Alexandria, piqued interest in the MB’s doctrine and 
views on a woman’s role in a political context and within an Islamist framework. 
However, female participation within the MB did not extend beyond having 
women run as electoral candidates as a result of the government’s reaction to el-
Halafawy’s win; which declared that her win was illegal ‘based on procedural 
grounds’. 2  Many ideas surfaced as to why the MB decided to temporarily 
abandon their strategy of nominating women to run for elections soon after, and 
why the government put a stop to such an activity. The most prominent reasons 
were that the government wanted to discourage the MB from appearing as a just 
and democratic organization that was in full support of active female participation 
and women’s rights; and the MB claimed that a higher profile for women in 
elections under the MB’s direction was dangerous - as it would bring about the 
                                            
2 Mona El Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of The Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 37 (2005): 373, accessed November 25, 2010, DOI: 
10.1017.S0020743805373041  
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wrath of the regime.3 Such ideas and allegations will be further explored in the 
analysis portion of this thesis. At the same time, the women of the MB and their 
activities and initiatives will be explored, as many of the Muslim Sisters have 
called for full integration of the female members into the heart of the organization 
and its movement.4 
In addition to the questions of emancipation and equal representation of 
women within the MB, the dissertation will shed light on the extent that the 
Muslim Sisters are calling for better representation, and whether they are 
challenging the upper echelons of the MB’s organizational structure. There exists 
in Egypt’s society a small yet sure movement of women found within and outside 
the organization - the Muslim Sisters - that aim to gain political representation in 
Egypt’s Parliament. These women have been identified as MB members, MB 
loyalists, MB sympathizers and Islamic feminists. With the dissolution of the 
Mubarak regime, the MB members - both women and men - have been free to 
come out of the shadows and identify themselves as members of the oldest 
Islamist organization in the Middle East. Only women who are actively engaged 
in the political scene in Egypt, driven by their Islamist conviction and ideologies, 
will be presented in this research. This focus will further reveal the intricate and 
complex relationship of the state, the MB and gender representation within 
society and state.  
                                            
3 The political crackdown of the Mubarak regime was mentioned during the author’s interviews 
with a senior MB male member, and an active female member who ran during the 2010 and 2011 
parliamentary elections. O.B. Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 17, 
2012, and M.A.H. Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 17, 2012. 
4 Omayma Abdel-Latif, and Marina Ottaway, “Women in Islamist Movements: Toward an Islamist 
Model of Women’s Activism,” Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Middle East Center, no. 2 (June 2007): 
11.  
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This research is vital in understanding the future of female politicians in 
Egypt and its state policies regarding female political representation in 
Parliament and beyond, as it tackles several important issues that are currently 
the source of debate in both the academic circles and within international human 
rights contexts. More specifically, the outcome of this research will provide a 
better understanding of the future of female participation in a growing Islamist 
political setting and government; a form of governing that has been long 
perceived as anti-human rights and that has been growing in influence in Egypt 
post January 25, 2011. Most research efforts that have tackled the complexities 
of Islamist political and feminist issues have done so with a focus on issues of a 
social and cultural nature.5 Granted, in most Middle Eastern societies, social and 
cultural frameworks hold great influence and importance for the livelihood of 
women in predominantly patriarchal cultures. Nonetheless, there is a lack of 
investigation of and focus on low female parliamentary representation and how 
its relationship with authoritarianism and Islamism is empowering or hindering 
women’s success in Parliament or even on the presidential rung of the political 
ladder. Such a focus is vital for better understanding the tools of democratic rule 
and government, and how they could empower or hinder women’s rights in a 
traditionalist and Islamic-oriented society, with the demise of an authoritarian rule 
                                            
5 For an example of the works published regarding women’s social and cultural issues within an 
Islamic context e.g. the veil, divorce, female genital mutilation, and polygamy, refer to Kandiyoti 
(1991), Mahmood, (2005), Zuhur, Revealing Reveiling (1992). 
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that held only symbolic elections for the purpose of legitimizing its autocratic ruler 
and respective cronies.6 
 The seemingly uncontrollable wave of Islamization that has swept through 
the Middle East, especially in Egypt, has carried a major return to Islamic 
practices; such as the veil that was once discarded in a display of feminist power 
and female liberation in Egypt. A focus on the MB organization in Egypt is 
pertinent during the current political period, as the MB has risen to the higher 
echelons of the Egyptian government and with the election of a senior MB 
member as Egypt’s president in the post-January 25, 2011 era. Assessing the 
future of Egyptian women and Egypt as a whole - in light of rising Islamist 
factions and powers - is a prerequisite to any in-depth analysis of the Middle 
Eastern region during the Arab Spring, and is pivotal to an analysis of the 
region’s power struggle and its stance in regards to international politics and 
foreign policies.  
Despite the fact that the Arab Spring was launched by the Tunisian 
Jasmine revolution and the self-immolation of a street vendor in protest of the 
injustices of a corrupt government; the Arab Spring was pushed into full force 
with Egypt’s 18-day revolution, when many countries within the region followed 
suit in protesting against their longstanding corrupt governments. Egypt is the 
largest Arab country in population, amassing a greater presence and political 
weight amongst is neighbours; especially due to its pivotal role in the 1978 Camp 
David treaty, and in maintaining a semblance of peace or truce between Israel 
                                            
6 Refer to the concept of ‘Electoral Authoritarianism’ in Andreas Schedler, ed. Electoral 
Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2006). 
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and the Arab world. The overthrow of Mubarak’s authoritarian regime has 
revealed a new playing field and a new set of rules. With the absence of the all-
seeing and stifling Mubarak government, how will the Islamist factions respond to 
the newfound possibilities that are presented to them, albeit under the watchful 
eyes of the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF)7 and the rest of the 
world? They have become free to establish their own political party and to 
compete in free and fair elections. Currently, the MB represents the majority 
faction in both the upper and lower houses of Parliament and - with the election 
of MB member Dr. Mohammed Morsy as Egypt’s president post-revolution - in 
the Presidential office. How will a political setting free from regime crackdowns 
and arrests, factor into their agenda for minority rights, especially women’s 
rights? Will the Muslim Sisters be emancipated form their customary secondary 
roles within the MB? Will the newfound political freedom drive them to contest for 
different political roles in the MB and the new government? Or will they curb their 
ambitions for political equality in favour of supporting the MB and its political 
party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)?8 
 
The Gender Debate in an Islamist Framework  
Egypt has witnessed over a century of ground breaking feminist 
movements starting with the pre-revolution women’s suffrage movement, up to 
present day women-led activism within the realm of political Islam. The women’s 
                                            
7 SCAF is the governing unit of the Egyptian military, and is made up of the military’s senior 
officers. It is also the de-facto ruling authority in Egypt. 
8 The MB’s political party - the Freedom and Justice Party - was formed in 2011, within months of 
the 18-day uprising and the dissolution of Mubarak’s government.  
 12 
movement in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt, has gone through a myriad of 
societal and political changes that gave rise to new terms such as secular 
feminism, Muslim feminism, Islamic feminism and gender activism9 - all within a 
Middle Eastern context. Feminism10 and its ideologies are widely known and are 
applied outside of the Middle East, but as Moghadam explains - the feminist 
movements that the region has witnessed are true to the Middle Eastern identity, 
and are, in many ways, entirely different from the feminist movements that the 
Western world has observed.11 But why is there a need to focus on the Egyptian 
women’s movement in the 21st century? As the world has experienced dispersion 
of ideas, thoughts, beliefs, educational opportunities and modern trends through 
the effects of globalization and the Internet, more women have found their voice 
and have taken it upon themselves to publicize their political views and stances. 
Increasingly, Muslim women are using the Internet to write personal accounts 
(via blogs) of their experiences in different countries in the Middle East. Such 
accounts have attracted considerable attention in the West and have affected the 
way in which these women are perceived.12 In particular, rather than being 
                                            
9 Refer to the works of Karam (1998) Badran (1995) Shehadeh (2003) Baron (2005) Roded 
(2008), Moghadam (2003) Zuhur (2001) Hafez (2011). 
10 Within the Western context, most gender-related political activism is referred to as feminist 
movements or gender activism, whereas the application of feminism within the Middle East 
context separates its ideologies into two distinct entities: secular feminism and Islamic feminism, 
in light of the dominant influence of religion in the daily lives of Middle Eastern women and men.  
Refer to Margot Badran, “Between Secular and Islamic Feminisms,” Journal of Middle East 
Women's Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 6-28, aaccessed November 24, 2010, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40326847  
11Moghadam explains that feminism is a theoretical perspective that thrives based on the setting, 
time, location and history. See Valentine M. Moghadam, “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: 
Toward a Resolution of the Debate,” Signs 27, no.4 (Summer 2002): 1165, accessed November 
25, 2010, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175948  
12 Many articles and interviews have taken place during 2011, revealing the testaments of several 
female bloggers in the midst of the 18 days of the revolution and the months of uncertainty that 
followed. Refer to Hania Sholkamy, “Why Women are at the Heart of Egypt’s Political Trials and 
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oppressed within a patriarchal structure, Muslim women have been voicing their 
political views.  
 
Brief History of the MB’s Electoral Activities 
Since the MB took the decision in the 1980s to participate in parliamentary 
elections and push forward its agenda, it has been successful in winning a 
considerable number of seats. Its popularity and influence in the political arena 
have been exceptionally impressive since, as an autonomous entity, it is banned 
as a political party in accordance with Law no. 40 (1977) which states that a 
political party cannot be formed on the basis of a social class, sect, geographic 
region, race or religion.13 To circumvent this law, they have had to ally and work 
closely with other legitimate and formal political parties, such as the Wafd 
Party, 14  in their continuous struggle against the ruling authoritarian regime. 
Through forming alliances with other parties, due to their status as a banned 
political movement since 1954, the MB managed to win a considerable number 
of seats as a result of their presence at the grassroots level, as well as the active 
membership of many of the Brothers in Egypt’s professional syndicates. As the 
MB’s political clout began to grow and influence Egypt’s population throughout 
                                                                                                                                  
Tribulations,” 50/50 inclusive democracy, January 24, 2012, accessed January 30, 2012, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/hania-sholkamy/why-women-are-at-heart-of-
egypt%E2%80%99s-political-trials-and-tribulations.  
13 Law no. 40 of the Egyptian Constitution, Legislative Assembly, 1977. 
14 The Wafd Party is the oldest liberal party in Egypt. It became a major party when Egypt 
attained independence in 1922, and was very active in the 1920s and 1930s as a major 
nationalist force under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul. At the time, it was viewed as the only 
legitimate threat to the Muslim Brotherhood’s power and influence. It reemerged as the New Wafd 
Party - a nationalist, liberal party – in 1983. 
 14 
the 1990s, the regime became more aware of the MB’s threat to their stability 
and longevity in Egypt’s political game.  
For the past decade, the MB and its top officials have called for more 
democratic articles in Egypt’s national policies, voicing the same concerns as 
their counterparts and human rights organizations. In addition, the MB has been 
a strong advocate of female participation in the political realm thoroughly 
supporting female members of the MB in running for elections at the local, district 
and national levels. During the 2000 and 2005 elections, for instance, several 
female MB members took part in many of the MB campaigns, ranging from 
heading demonstrations to electoral campaigning, thereby dispelling some of the 
pre-conceived notions of Islam as an oppressive tool used against women.15 
 However, the intention behind the MB’s support of the Muslim Sisters is 
questionable. A review of the history of the MB’s political activities demonstrates 
how they constantly shaped and adapted its vision according to the surrounding 
political climate. In particular, the MB successfully adapted to the regime’s tactics 
of capitalizing on its ‘Islamizing’ social presence and growing influence to make 
the government’s ‘democratic’ agendas and plans appear more appealing to the 
masses. This led the regime to give more political freedom to the MB to 
counteract the secular parties with a more democratic vision since a popular 
secular party could threaten the regime’s NDP and its success. 16  This 
                                            
15 Matt Bradley. “Muslim Brotherhood Reaches out to the Sisterhood,” The National, April 13, 
2010, accessed April 13, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/africa/muslim-
brotherhood-reaches-out-to-the-sisterhood  
16 Khairi Abaza, “Political Islam and Regime Survival in Egypt,” Policy Focus, The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, no. 51 (2006): 18, accessed November 10, 2011, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/PolicyFocus51.pdf  
 15 
‘evolutionary’ trait is also evident through the MB’s history of electoral activities 
from the 1980s to the present day. However, the old regimes of Nasser, Sadat 
and Mubarak, consistently use religion as a tool to achieve their political ends, by 
reassuring the Muslim majority in Egypt that the government relies on the laws of 
Islam to oversee its executive decisions.17 This research will examine whether 
this ‘evolutionary’ and accommodating trait extends to the Muslim Sisters when 
presented with the choice of either asserting themselves within the MB and 
society, or accommodating the MB organization’s needs and priorities over their 
own.  
With a minority presence in Egypt’s Parliament and state, the MB will be 
required to answer to the Muslim Sisters’ demands, and listen to their grievances 
of not being fully integrated into the MB as equal members. The Muslim Sisters 
may not view themselves as Islamic feminists but they are women who are 
repeatedly asking for their equal status and the rights that have been given to 
them by Islam and Islamic jurisprudence. However, these demands of women’s 
empowerment and rights may not necessarily mean well for the overall feminist 
discourse and the enacting of constitutional laws that would safeguard women’s 
rights and liberties. An analysis of the Muslim Sisters’ participation in the 2012 
Constituent Assembly will clarify their position – as either beneficial to some, or 
detrimental to all. For example, the descriptive and/or substantive representation 
of the Sisters may prove beneficial to women belonging to an Islamist camp and 
detrimental to women who identify themselves as secular, and to women who 
                                            
17 Robert Lee, Religion and Politics in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010): 281-283 
and Scott Hibbard, Religious Politics and Secular States: Egypt India and the United States 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010): 62-63.  
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see themselves as part of the Muslim community, but prefer to support non-
Islamist political affiliations.  
 
Outline of Chapters  
The point of this research is to analyze the stance of the Muslim Sisters 
within the MB and within the Egyptian society by looking at their political 
participation in Egypt’s elections. The political ratings of the MB within the 
Egyptian Parliament will further help in assessing the progress (or lack thereof) of 
women’s empowerment within such an organization. The MB had always claimed 
to have ambitious plans for the Muslim Sisters and women’s participation in 
elections and in the MB organization. However, why hasn’t there been a 
significant increase in female political participation within the MB? Is there a lack 
of sincerity on the part of the MB officials in their desire for a larger politically 
proactive female division within the party; thereby discouraging the Muslim 
Sisters from pressing on with demands for better representation? This is not to 
say that the number of women who adopt political roles within the MB, while 
staying true to their Islamic beliefs, has not increased over the past decade. On 
the contrary, more women are taking a stand to defend their rights under the 
banner of Islam. These women defend their religion and faith against arguments 
claiming that Islam is completely incompatible with the concept of human rights 
and gender activism.18 The question here is: why hasn’t the number of politically 
                                            
18 Dr Heba Abdel Roauf and Dr. Safinaz Kazim are prominent Islamist academics that continually 
address the misconceptions about Islam and its treatment of women and their political rights 
within an Islamic and secular society and government.  
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active and influential female members of the MB increased dramatically as one 
would expect after the growing influence of Islamic political thought and the MB’s 
public support towards its female members? 
Chapter One - Historical Background, will assess the women’s movement 
within the MB and Egyptian society by analyzing previous literature and 
scholarship that have targeted the three main variables - women, the MB and 
Egypt. An Islamic feminist perspective will be applied that would best describe 
the relationship of these three subject matters in light of this research’s focus on 
the Muslim Sisters, in addition to a discussion of the Sisters’ descriptive vs. 
substantive representation within Egypt’s government and parliament. Chapter 
Two - Methodology, will then discuss the methodology applied to compile and 
analyze the present qualitative data, as well as the information that was gathered 
through field research. Possible obstacles and impediments to the ideal and 
successful completion of field research will be posed and discussed. Questions 
posed during interviews as part of the field research effort, are presented as well. 
Chapter Three - Historical Background, presents a highlight of the history of 
feminist movements - Islamist and secular - in Egypt, as well as history of the 
creation and growth of the oldest Islamist organization: Egypt’s MB. Additionally, 
Chapters One and Three include a theoretical and historical examination of the 
complex relationship between the feminist movements and authoritarian regimes. 
Next, the analysis portion of the thesis will be divided into two parts. Part I 
assesses the Muslim Sisters’ non-electoral activities as part of the MB, and Part 
II examines their electoral participation and efforts before, during and after 
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election season. Both parts will investigate the Sisters’ actions by analyzing the 
years after the formation of the MB to the 2012 parliamentary elections. 
Specifically, Part II will examine and assess the outcomes of the 2011/2012 
parliamentary elections and the Muslim Sisters’ role in the Constituent Assembly 
in rewriting Egypt’s new constitution. The Sister’s activities within the MB’s 
political party - the FJP - will be documented as well. The concluding chapter will 
present the assessments reached in light of this research, and will determine 
whether the thesis statements are supported, disproved or require further 
investigation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Theoretical Background 
 
This research questions the extent to which the Muslim Sisters 
themselves seek representation within the largely patriarchal-hierarchy that is the 
MB. Moreover, it sheds light on a more defined reason or catalyst for the rise in 
female political participation under the banner of the MB in parliamentary 
elections in particular, and in election activities as a whole. Research also 
queries as to whether the Muslim Sisters have been affected by the growing 
popularity of the phenomena commonly known as ‘Islamic Feminism’ - an 
ideology that seeks to ensure women’s rights within an Islamic framework - or 
whether they desire to remain unchanged in regards to their position and level of 
influence in the MB on an organizational level, and inevitably, on a state level. To 
that end, and for a better understanding of the ideology and framework in which 
the Muslim Sisters mobilize, this research provides an assessment of ‘Islamic 
feminism’ and the growth of the feminist movement in Egypt.  
Such an assessment, of women’s rights and a woman’s place in general, 
is pertinent now more than ever, in the shadow of the growing Islamist presence 
in Egypt. The political stance of the Muslim Sisters is increasingly relevant in 
regards to the national policies put forth by the new government, which is moving 
forward down the path of Islamization and gradually eradicating secular 
influences. More importantly, the reaction and stance of the Muslim Sisters within 
the MB, and the FJP’s view of foreign policy and the intervention of powerful 
states and international organizations in relation to women’s issues, will be 
pivotal in determining the direction of women’s rights and stance within Egyptian 
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society, and under the new constitution. The results of this academic effort may 
help map out the future of women’s rights and women empowerment within 
Egypt and other Arab countries where powerful Islamist parties and organizations 
exist. An understanding of the context in which we see growing participation of 
the Muslim Sisters could reveal the extent to which the president’s social and 
political agenda prioritize women’s right in particular and human rights in general. 
Inversely, the decreasing political participation of the Muslim Sisters might 
indicate that a rising Islamic rhetoric and a narrower Islamic interpretation will 
undermine already existing rights of women. Understanding the reasons behind 
and motives for the rising political participation of the Muslim Sisters, will reveal if 
women’s right in particular and human rights in general are a priority in the new 
president’s political and social agenda. It will also shed light on the question of 
whether rising Islamic rhetoric and a narrower Islamic interpretation will 
undermine the rights that women have gained over the past few decades. In this 
way, analyzing the activities of the Muslim Sisters will serve as a barometer of 
the future climate.  
 
The Boundaries of the Terms ‘Feminism’ and ‘Islamic’ 
In order to better grasp the evolving ideology of ‘Islamic feminism’, a 
dissection of the term ‘feminism’ and the term ‘Islamic’ is needed to provide a 
clearer picture of the controversial idea of Islamic feminism. A complete 
breakdown of both terms and an overview of their common misconceptions and 
the normative beliefs surrounding them are required for the outlined task.  
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Feminism 
The term ‘feminism’ has always been viewed as a Western invention. It 
was introduced in France in the 1880s, where Hubertine Auclert coined the term 
in her political writings as she critically weighed the apparent male dominance in 
defining women’s rights that were within women’s reach after the French 
revolution.19 Feminism as an idea and movement is rooted in the belief that 
women are full citizens of their respective societies and nations, and the demand 
for equal rights by their governments and peers should serve as the movement’s 
primary goal. As Badran puts it: “At its most basic, or generic, feminism is a 
critique of women’s subordination and a challenge to male domination and 
includes efforts to rectify women’s situation.”20 In regards to the topic at hand (i.e. 
Islamic feminism), what differentiates liberal feminism from Islamic feminism, is 
that liberal feminism emphasizes the ‘individual’ and individual autonomy with the 
desire to occupy positions in society and government that have been previously 
exclusively for men. Whereas Islamic feminism focuses on the Islamic society 
that is characterized by an Islamic framework as a whole to achieve women’s 
rights, and does not concern itself with the issue of women attaining powerful 
positions in the state that are only reserved for men.21 Still, both strains of 
feminism see legislative reform as the main tool that would enable women to 
become equal contributors to the betterment of their society. However, the 
                                            
19 Carolyn, J. Eichner, “La Citoyenne in the World: Hubertine Auciert and Feminist Imperialism,” 
French Historical Studies 32, no. 1 (2009): 63-84. doi: 10.1215/00161071-2008-013  
20 Margot Badran, Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences, (Oxford: One World 
Publications, 2009), 329. 
21 Huma Ahmed-Ghosh, “Dilemmas of Islamic and Secular Feminists and Feminisms,” Journal of 
International Women’s Studies 9, no.3 (May 2008), 111. 
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versatility of feminism, as a concept and ideology, has made it possible to be 
redefined and grow in different soils across the world. History has witnessed 
various types of feminisms that can be defined by their political leanings such as: 
liberal feminists, right-wing feminists, conservative feminists, socialist feminists, 
utopian feminists, equity feminists, Nazi feminists, imperial feminists and national 
feminists.22 Alternatively, a group of feminists may be demographically grouped 
such as Turkish feminists and Egyptian feminists. One of the most vital identities 
that have united women and women rights activists in the fight for equality 
throughout history has been religion; such as the congregation of Jewish 
feminists, Catholic feminists and Islamic feminists for the purpose of achieving 
women’s rights within the spectrum of their religious beliefs. Christian and Jewish 
feminists, like Islamic feminists, - who while examining and rethinking their own 
traditions - could not tolerate the idea of not working to change and rethink their 
traditions and culture, in favor of adopting the cultures of their new and changing 
surroundings. For example, Islamic feminist Leila Ahmed describes herself as a 
‘self-critical American feminist’ who is occupied with “examining and rethinking 
Muslim norms and values so that they might be more accommodating to 
women.”23  
Feminist theory rejects the over-simplistic explanations of sex and the 
notion of sexuality, as it does not accept that what primarily defines a women is 
                                            
22 Moghadam, “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents,” 1154.  
23 Miriam Cooke, Women Claim Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism through Literature (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 292. 
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only her physiology.24 The use of the term gender has enabled theorists to 
comprehend several elements other than the physical, in defining a woman or 
the homogeneous grouping of women. Through the integration of cultural, 
historical and social positioning, feminist theorists have added elements to more 
effectively create the social construct of women without relying solely on their 
physical attributes. Activities of positioning are evident in the study of gender 
where the place, timeline, and language are taken into consideration and which 
inevitably gave rise to the issue of gender performativity. In regards to the topic 
at hand, Cooke describes Islamic feminism as “not a coherent identity, but rather 
a contingent, contextually determined strategic self-positioning.”25 
To better understand the rhetoric of gender regarding a certain case 
study, one must acknowledge the already present social construct of the male 
and female subjects, and how it facilitates one’s ‘performance’, affirming Butler’s 
theory that whatever construct gender appears in; it is more often than not, 
influenced by the society that is being researched, where people acquire - and 
are not born into - such societal positioning.26 In the case of Islamic feminism in 
the Middle East, it has been maintained that discrimination against women was 
more rooted in social norms and was not derived from religious texts and laws.27 
This, in turn, revealed endless possibilities for women activists to work with in the 
face of discriminatory elements found in the Middle East, such as authoritarian 
                                            
24 Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory.” Theatre Journal 40, no. 4 (1988): 520-521, accessed June 28, 2012, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3207893 
25 Cooke (2001), 59. 
26 Butler, 523. 
27 Moghadam, “Islamic Feminism and its Discontents,” 1144. 
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regimes and the influence of traditional and patriarchal Islamic ulamaʾ (legal 
scholars). It can be argued that authoritarianism and patriarchal practices are 
rarely exclusive from one another. It could also be said that Islamic feminism 
distorts the spectrums that have long been constructed when discussing the 
polarities ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ and ‘East’ and ‘West’.28 
The relevant questions here, in regards to this research on the Muslim 
Sisters, are as follows: Is feminism a Western concept? Is it only viable and 
applicable in Western contexts? Can it grow on foreign soil? Moreover, are 
those, who promote women equality and advancement automatically, feminists? 
Furthermore, Moghadam puts forth an important question: Can creating a “more 
inclusive ‘global feminism’”29 minimize the differences and misunderstandings 
between Western and Eastern feminist analysts?  
  Of the many misconceptions of the ideology of feminism is the perception 
that it communicates exclusively via liberal and democratically charged rhetoric 
and tools; rejecting any reference to women’s issues with a conservative 
element. When assessing feminist texts by Western writers, it comes as a 
revelation that there exists a pool of thinkers and analysts who work within the 
conservative construct to ensure that women’s rights are pinpointed and 
actualized. Several academics such as Childs, Celis and Krook 30  have 
challenged the traditional constructs of feminism by assessing and analysing 
                                            
28 Badran. “Between Secular and Islamic Feminisms,” 12-14. 
29 Moghadam,“Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents,” 1154. 
30Sarah Childs, Karen Celis and Mona Lena Krook have published several works that discuss the 
concepts of sex, gender and the substantive representation of women in regard to party politics 
and gender-specific policies in Western governments. It is important to note that the majority of 
their works solely focus on how female representation (whether descriptive or substantive) affect 
gender-related policies within government, and not within their political parties or social 
movements.  
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conservative women movements within EU governments and pointing out the 
pitfalls of the ideas of ‘false consciousness,’31 and presenting relevant arguments 
of substantive vs. descriptive representation.32 False consciousness is relevant to 
the current discussion since it highlights how women, affiliated with an Islamist 
conservative movement, are rejected as a possibility or reality by the Egyptian 
society, in their pursuit of women’s rights and implementation of gender related 
policies. The Egyptian secular society is highly critical of social political 
movements that work within a religious framework; perceiving their goals and 
agendas to only take into account gender issues that are in cohesion with 
religious texts and practices. However, Western conservative feminists have 
made major strides in calling on their governments to construct and pass gender-
related policies under the direction of their conservative views and agendas. 
Much like the Muslim Sisters, Webb and Childs’ assessment of conservative 
feminists in Western cultures value women’s traditional gender roles in society 
and reject “feminist arguments that adopt a ‘male’ model of careerism and public 
achievement as female goals, thereby denying women’s needs for intimacy, 
family and children.” 33  Celis and Childs continue this line of analysis by 
explaining that, generally, the topic of conservative feminists is tackled using one 
                                            
31 The idea of false consciousness in its most basic form refers to any ideological construct or 
view that prevents society from grasping the essence or true sense of an event or situation. It was 
later developed further by Karl Marx to explain how people and societies are moved and 
mobilized through the construction of exploitive tools that cripple an individual’s ability to become 
aware of the true reality of his/her social and political framework.  
32 Substantive representation refers to the representation of women’s issues and needs, whereas  
Descriptive representation makes a distinction between women representing women’s issues and 
male representatives. Many academics contend that commonalties in gendered experiences 
serve as a better representation for women issues than having male representatives for gender-
specific policies. Refer to Dovi, (2002), Mansbridge, (1999) and Phillips (1995). 
33 Paul Webb and Sarah Childs, “Gender Politics and Conservatism: The View from the British 
Conservative Party Grassroots,” Government and Opposition 47, no. 1 (2012): 24, 
doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01355.x  
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of two approaches: assessing feminists against liberal/secular feminist criteria; or 
by considering breaking down their representation and placing it on a “continuum 
with ‘nonsubstantive representation of women/anti-feminist/conservative’ at one 
end, and the ‘substantive representation of women/feminist/leftist’ at the other.”34  
In a post-2011 revolution Egypt, the Muslim Sisters - due to their religious, 
political and social affiliations - are viewed as conservative descriptive 
representatives of Egypt’s women’s issues and gender-specific politics in a 
Parliament dominated by men. Female representation in Parliament is a little 
over two percent; with the Muslim Sisters standing as a majority in that minuscule 
percentage. 35  Expectedly, the initial assessment of the Muslim Sisters’ 
2011/2012 political performance in regards to women’s issues is quite bleak, but 
due to the basic idea of representation, Celis et al. explains that the “represented 
and their needs are constructed through claims, rather than a reflection of the 
‘authentic’ needs and values of society.”36 As this research effort progresses, the 
MB and FJP’s claims will further define and clarify the Muslim Sisters’ activities 
and political actions before and during the MB’s political and social reign in 
Egypt. The Muslim Sisters have been given a large responsibility and burden 
within Egypt’s society, due to the MB’s resonance in Egypt’s streets and 
Parliament, and due to their ‘descriptive’ obligation to serve women’s needs in 
Egypt’s politics. Childs warns against such portrayal of female candidates; where 
arguing that women are almost always better representatives than men regarding 
                                            
34 Karen Celis and Sarah Childs,“The Substantive Representation of Women: What to Do with 
Conservative Claims?” Political Studies 60 (2012): 218, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00904.x 
35 Sholkamy. 
36 Celis and Childs, 216. 
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women’s issues, leads to both reductive and essentialist conclusion,37 that do not 
ultimately prove useful in the dissection and analysis of the role of the Muslim 
Sisters within the MB and Egypt’s Parliament and society. Childs highlights a 
major question that is highly relevant in Egypt’s patriarchal society and state: “Do 
women in politics make a difference?”38 In other words: Does the number of 
women, present in Parliament, affect the future of women-centric policies; 
whether they are passed or rejected? Can the thesis statement of this research – 
are the Muslim Sisters empowered within the MB and Egyptian society – be 
answered by assessing the percentage of conservative female politicians in the 
Parliament? Celis et al. argues that descriptive representation of women in 
Parliament does not necessarily lead to an increased focus on women-centric 
policies, because this narrow outlook overlooks the fact that not all women hold 
the same views and political alignment. This outlook, also, completely negates 
the possibility of men serving as potential political actors interested in advancing 
an agenda that serves women’s rights and policies.39  
 Egyptian feminists and respective organizations have been largely 
focused on descriptive representation post-January 25 revolution, due to the fact 
that the women represented in Parliament are largely from the MB, and that 
descriptive representation of women should ensure the growth of democracy and 
a sense of justice in Egypt over the long term, by including women in 
                                            
37 Sarah Childs, “The Complicated Relationship between Sex, Gender and the Substantive 
Representation of Women,” European Journal of Women's Studies 13, no. 7 (2006): 10, 
accessed August 10, 2013, DOI: 10.1177/1350506806060003 
38 Ibid.  
39 Karen Celis, Sarah Childs, Johanna Kantola, and Mona Lena Krook, “Rethinking Women's 
Substantive Representation,” Representation 44, no.2 (2008): 99, DOI: 
10.1080/00344890802079573 
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policymaking and political decision-making. Descriptive representation also 
presents Egyptian women with the opportunity to more clearly discern if women’s 
political presence has worked for - or against - feminist demands and to 
determine whether the practice of applying women’s quotas is needed, despite 
popular arguments that placing such quotas contradict the application and 
practice of a democratic agenda. Again, these questions push analysts to shift 
their focus from the question of how descriptive representation in Egypt makes a 
difference to the question of how substantive representation affects women’s 
empowerment within their society and government. This shift acknowledges the 
ideological contradictions and difference between the Muslim Sisters and the 
secular feminists who challenged the Sisters’ representation of Egyptian women 
– as a group – in a traditionalist and patriarchal society and state. As Childs 
points out, there could be a merging of “the substantive representation of women 
and the substantive representation of (leftist/liberal/progressive) feminist 
interests,” 40  when they are viewed as one and the same. Such logic also 
concludes that conservative women’s priorities are set by their conservative 
views in regards to women’s issues. In order to negate such narrow views of 
conservative feminists’ substantive representation, female conservatives may on 
occasion; and in a way that may appear to be in contradiction to their party or 
political affiliation, choose to act on behalf of women in a feminist manner. Such 
an argument by Childs is comparative of the Muslim Sisters’ predicament in that 
conservative women may fail to defy their political party’s wishes, further 
highlighting why the “relationship between the descriptive and the substantive 
                                            
40 Celis and Childs, 216. 
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representation of women has proven so contingent in practice.”41 Current media 
outlets and feminist movements in Egypt have denied the Muslim Sisters’ 
conservative claims and actions in regards to safeguarding women’s rights due 
to the Sisters’ perceived false consciousness or the belief that they are nothing 
but a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing.’ This level of distrust in conservative or religious 
elements have halted major efforts of Egyptian women and men working together 
to implement policies and laws that would benefit and protect women’s rights and 
interests.  
With the growing Islamization of society and state in the Middle East, 
feminist movements in Egypt need to let go of limited theories that women or 
men cannot be substantive representatives in Parliament when they are directed 
by conservative claims, or do not associate with the term and ideology of 
feminism. Childs contends that these representatives and their accompanying 
parties are “likely to come from across the ideological spectrum. This is likely, in 
turn, to result in diverging, if not conflicting, views about women’s gendered 
interests.”42 As this research will reveal, the Muslim Sisters and the MB have 
shown a strong aversion to the idea of feminism, and its members reject any 
definition that would place them within the same spectrum as this ‘Western’ 
concept. It must be noted that the term ‘Islamic feminism’ is still in formation; it is 
yet to take on a form of a tangible movement or a political theory. It materialized 
in the midst of Middle East and Western feminists study of Muslim women, and 
women who belong to Islamist movements, in an attempt to clarify this 
                                            
41 Celis and Childs, 217. 
42 Ibid., 214. 
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homogeneous group’s interests and motives. Islamic feminism may not 
necessary uphold the same idea of equality between the sexes as most feminist 
movements, in the rest of the world or amongst the secular pockets in the Middle 
East, do. Currently, there exists a divide between the world of academia and the 
real world that corresponds to the divide between theory building and the reality 
of women’s rights issues within the confines of Islam. Academics are analyzing 
the tools used by Muslim women to redefine the dated interpretation of the 
Quran, whereas theorists and theologians are exhausting their efforts in trying to 
reach policy-makers and focusing on rectifying the West’s perception of women 
in Islam.  
 
 
Islamic/Islamist  
 
‘Islamic’ and Islamist’ are used interchangeably in the present day, 
resulting in the collation of both terms and the misconception that both terms can 
be used to describe anything pertaining to the practice of Islam. ‘Islamic’ defines 
anything that pertains to the religion of Islam, especially in regards to practice 
and thought. ‘Islamist’ is an adjective; it refers to the growing phenomenon of 
political Islam. Islamic - rather than Islamist - feminism is used to describe 
Muslim women who seek women’s rights through Islam due to that fact that their 
primary idea and analytical tool is ’ijtihad (the independent investigation of 
religious sources). Not all Muslim women seeking to redefine women’s rights 
through the use of Quranic interpretation take on a political discourse, as ’ijtihad 
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requires the focus on theological aspects first and foremost;43 thereby negating 
the option of framing these women as ‘Islamist feminists’.  
The Islamization of feminism began to take root during the 1970s when 
the Islamization of the Middle East took place. The growing Islamizing social 
movement fed the growth of Islamic feminist discourses. Badran explains that 
initially: “Islamists’ rhetoric called for a return of women to a ‘purer’ and more 
‘authentic’ domestic life away from the public scene.”44 However, this was soon 
followed by the recruitment of women and their many skills at accessing the 
private sphere of society, with the promise of a new day and a new Islamic 
state.45 At the same time, it was the spread of this conservative and patriarchal 
interpretation of religion that captured the attention and concern of both secular 
and Muslim women, thereby planting the seeds for the growth of Islamic 
feminism that would enable women to replace the limited views of Islam with 
more progressive ones. The growth of Islamic feminism in Egypt came as no 
surprise since the Islamization of Egyptian society has been evident for decades; 
much like the growing Islamist influence and the current plethora of Islamic 
feminist thinkers that was previously witnessed in Iran. 
 
 
 
                                            
43 Cooke (2001), 62 and Nayereh Tohidi, "'Islamic Feminism': Perils and Promises," The Middle 
East Women's Studies Review 13 (Fall 2001): 141-142, accessed March 28, 2011,  
http://find.galegroup.com/gtx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IACDocuments&type=retrieve&tabID=T0
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44 Badran (2009), 9. 
45 Ibid.  
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The Evolution of the Term ‘Feminism’ in Egypt  
To better understand the definition and place of Islamic feminism in the 
spectrum of women-related studies, one must consider the other commonly used 
identities in the Middle East and Egypt. Feminism as a movement appeared on 
Egypt’s political scene in line with other nationalist movements at the turn of the 
20th century during Egypt’s resistance of British rule. Badran refers to this 
feminist movement as the Egyptian feminist movement, so as not to be confused 
with Western feminism.46 Egyptian feminism describes an ideology that mobilized 
the women of Egypt during nationalist movements and served as a prelude to the 
rise of Islamic feminism. Islamic feminist’s actions and practices have grown out 
of earlier feminists’ causes and struggles whether they were secular, nationalist 
or even humanitarian.  
 
Egyptian Feminism  
Egyptian feminism was founded in a political scene unique to Egypt, 
where Egyptian women called for equal representation within the nationalist 
movement that swept the country at that time.47 Bearing in mind that the Egyptian 
women’s movement has changed throughout modern Egyptian history, chapter 
three - historical background, will offer a glimpse of several prominent women 
credited with the impressive women’s movement. This practice of methodological 
individualism reflected the divergent opinions and beliefs amongst Egyptian 
women during the past century or so, in relation to women’s roles in society, both 
                                            
46 Badran (2009), 2.  
47 Badran, “Between Secular and Islamic Feminisms,” 12. 
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in the public and private sphere, and the relationship between the individual, the 
state and religion. Egyptian feminists were those who sought equal 
representation for women through the use of secular rhetoric; they sought a 
democratic nation that is separated from religion. In the case of Egypt in the early 
20th century, Egyptian feminism was a way to combine the plight of Egyptian 
women - both Muslim and Coptic - with that of a nationalist secular agenda. 
Egyptian feminism depended on multiple discourses that also included Islamic, 
modernist and humanitarian.48 The term ‘Muslim feminists’ was later used by 
academics such as Karam to describe politically and socially active women in a 
Muslim-majority country, who tried to achieve their goals by acknowledging and 
consulting both Islamic and secular principles. 49  More specifically, Muslim 
feminists have tried to define their struggle through the use of several 
nationalistic, cultural and democratic discourses; resorting to the use of Islamic 
speech on occasion.50 
 
What is Islamic Feminism? 
The term Islamic feminism is a contentious one. Many have hesitated to 
use it, others reject it as a concept altogether.51 It is still an evolving term, it is not 
set in stone and it has not been completely adopted by academics and activists 
                                            
48 Margot Badran, “Islamic Feminism: What's in a Name?” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 17 - 23 
January 2002, accessed October 10, 2010, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/569/cu1.htm 
49 Azza Karam, Women, Islamisms and the State: Contemporary Feminisms in the Middle East. 
(London: Macmillan, 1998), 9. 
50 Egyptian feminist Hoda Sha’rawi acknowledged that women had rights bestowed on them by 
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Egypt. Refer to Ruth Roded, Women in Islam and the Middle East: A Reader (London: I.B. Tauris 
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engaged in gender activism. Ahmed-Ghosh suggested that one could move the 
focus away from the term feminism for those  
“who claim that a rereading of the Quran by women is essential to 
the reinterpreting of women’s status in Islam …Neither Islamic 
feminism nor secular feminism is an end in itself; they are 
processes that are constantly shifting.”52 
 
 For the purpose of this research, the term Islamic feminism is used as more of a 
description and a starting point for the analysis of the Muslim Sisters. It is not a 
label for a group or an existing movement, it is more of a descriptive identity to 
better explain what a certain group of gender activists aim to accomplish through 
the dissolution of secular feminist ideas and the reconstruction of a set of beliefs 
and actions that may better represent women in predominantly Muslim states 
within the MENA region. As aforementioned, a divide exists between feminism in 
the East and its counterpart in the West. Badran asserts the importance of 
recognizing that  
“there is no East/West fault line. We cannot speak of Islamic 
feminism and the West. Islamic feminism, like Islam today, is in 
the West as it is in the East. Muslim detractors allege that "the 
West" has foisted feminism, first secular and now Islamic, upon 
Muslims to the detriment of Islam and society.”53  
 
Islamic feminism declares the religion of Islam and its scriptures, as the 
only source from which all gender-related interpretations are derived.54 Islamic 
feminism’s naming and positioning has enabled it to operate on several levels, 
further highlighting the commonalities between feminists’ agendas and Islamists’ 
concerns, which occasionally overlap on several noticeable issues such as those 
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pertaining to family law. Islamic feminism could be viewed as an ideology that 
springs from a focus on women’s issues and that is defined by its Islamic 
framework, where Muslim women and Islamist women argue that women’s rights 
may be realized through the implementation of the tools of Islamic sharia and 
jurisprudence.55 Some Islamic feminists may go as far as to declare that these 
‘Islamic’ rights will only be attained within the confines of an Islamic state.56 
However, many Muslim women, who are engaged in ‘women-centric’ movements 
and activities, reject the identity of ‘feminist’ as they are convinced that ‘feminism’ 
was borne out of Western concepts, and therefore would never succeed in the 
traditional and majority-Muslim populations of the Middle East and Asia.57 There 
is no denying that there are no strains of Western influences in the work of 
Islamic feminists, a fact highly evident in works of Muslim and Islamic feminists in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, as they bridge their world with others, to partake in 
an idea of transnational feminism while remaining true to their Muslim or Islamic 
identity.58 On the other hand, the term ‘Islamic’, to others, may imply a deeply 
patriarchal monotheistic religion that is unbending and strict in regards to women 
and their rights.59 Many analysts and feminists view ‘Islamic feminism’ as more of 
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an oxymoron than a growing and evolving theory.60 Muslim women are not the 
only source of antagonism that the term currently faces within the Middle East. 
Feminist and academic Haideh Moghissi argues that the religion of Islam is 
completely incompatible with feminism and women’s rights altogether, as she 
believes Islam is “a religion which is based on gender hierarchy [and] the 
struggle for gender democracy and women’s equality with men.”61 Furthermore, 
due to Islamic feminism’s lack of structure and identity, the idea itself is left 
vulnerable to claims of inauthenticity and harsh theoretical criticism. Moghissi 
explains that the reason for the term’s lack of coherence is that it originated from 
“diasporic feminist academics and researchers of Muslim background living and 
working in the West… [that] excludes core ideas of legal and social equity, 
sexual democracy and women’s control over their sexuality,”62 and not from 
Muslim women within the confines of an Islamic and/or patriarchal state. Analysts 
have also criticized Iran's Islamic feminists for their neglect of other issues 
pertaining to sexuality and gender such as homosexuality and personal 
autonomy, in comparison to the strides taken by Western cultures and 
governments to deal with such concerns.63 At the same time, there is neglect in 
the assessment of American liberal feminists’ failure of not focusing more on 
economic and political concerns; 64  which the Muslim Sisters in Egypt have 
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discussed and argued for during their sessions in Parliament, and as members of 
the MB’s political party. This is due to the MB’s commitment to implementing a 
capitalist system in Egypt to fulfil demands for equal opportunities in education 
and employment.65  
 
Secular Feminism vs. Islamic Feminism 
The languages used by secular feminists and Islamic feminists, in Egypt 
and the Middle East as a whole, sometimes differ greatly and places them at the 
opposing ends of women’s activism and their goals for equality.66 As mentioned 
before, the term ‘secular’ has become associated with Western modernity while 
anything ‘religious’ has been viewed by the West as well as Westernized 
seculars as ‘traditional’ and ‘ancient’. Such connotations have made it difficult for 
secular feminists and Islamic feminists to make significant or lasting contributions 
to the well being of Middle Eastern society. Islamic feminists and the MB 
continue to reject their association with what they perceive as Western feminist 
philosophy and politics seeking to undermine traditional family structures 
inevitably leading to the dissolution of hopes of realizing a united Islamic ūmma.67 
The end result is that Islamic feminists are portrayed as hard-lined Islamists. This 
research study aims to establish whether the Muslim Sisters fall in the category 
of Islamists, or whether they are to be viewed as Islamic feminists. Orientalist 
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views68 are still deeply entrenched in Western discourse regarding Islamic and 
gender studies of the Middle East. The concept of ‘Insider’ and ‘Outsider’, ‘Self’, 
‘Other selves’ or just ‘Others’ are used in relation to women’s movements in the 
Middle East and Asia. 69  Naturally, the history surrounding gender relations, 
women’s emancipation and overall gender-related social movements take place 
against the presence of the ‘Other’. The ‘Other’ in most Middle Eastern societies, 
who inhabit the ‘public’ space, subjecting women to the ‘private’ space of the 
society, is the male presence. This is where the rise of feelings of antagonism 
takes place; when one identity cannot fully evolve or reach its potential in the 
presence of the ‘Other’.70  
Secular feminists seek to establish a society where well-balanced 
individuals may thrive and exist with other gender identities. Whereas Islamic 
feminists, who operate towards the endpoint of creating an Islamic ūmma, are 
more concerned with the establishment of well-balanced families that would lead 
to a balanced Islamic society.71 Moreover, secular feminists in the Middle East 
have been known to separate between the private and public sphere of a 
woman’s existence. Egyptian feminists fought for women’s right to vote, for a 
place in governmental establishments and an acknowledgement of women’s 
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irreplaceable role in Egypt’s public social sphere. 72  However, in regards to 
women’s role in the private sphere, as mothers and wives, advocacy for a 
complementarity position was followed. Islamic feminism, on the other hand, 
defies this separation, and abolishes the idea of women’s different roles in the 
public and private sphere.73 Dr. Heba Raouf Ezzat is an academic who shares 
that common drive with Islamic feminists; she aims to “stretch the ‘private’ into 
the ‘public’, transcending and dissolving the distinctions people have made 
between these realms.”74 This she makes possible through the reinterpretation of 
the Quran and sharia. Women’s rights are, thus, realized within an Islamic 
framework that includes Quranic texts, hadiths and the disciplines of fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence). Ahmed-Ghosh (2008) explains that this combination of religious 
texts defines a woman’s roles in the family unit, in her community and her 
“inclusion in the formation of the nation-state in which the individual is 
subsumed.”75  
As mentioned before, secular feminists focus on the individual to ensure 
the attainment of human rights for each individual within a civil society that would 
ultimately advocate a democratic rule. In theory, Islamic feminism maintains this 
individuality. For example, also in theory, it accepts that women may occupy 
senior positions in an Islamic society, such as heads of state, leaders of 
congregational prayer, judges, and muftis (Muslim scholars who are defined as 
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interpreters of Islamic sharia and fiqh), as the Quran addresses both man and 
woman equally “since all rules, orders and rights are revealed to the male and 
female without discrimination.”76 Furthermore, the Quran unambiguously defines 
women “as the moral and spiritual equals of men and allows them to inherit and 
pass down property.”77 However, according to the majority of Islamic feminists, 
traditional societies rooted in age-old patriarchal customs and traditions have had 
a major influence in distorting these rights. 78  With the growth of feminist 
movements in the Middle East and Asia, and the widening of the political and 
social space for women’s rights and women’s activism, traditional mullas (Islamic 
clergymen educated in Islamic theology) have increased in number, and grown 
more assertive in establishing their patriarchal and misogynistic rule and 
influence. 79  Modernist tools have appeared to challenge their traditionalist 
interpretations of gender differentiation, in the form of Islamic feminism’s 
application of ’ijtihad. Islamic feminism’s methodologies centre on the practice of 
two significant methods: ’ijtihad and tafsīr (interpretation of the Quran).80 The 
process of ’ijtihad enables Islamic feminists to analyze and reread the Quran and 
other texts that are dependent on the Quran, to pinpoint and highlight debates 
where patriarchal interpretations are evident. This process is paramount in the 
ideology of Islamic feminism, which is to advance gender equality through the 
texts on which Islam is based. Freidl asserts the importance of challenging older 
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interpretations of the Quran, through the process of ’ijtihad, as the practice of 
interpretation is transformed into a political process, where those who participate 
in the selection and deciphering of these holy texts were “unavoidably influenced, 
if not out-rightly motivated by the political programs and interests of those who 
control the formulation and dissemination of ideologies.”81 There was - and there 
still is - a monopoly on the profession of ʿulamaʾ by men, who have the authority 
to interpret the Quran, and who are socially and legally accepted to practice 
’ijtihad. In its essence, Islamic feminism questions the process of the creation of 
Islamic knowledge from its inception as a religion to the present day. Such 
practices should be feasible and more welcomed in Islamic societies than secular 
feminism, as Abdullahi an-Naim argues that  
‘Islamic rule and law are not top-down and unchanging; they‘re 
democratic, emerging out of a community consensus that derives 
from individual understandings of God’s laws, without privileging 
the identity and status of the individual interpreter.’82 
 
When one examines the views of Islamic feminism and secular feminism in 
a predominantly patriarchal society and political system, it could be argued that 
Islamic feminism is the middle ground between secular feminism and patriarchal 
Islamism. Islamic feminism questions a women’s place in society through the use 
of Islamic language and reference, thereby appeasing secular feminists’ calls of 
equal representation. At the same time, it also uses the same tools that 
traditional and patriarchal units live by, but with a more modernist view. Badran 
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describes this in-between stance as a kind of “self-positioning that will then 
inform the speech, the action, the writing or the way of life adopted by someone 
who is committed to questioning Islamic epistemology as an expansion of their 
faith position and not a rejection of it.”83 Islamic feminism’s strategic positioning 
enables it to be in a position of negotiation in Islamic and Muslim-dominated 
societies and nation-states. For example, with the increased popularity of the MB 
following the January 25 Revolution, the Muslim Sisters are currently in a strong 
position to negotiate the realisation of women’s rights within the framework of 
Islam and its religious texts. As mentioned earlier, it is yet to be found whether or 
not the Muslim Sisters share the same ideology and plan as the Islamic 
feminists, and whether or not the Muslim Sisters can be identified as Islamic 
feminists or just as Islamists who belong to an Islamist organization. Throughout 
the analysis chapters, the Muslim Sister’s performativity regarding issues of 
gender, such as their social activities, attire and language, is discussed. 
Historical accounts of the Muslim Sisters themselves, as well as academic and 
journalistic research efforts, have highlighted the Muslim Sisters’ persona over 
the past decades, making it easier to identify them and follow their activities. In 
effect, their self-positioning within the Egyptian society and the MB will be 
assessed through the analysis of their speech and language during their political 
assignment in Egypt’s parliament, in regard to women’s legal rights. 84 
Furthermore, Badran asserts that one must understand that “Islamic feminism 
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and Muslims’ secular feminism are not in opposition to each other, rather they 
are mutually reinforcing.”85 The difference between the two is that Muslim secular 
feminists are able to accommodate other identities within their framework, i.e. 
creating a space for the inclusion of Egyptian Copts, as well as other activists 
that identify with other discourses such as nationalist, democratic and Arabist. 
This research effort argues that Islamic feminism and all forms of secular 
feminisms (whether nationalist, liberal, socialist, etc.) belong on the same 
spectrum and are not mutually exclusive. They may, at certain points in time and 
in certain events, clash and contradict, and they may be mutually reinforcing. 
Chapter three - historical background, will disclose both secular and Islamic 
strands of feminism in Egypt united under a nationalistic message, where both 
strands of feminism worked within their bounds to preserve the legitimacy of their 
respective political systems. It can be argued that this process was repeated 
during the 18-day revolution. However, Badran points out that it is always 
beneficial in the practice of theoretical analysis to remember that even though 
those different movements both engage in some form of gender activism and 
along the same spectrum, “women’s moorings in divergent ideologies remain 
significant.”86 
 
The Appeal of Islamic Feminism  
What makes Islamic feminism, and its producers and users, worth 
following is that it appeals to many different strands of politically active women in 
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the Middle East and Asia.87  Cooke asserts the importance of positioning in 
bridging the gap between women with an Islamic image, and those who choose 
not to identify with a religion or one self, as she explains that self-positioning 
helps understand how “women ‘claim,’ articulate, and practice feminism within 
Islam, getting beyond issues of identity.”88 Islamic feminism equips feminists and 
gender activists with the necessary tools to effectively guide the empowerment of 
women under the growing Islamist trends and traditional patriarchal societies, 
towards laying the groundwork for the achievement of democratic principles and 
the safeguarding of equal rights for women, through the use of Islamic principles. 
Islamic feminism makes the ideas of democracy and modernity conceivable 
through the use of Islamic language and symbols.89 While feminism may be 
identified by many different strands and ideologies, feminists that follow an 
Islamic doctrine claim one paramount identity: the Islamic one. Cooke explains 
that the label of Islamic feminism does not describe  
“a fixed identity, but [it] create(s) a new, contingent subject position. 
This location confirms belonging in a religious community while 
allowing for activism on behalf of and with other women… to be 
feminists without fear that they be accused of being westernized and 
imitative.”90 
 
Further, the term “Islamic” combines people that associate themselves with the 
terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamist’ and that have assigned themselves to questioning 
current Islamic jurisprudence as an “expansion of their faith position and not as a 
                                            
87 Due to its potential to resonate in the Muslim majority found in the Middle East, dozens of 
analysts that have been described as secular feminists or Islamists or Muslim feminists have 
written about Islamic feminism and have engaged other feminists in trying to assess its place and 
impact within Middle Eastern societies. For examples of those debates, refer to Moghadam 
(2004), Moghadam (2002), Ahmed-Ghosh (2008), Bahi (2011). 
88Badran (2005), 15. 
89 Hymowitz and Badran, “Islamic Feminism: What's in a Name?” 
90 Cooke, 60.  
 45 
rejection of it.” 91  Islamic feminists view Islam as a world religion that 
acknowledges women’s life-cycles, and the different roles and responsibilities 
bestowed upon them at different times of their lives. For each role, a woman 
must be recognized and respected under the banner of Islam.92  
 Nevertheless, the term Islamic feminism is yet to be fully accepted, 
especially amongst those intellectuals whose research efforts and writings tackle 
that same paradigm: creating a space for negotiation, understanding and 
compromise for gender activists in a largely patriarchal and Islamic setting. 
Experts and academics on the subject of women’s rights within Islam, such as 
Egypt’s Ezzat and Kazim, have rejected the label of ‘Islamic feminists’, yet again, 
due to the Western origin of the term feminism. In fact, Ezzat argues that 
feminists are “secularists who are fighting male domination…conflict is the main 
concept of their theory,”93 and in so doing, they neglect what better serves 
women’s agency in the Middle East. She further argues that the space, in which 
secular Egyptian feminists mobilized, was quite different from that of any Islamist 
activist. The ‘holistic space’ for secularists was the nation-state, whereas for an 
Islamist such as herself, it will forever remain the Islamic polity - the ūmma.94 Yet, 
one can argue that ‘Islamic feminist’ is the most suitable label to describe these 
women and their work. A professor in Cairo University, Ezzat has dedicated her 
work to re-examining hadiths and Islamic laws that concern Muslim women’s 
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rights, by assessing their authenticity and the reliability of their sources. Her 
analysis includes the examination of the historical incidents or cases in which 
these sharia laws were created or from which they were derived. Since Islamic 
jurisprudence or fiqh came to be in the ninth century, it has been heavily 
influenced by patriarchal rhetoric, which is evident in the contemporary sharia 
laws to which Muslims worldwide refer and follow. Ezzat attributes that decline of 
Islamic rhetoric, that supports pro-women Islamic practices and teachings, to the 
deterioration of women’s living standards and social standing in some Islamic 
societies.95 She argues that what made the Muslim women’s plight seem even 
drearier was the Western vision of equality that is incompatible with Islamic 
societies. Ezzat explains that as Islamic literature started to embrace and adopt 
Western literature well into the modern era, the Western concepts of feminism 
strove to eliminate the physical, psychological and organic differences between 
men and women, as the very reason that held back women’s right and freedoms, 
and not the patriarchal interpretations of a religion that had established women’s 
rights over 1400 years ago.96 Ezzat believes that it is the duty of any Islamic 
thinker to draw on the concept of equality found in Islam that ‘is characterized by 
moderation’ rooted in the perceptions and practices of ‘Tawhid (unity) and the 
presence of disagreement.’97  
 In addition to Ezzat’s efforts to reassess Quranic interpretations 
pertaining to women’s rights, Kazim advocates Islam as the only context within 
                                            
95 Heba Raouf Ezzat, al-Mar’a wal ‘amal ’al-Siyasi: al Ru’iya al-Islamiyya [Women and political 
action: Islamic vision] (Washington D.C.: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1995), 60. 
96 Ibid., 60. 
97 Ibid., 62. 
 47 
which women can attain their full rights. Kazim is known for her Islamic activism 
and for continually defending the veil in her weekly column. Her access to media 
enables her to discuss issues ranging from art and music to Islamic doctrines. 
When studying Islamic feminism, Badran advises to differentiate between Islamic 
feminism as an ‘explicitly declared project - as an analytical term,’ and Islamic 
feminism as an identity.98 So, for example, while some female analysts may see 
Kazim’s work as advocating the practice of women’s equality and social justice 
guided by revised Quranic interpretations as Islamic feminism, other analysts, 
such as Ezzat, describe their efforts “as an Islamic project of rereading the 
Quran, women-centred readings of religious texts, or ‘scholarship-activism’.”99  
 
Islamic Feminism and Egypt: Its Relation with the State and the MB  
Islamic feminists believe that it is within their rights to take part in the 
politics that shape their country’s laws that have direct effects on the livelihood of 
women.100 Arab and Islamist politics should not be confined to men, but it should 
reopen the doors that were opened once before to women’s participation; when 
women had given their vote (bayʿa) to the Prophet over 1500 years ago.101 A 
generous amount of research highlights the correlation and causation between 
the destructive practices of the Egyptian regime and their effects on empowering 
women politically in both secular and Islamist circles, with the latter group 
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suffering more due to their MB affiliation.102 Similarly, defining modernity and 
modernization as a Western construct, in the face of the growing phenomenon of 
political Islam, has pushed international politics down a course of action where 
women’s rights and livelihood are used by both the West and the Middle East to 
navigate the political minefield of human rights and the Islamizing of state; and 
ultimately to assert their dominance and power on the global scene. As for state 
policies, nothing has been more detrimental to the feminist cause as the thriving 
of authoritarian practices in Egypt. 
  
The State and/or Ruling Elite  
Prominent writers, such as Karam, have extensively covered the debate 
about the effects of authoritarianism on civil security organizations and human 
rights. Karam explained the correlation of the unhealthy relationship between the 
Egyptian regime, and political and civil society organizations; which house 
Islamic and secular feminists, through the application of Gramscian103 realist 
theories. 104  Similarly, many analysts have discussed the phenomenon of 
electoral authoritarianism in the Middle East, where autocratic or authoritarian 
rulers employ democratic tools to maintain a level of legitimacy while their power 
remains uncontested and unchanging.105 
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Initially, this qualitative piece of work intended to explain the nature of 
female political participation in the MB by focusing on their activities prior, during 
and after the parliamentary elections of 2000, 2005 and 2010, seeing that the 
number of MB female members running for seats in Parliament had increased to 
eighteen women. However, with the arrest and forceful alienation of MB officials 
and supporters from the polling stations in October 2010, none of the MB 
representatives were elected. With the January 25, 2011 revolution and the 
dissolution of the authoritarian regime that previously controlled the dynamics of 
Egypt’s politics, the activities of the MB and the Muslim Sisters will be analyzed 
in the new political climate: in the absence of a constrictive authoritarian 
presence. Following the 18-day uprising, the SCAF temporarily stepped in during 
Egypt’s phase of governmental transition to fill in the power vacuum until a new 
president was elected. Consequently, with the election of a MB member, Morsy 
has carried himself much like an authoritarian ruler claiming that his imposition of 
strict laws will protect the goals of the new emerging state of Egypt. 106 Since this 
case study of the Muslim Sisters cannot be detached from the political climate, a 
base of realist theories to explain the nature of the Egyptian government is 
needed for this research.107 This sets the stage for a presentation and analysis of 
several obstacles that affect democratic practices such as the implementation of 
a nation-wide human rights agenda. A focus on the role of Egypt’s authoritarian 
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political system is needed throughout the analysis chapters regarding the Muslim 
Sisters, and how this system facilitates or inhibits new agents and their forward-
thinking attitude, with the help of a religious group that was previously thought of 
as oppressive.  
Mirroring the spectrum of Islamic feminism and secular forms of feminism 
in the Middle Eastern region, authoritarianism and democracy are not mutually 
exclusive, and also exist on the same continuum of types of rule and 
government. The concept of electoral authoritarianism encompasses both 
competitive authoritarian regimes and non-competitive regimes.108 In the case of 
Egypt, it may be perceived as a competitive authoritarian regime where 
opposition parties compete for power. Nonetheless, in the case of the MB, it has 
been declared an illegal entity due to its religious characteristics, thereby 
eliminating any chance of an effective and competitive multiparty election in 
Egypt. Egypt was seen as a non-competitive authoritarian regime practicing an 
extreme form of electoral authoritarianism, where competition is unfair and 
seriously crippled by an absence of free elections as voter intimidation and fraud 
were common practices. 109  According to Levitsky and Way’s definition, a 
competitive authoritarian regime lacks at least one of the following significant 
markers of a democracy: “(1) free elections; (2) broad protection of civil liberties; 
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and (3) a reasonably even playing field.” 110  Egypt is a non-competitive 
authoritarian regime where:  
“(1) major candidates are excluded (via bans, imprisonment, or 
exile); (2) repression or legal control makes it impossible for 
opposition parties to sustain public campaigns; [and] (3) fraud is so 
massive that there is virtually no observable relationship between 
public preferences and electoral results.”111 
  
However, during the decades of the Egyptian regime’s oppressive practices, the 
MB and its female members continued to participate in elections and provide an 
opposing voice to the regime, albeit in a limited manner. Lindberg explains that 
“by choosing to contest elections and accept the outcome of that contest, 
opposition groups greatly enhance the probability of the regimes to become 
democratic.” 112  Brumberg argues that the Egyptian regime may present a 
“degree of acquiescence and sometimes even support from both secular and 
some Islamist opposition groups.”113 Such agreements prolong the validity and 
life of liberal autocratic regimes and their methods, at the expense of democratic 
practices and women’s rights and issues.  
Undemocratic practices of statist repression by the authoritarian Egyptian 
regime were regularly enforced through the oppressive use of the law and the 
military. Despite the regime’s best efforts, however, the Islamic organizations 
remained popular.114 Their popularity is due to their taking up the role of the 
failing government by funding and supporting the majority population, the lower 
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classes, through charitable and social activities.115 Such popular backing posed a 
threat to the regime’s stability, creating a power struggle. It drove the state to use 
legal and military tools to break down and dissolve the MB’s power and influence. 
To reiterate the MB’s success in the Egyptian society, Landman states that 
studies on “social movements demonstrate how changing political opportunities 
intersect with movement activity, as well as how the time-dependent dynamics of 
social movements can be described as a ‘cycle of protest’.”116 State power is 
seen to overpower movements like the MB, and all but ignore feminist 
movements. Feminist movements have gained ground on the political and 
developmental levels, but such advancements were only allowed to take place 
with the consent and control of the state.117 After Egypt’s independence in 1922, 
Egyptian nationalists came to power, and the feminist movements that operated 
under the nationalist discourse were all but forgotten, as all forces were focused 
on building a new nation. The disappearance of political support led to the 
creation of several feminist organizations by the women themselves. 
The Egyptian government’s authoritative practices can be traced back to 
Nasser who took control of Al-Azhar to gain religious legitimacy as a powerful 
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tool to fight off the MB’s popularity.118 The combination of the leading religious 
institution of Sunni teachings in the Middle East and a patriarchal rule, further 
cemented the tradition of manipulation of religious rhetoric through the 
continuation of patriarchal politics. It was also during the Nasser era that women 
were given full political rights, thanks to the persistent efforts of several secular 
feminist movements at the time.119 That meant that all Egyptians - men and 
women - were to have the right to vote, be treated equally under the law, and had 
the same labor rights irrespective of gender. However, Islamic feminists may 
have a better chance in achieving some kind of political autonomy through 
operating within an Islamic framework. By using the same tools and constructs of 
religion and tradition set forth by lawmakers and traditionalists, Islamic feminists 
may break through the wall that divides women’s rights (as a Western concept) 
from a society rooted in Islamic ideals. By engaging Egypt’s authoritarian 
structure through the use of the same language, idea and symbols of Islam, 
Islamic feminists may create a common political ground from which other agents, 
such as the state and the MB, can negotiate the reformulation of women’s status 
regarding their social and political rights. In effect, the agency of Islamic feminists 
has been viewed “not as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but 
as a capacity for action that historically specific relations of subordination enable 
and create.”120 The problem lies in the lesser-developed public laws found in 
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Islamic jurisprudence in comparison to private laws, where the shortcomings of 
public law is due to overbearing secular authoritarian regimes in Islamic 
societies, which strove to suppress the reinterpretation and innovation of Islamic 
fiqh and jurisprudence; and which depends on political and social freedoms. The 
study and growth of private laws continued, as it did not represent an immediate 
threat to the power of these authoritarian regimes. The association of Islam with 
the ideology of feminism may be more appealing to Muslim women, as it would 
enable them to criticize the actions of the state that may appear detrimental to 
women’s rights, through the use of traditional language and culture that are 
dependent on Islamic rhetoric. If Egypt’s religious scholars and Muslim citizens 
were allowed to discuss and improve Islamic fiqh, women’s rights would be 
realized and protected, under the direction and supervision of an Islamic 
framework. It is therefore the duty of Islamic feminists, and Muslims in general, 
not to abide by authoritarian regimes and their laws, and to find a safe space - 
i.e. a way to engage society without offending the traditional segment - to discuss 
the alleviation of women’s laws and its shortcomings through the realization of 
women’s rights through the use of Islam and its teachings. 121 Such a tactic will 
allow the patriarchal society to more readily accept and support the new status of 
women in society. Inevitably, such acceptance and a process of dialogue will 
result and lead different concepts to overlap and integrate. As Ezzat explains, the 
concept of justice becomes in sync with that of equality; similar to understanding 
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the definitions of one’s right and one’s duty, thereby ensuring a safer and more 
equitable passage towards the realization of women’s rights.122 
Islamic feminism as an idea, appeared in lieu of the Islamist wave in 
Egypt, when people grew disillusioned with the failure of secular rule that did not 
succeed in improving Egypt’s deteriorating economy post-Nasser and the 1956 
and 1967 wars. From the 1970’s onwards, the nation’s economic strife gave way 
to many socio-economic problems such as an increase in crime rates and drug 
use.123 Islamist rhetoric grew popular in the 1970s, evident in the number of 
Islamist movements in Egypt’s political and social atmosphere at the time, and 
with the resurrection of the MB and the growth of other militant Islamist 
movements.124  
This new Islamist discourse presented the disillusioned majority with 
another option of restoring its ailing nation, and that could unite people who 
viewed Egypt as a nation and as an ūmma, i.e. Egyptians who were bound to 
one religion and those who had pledged their loyalty to one nation. Egypt began 
moving towards a more conservative atmosphere, evident in the increasing 
number of women adopting the veil, as part of their everyday routine and their 
newfound Islamized identity. This conservative atmosphere had adverse effects 
on women’s lives; it opened areas for women that were previously ‘men-only’ 
areas, such as mosques, academic theological debates and discussions of 
Islamic law.125 An unprecedented number of Egyptian women at that time had 
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succeeded in attaining higher degrees and were entering the workforce as 
competent contributors to Egypt’s economy. The combination of Islamist currents 
and education equipped Egyptian women with new ways to further promote 
women’s equality.126 Islamic feminism seemed to fit the mould, as it was the only 
tool acceptable within a conservative, largely Muslim population. Islamic 
feminism was seen as a force against both the aged traditionalist patriarchy that 
still ruled Egypt, and the new modern and Western influences. 
Egyptian political history attests to the successful use of symbols, political 
and religious rhetoric in appealing to the masses. In Egypt, with the MB’s glorified 
message: “Islam is the solution”, symbols and the daily usage of ‘patriotism’,127 
‘Pan-Arabism’ and ‘Islam’; the idea of cultural influences is relevant, integral in 
fact, to the study of Middle Eastern political culture. The MB dominated the civil 
society as they were dependent on luring supporters through the use of cultural 
content and symbols. This can also be described by Gramscian concepts of 
“counter-hegemonic struggle and war of position, and culture/identity oriented 
new social movements.” 128 Most of the MB’s informal gatherings comprised of 
MB members and MB supporters take place in the private sphere, and are 
mobilized by the Muslim Sisters. For each nation-state, there exists a range of 
symbols and ‘rhetorical practices’ that plays a big part in the mobilisation of the 
people for or against the government in question129. Post-structuralist theory130 
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affirms this idea; it maintains that cultural influences and tools are responsible for 
determining the nature or purpose of organizations, governmental entities and 
even economies. The MB’s assigned gender-specific roles in the labour force, 
and the gender attachment to both the public (men’s domain), and private 
(women’s domain) spheres will also be considered. Again, with regards to the 
MB, it is vital to evaluate its members’ views and understanding of a secular 
government and regime structure and how those serve their political message. 
From an Islamist point of view, and in accordance with a historical standpoint, 
citizens are loyal to the concept of the ūmma and not to the state.131 They pledge 
their allegiance to the law of sharia and not to the president or legislative 
assembly. For Islamists, din wa dawla (religion and state) are united, where one 
cannot exist without the other. However, some reformist thinkers have attempted 
to shift from the concept of din wa dawla, to defining Islam as a religion 
contingent upon the existence of din wa ‘umma (religion and community). 132 This 
re-definition has served Islamist entities and political parties well in disengaging 
from nationalistic sentiments and shows of patriotism “in the name of the ummah 
and to understand the suffering of Muslims in other lands as their own.”133 In 
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effect, Islamist political parties exist to promote the Islamic way of life of 
implementing sharia laws rather than the laws of a secular state.134 However, the 
reassessment of Islamic texts as part of the Islamic feminists’ aim to highlight the 
likelihood of patriarchal contextualization of Islamic texts and hadiths which may 
have been re-interpreted differently with each passing generation; results in a 
negative reaction from the Islamic community because of the secular Western 
image that is attached to such terms.  
The MB’s history stands as a testament to the success of Islamist 
movements in adopting democratic methods and tools such as civil society 
organizations and political parties.135 Karam applies Foucault’s analysis of power 
and Gramsci’s theory in regards to the relationship between unequal powers, and 
the continuous interaction between them. Karam’s book details the same primary 
actors this paper seeks to analyze. The focus of her argument points to one type 
of relationship, however: 
“It is the relationship between unequals that is important for our analysis 
of the Egyptian situation. Neither Islamists, feminists nor the state 
actually share equal power relations…When analyzing the relationship 
between Islamists and the state, both forces are effectively playing an 
active role. The state dominates (in the sense of force and coercion) 
this relationship. Islamists, through their successful social programmes 
and political alliances, are simultaneously hegemonizing political 
discourses of legitimacy, as well as attempting to Islamize state and 
society.”136 
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In effect, the ruling party and the elite society that supports it are the ones 
holding the proverbial stick. The carrot is represented by the façade of a 
democratic society, eagerly reinforced by other political parties who hope to 
dominate the political arena. In the end, the party that shines the brightest will 
unseat the elite-governed NDP. In 1995, the MB decided to participate in future 
legislative elections. Since that important decision, the MB has been the target of 
the state’s continuous oppressive tactics. According to Karam, the state’s 
reaction can be best described in Gramscian terms where “state discourse vis-à-
vis Islamism is dominant ... In other words, state repression underlines the state’s 
inability to obtain Islamists’ consent to the status quo.”137 The ruling body and the 
type of government in place directly affected the successes and failures that 
women activists have made during Egypt’s modern history. However, it is yet to 
be seen how women’s rights in general and those of the Muslim Sisters in 
particular, will fare under a MB-dominated government and president.  
 
The Muslim Sisters: Islamic Feminists or Plain Islamists?  
This research work sets out to determine whether the Muslim Sisters are 
empowered within the ranks of the patriarchal MB and its political party the FJP. 
More specifically, in regards to female empowerment, what do the Muslim Sisters 
perceive as being empowered within the Islamist doctrine and practice of the MB 
and FJP? There is evidence that Islamist women have begun to question male 
dominance, as they believe that this dominance surpasses the limits of what is 
                                            
137 Karam (1998), 15. 
 60 
considered the right Islamic boundaries. Abdel-Latif’s and Ottaway’s research 
work138 on the women in the MB before the revolution, revealed that the Muslim 
Sisters were questioning their place and status within the MB, thereby 
transgressing the bounds of what the MB considers to be the correct Islamic 
parameters. The Muslim Sisters pragmatically chose to work outside the margins 
of a feminist movement and within an Islamist movement in the hope of achieving 
their demands of better representation and opportunities within traditional 
parameters. Women in the MB were no longer accepting of being relegated to 
the side-lines of the MB, with the sole aim of assisting the Brothers from a 
separate unit affiliated with the MB hierarchy, but not completely part of it.139  
In the past, the authoritarian Egyptian state impeded both the growth of 
feminism and Islamist movements. In the present time, the positioning of the MB 
and the Sisters has changed within society and state. No longer a banned 
movement and armed with a political party, the Muslim Sisters are struggling 
between their affiliation to a powerful Islamist movement and their descriptive 
representation within the Parliament. The following chapters will analyze the 
Muslim Sisters’ public and private roles as both the women of the MB and as 
Egyptian female citizens; as well as the Muslim Sisters’ substantive and/or 
descriptive presentation within the MB/FJP and as MPs in Egypt’s Parliament. 
The Muslim Sisters reached Parliament with four women representing the 
FJP, significantly larger than any other party or alliance of secular or religious 
agendas. In the traditionalist society and state, the Muslim Sisters have fulfilled 
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Egyptian women’s desires in achieving competent female participation within 
Parliament. In effect, the Muslim Sisters were looked upon - and viewed 
themselves - as a descriptive representation to the plight of the Egyptian woman. 
However, during their short period of participation in Parliament, they have been 
accused of being nothing more than a symbolic representation, which usually 
occurs when the current government or governing entity seeks to include 
subgroups and minorities in its attempt to ‘verify’ its legitimacy and democratic 
standing.140 Despite the fact that the Muslim Sisters are part of the vast religious 
majority in Egypt and part of the most powerful social movement, the Sisters 
have found their voices within a secular space and with the use of democratic 
tools. In other words, it can be argued that the Sisters have attained equal status 
within their national or secular society but not within the MB. However, their 
newfound positioning with society and their descriptive representation in 
Parliament does not necessarily amount to substantive representation or make 
them advocates for women’s rights. Tohidi warns that “spiritual feminism and 
faith-based feminists cannot be much different form religious fundamentalists if 
they do not respect the freedom of choice and impose their version of feminism 
on secular, laic and atheist feminists.”141 Further, what is very troubling in the rise 
of any religious ideology is its possible intolerance of other views, which will 
inevitably result in another form of totalitarian rule. The same could be said for 
the Muslim Sisters’ brand of feminism or social mobilization, whether Islamic 
feminist or Islamist. What the Muslim Sisters choose to adopt from the range of 
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political and social issues during their roles as MP’s and FJP members will 
determine their level of willingness to revert back to the basics of human respect 
and dignity, and band together with the rest of Egypt’s female activist in fighting 
for women’s freedom of choice and empowerment. 
The interplay of state power, MB’s popularity and competence in both the 
economic and political field and Islamist feminists’ newfound confidence and 
assertion of their message of women’s justice and equality within the Egyptian 
society, has paved the way for the Muslim Sisters to achieve ‘Islamic women’s 
rights’ in their country. In the document, ʿaqidat al-Jama’a, the organization’s 
doctrine, which was created in the 1930s with the formation of the MB, the 
citizenship rights of women were stipulated alongside those of men. The 
document discussed the family unit, the private space of the home, the public 
space of the Egyptian society and economic and political institutions. This 
doctrine later became a “measure of the Brotherhood's ability to leave its cultural 
mark on secular society.”142 While the MB constitution did not shun women to 
their homes to work dutifully and solely on raising future generations, It did, 
however, limit women’s political and social participation, thereby providing 
women within the organization with an active yet limited role of engaging the 
MB’s vision of “shared participation of co-religionists as they held out the promise 
of a new utopia.”143 
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When assessing the Muslim Sisters’ stance within the MB, the FJP and 
their social activities; the Sisters’ identity could be seen as: 1) Islamic feminists, 
trying to achieve women’s equality within the boundaries of Islam and the rights it 
bestows on Muslim women, or 2) Islamists seeking to further the MB’s success 
and achievements without necessarily voicing a clear women’s rights agenda. 
The anaylsis chapters four through nine, will examine why the Muslim 
Sisters are not assigned to senior positions within the MB, however it is important 
to note at this point that, currently, the Muslim Sisters are absent from the higher 
echelons of the MB structure.144 According to the male members of the MB, one 
major reason for this relates to security concerns posed by previous authoritarian 
regimes in the form of police crackdowns and arrests that targeted MB 
members.145 However, after the January 25 revolution and the MB’s new public 
role, that reason no longer applies. Will the MB, then, support the advancement 
of the Sisters within the organization and political party, or will the MB fail to 
integrate the Muslim Sisters into the MB’s organizational structure? If the Sisters 
choose to adopt the ideas and practices on which Islamic feminism relies, they 
could become the pioneers of such an ideology and transform into a movement 
in Egypt. In effect, the Sisters’ position of power within the MB may prove pivotal 
in regards to the advancement of Islamic feminism, where as Badran explains “it 
is not so much that the message is discredited (as it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to pretend that gender equality and social justice are alien to Islam), but 
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the messenger.”146 The position of Islamic feminism as the ‘in-between’ ground of 
the opposing views, secular feminism and patriarchal Islamism, has brought it 
closer to the plight of secular feminists due to their shared goal of attaining 
women’s equality and due to their common challenge. It is still unclear whether 
the Muslim Sisters call for women’s equality, or for the expansion and 
advancement of the MB. One has to bear in mind that Islamic feminism has yet 
to transform into a social movement as its secular counterparts have done in the 
past.147 The development of Islamic feminist theory is still on-going, with tafsīr at 
the core of its message, and no clear indication as to whether it will succeed 
where secular feminism has faltered in Egyptian politics.148  
 
Al-Ghazali: Islamic Feminist or Islamist? 
The idea of Islamic feminism has existed alongside the activities of the 
Muslim Sisters and their Division. Yet, Islamic feminism’s first encounter with the 
MB can be embodied in the anomaly that was Zaynab al-Ghazali. A former 
member of the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU), al-Ghazali left to create her own 
organization titled the Muslim Ladies Association (MLA) because she did not 
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agree with the EFU’s secular and Western-influenced principles regarding 
women’s rights under nationalist movements. Al-Ghazali’s language and self-
positioning regarding women’s activism changed throughout her life. Cooke 
points out that she “positioned herself as gender-neutral Islamist in her Qur’anic 
exegesis (al-Ghazali 1994), but as an Islamic feminist in her prison memoirs (al-
Ghazali, 1986).”149 
Al-Ghazali was an exception to the majority of the Muslim Sisters, if not all 
of them. She started her political and social career by breaking off from a secular 
feminist organization to start her own Islam-centric women’s organization. Her 
beginnings indicate that she had always focused on women’s rights and female 
empowerment. Her resistance to pooling her MLA resources with that of al-
Banna’s may have been indicative of the divergent views and agendas that the 
MLA and Muslim Sisters may have had. Another indication of al-Ghazali’s 
feminist leanings was her decision to temporarily join forces with that of the Lajna 
al-Nisa’iyya lil-Muqawama al-Sha‘abiyya (The Women’s Committee for Popular 
Resistance), in the wake of the 1952 Canal Zone violent incident. 150  This 
combining of resources saw al-Ghazali cooperate with communist and feminist 
Inji Aflatun, as well as male nationalists, for a common cause. 151 Yet, her use of 
religious rhetoric, such as issues of morality, one’s duty to God and responsibility 
towards an Islamic ūmma, is revealing of her Islamist persona. Her speeches 
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were void of concern with issues of female equality. However, Lewis insists that 
al-Ghazali’s life mission was feminist in nature, dedicated to establishing equal 
rights for women within an Islamic society, but her dislike of any movement or 
sentiment, that was influenced by Western forces, made her reject feminist 
movements in Egypt as imperialist.152 With Nasser as president and the eventual 
closing down of most non-profit organizations, al-Ghazali was left with no choice 
but to join the MB’s cause as a Muslim Sister and to continue her work as a 
preacher and political activist under the banner of the MB, which inevitably 
resulted in her arrest and torture. As the MB continued to be banned and 
targeted by the authorities, al-Ghazali worked to ensure that the MB continued its 
work in guiding the Egyptian society towards the vision of an Islamic ūmma solely 
governed by Islamic sharia. Yet, Cooke points out that al-Ghazali’s thoughts, as 
expressed in her writings, fluctuated depending on the topic at hand. For 
example, in her publications that focused on the Quran and its teachings, she 
positioned herself as an Islamist, whereas in her memoirs of her days in Nasser’s 
prison she asserted herself as an Islamic feminist.153 
With her release from jail in 1971, she continued her da‘wa activities, 
preaching to and advising the Muslim Sisters and women in general, to abandon 
Western concepts of job equality and career plans, and to focus on building a 
strong core for the Islamic society that will inevitably become a reality in Egypt.154 
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154 Soroya Duval, “New Veils and New Voices: Islamist Women’s Groups in Egypt” in Women and 
Islamization: Contemporary Dimensions of Discourses on Gender Relations, eds. Karin Ask and 
Marit Tjomsland (Oxford: Oxford International Publishers,1998), 54 and Lewis, 3.  
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Al-Ghazali argued that women need not succeed in both the private and public 
spheres; arguing that only a man, as decreed by God, can bear such 
responsibilities. Essentially, she did not comprehend why women wanted to 
“carry the double burden of family and work simultaneously.”155 As opposed to 
Islamic feminists like Ezzat and Kazim, al-Ghazali did not make it a priority to 
contest existing Islamic fiqh to challenge patriarchal language, influences and 
their dated Islamic interpretations, to liberate women and present them with their 
legitimate Islamic rights. Nevertheless, all three women viewed women’s issues 
through an Islamic lens and they have all been politically active by joining 
demonstrations, giving talks, organizing protests and writing politically infused 
articles and editorials. They have campaigned first and foremost for Islam, but 
also dedicated a large portion of their energy to women-related issues.156 Al-
Ghazali focused on the ways Muslim women and the Muslim Sisters can help the 
MB guide Egypt’s mostly Muslim - but rather secular - society, towards an Islamic 
way of life and governance. She asserted, in congruence with the MB’s 
ideologies, that a woman’s priority is that of her home, and when her duties have 
been fulfilled and her children have grown, only then could she consider joining 
the workforce, if needed.157 Mahmood’s research on da‘iyat (women engaged in 
the da‘wa activities) like al-Ghazali, reveal that they do not rely on feminist 
language or any notion of equality, but they do invoke the language of ‘rights’ to 
justify their access to sacred knowledge, where the female bearer of these rights 
                                            
155 Zaynab al-Ghazali, “Al-mara’a al-muslima: ila ayn?” [The Muslim Women: Where to?] In 
Humum al mara'a al-muslima wa al- da‘iya Zaynab ai-Ghazali. [The Woes of the Muslim Woman 
and of the da‘iya Zaynab al-Ghazali] edited by Ibn al-Hashimi (Cairo: Dar al-I‘tisam, 1990), 115. 
156 Karam, 206.  
157 Fernea, 241. 
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is not regarded as being on equal footing with her male counterpart, but more of 
a complementary being.”158 Also, da‘iyat, like al-Ghazali, do not engage in the 
argument against the prohibition of women’s delivery of the Friday prayer and 
sermon, or whether women should serve as Imams in mosques; much like other 
Islamic feminists in Iran, Pakistan or the Maghreb region.159 In contrast, Ezzat’s 
MA thesis, aimed to prove - through the reliance on Islamic jurisprudence and 
fiqh - that women will be able to occupy the highest possible positions within a 
society, as long as they have the necessary qualifications. Essentially, she 
demonstrated that Islamic jurisprudence values a person’s qualifications rather 
than their gender.160 
Al-Ghazali’s discussions and publications rarely made any reference to 
the drawbacks brought on by reliance on harmful traditions and norm in areas of 
human development, that have a negative effect on women and children in rural 
and urban areas. Moreover, al-Ghazali did not call for the Muslim Sisters to run 
for governmental positions or nominate themselves in parliamentary elections. 
She did, however, point out the important and irreplaceable role of women as 
campaign members and voters, encouraging women to engage in Egypt’s 
political sphere by voting for MB members who will strive to reinstate Islamic 
sharia in Egypt from within the government. 161  Nevertheless, al-Ghazali did 
champion women’s rights in certain aspects; when she sent a memorandum to 
                                            
158 Mahmood (2005), 71. 
159 Middle Eastern feminists such as Fatima Mernissei and Haideh Moghissi continually urge 
women to contest a women’s right to lead in prayers or address both men and women in Friday 
sermons as an Imam.  
160 Karam, 223.  
161 Lewis, 45. 
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the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, demanding that girls receive an education.162 
However, such an initiative is not indicative of al-Ghazali’s desire to improve the 
lives of girls and to empower them with the necessary tools to succeed in the 
workforce. Al-Ghazali insisted that women be well educated, especially in 
matters of religion; as the lessons and virtues of the Quran and Islam will prove 
beneficial to the social and political activities of the MB.163  
 Al-Ghazali has been called a pioneer of Islamic feminism164 and has been 
continually referred to as such, but in the absence of a threatening rule and 
government; al-Ghazali spent the remainder of her life relaying more of an 
Islamist agenda than that of an Islamic feminist. As many Muslim Sisters looked 
up to her as a leading figure, one must question whether the Muslim Sisters 
themselves seek equal rights for women and more representation in Egypt’s 
parliament and government, or they are wholly dedicated to the MB’s vision, 
even if it deters opportunities for women’s advancement in Egypt’s political and 
social participation. Islamic feminist or not, al-Ghazali remains, to many Islamic 
feminists as well as Islamist women, an idol. To Lewis, al-Ghazali’s blend of 
“conservatism, nationalism, feminism and spirituality may be the guiding principle 
of many Islamist women today.”165 Fittingly, when al-Ghazali was asked what she 
would do if she came to power, she replied that under Islamic rule Muslim 
women “would retreat to their natural domain as nurturers of the nation’s men.”166 
                                            
162 Marcotte, 64. 
163 Cooke (1995), 152. 
164 Refer to Lewis. 
165 Lewis, 2. 
166 Ghada Talhami, The Mobilization of Muslim Women in Egypt. (Gainesville: University of 
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 In respect to gender studies and the assessment of female participation in 
political roles and as part of political parties, academics should beware of 
allowing normative theories and behaviors to take over the analysis of female 
political actors, assuming that when female politicians or MPs are involved, 
women’s issues will be represented and defended. Still, here exists a very 
delicate and intricate relationship between descriptive and substantive 
representation of women in politics, where many interplaying factors and causes 
indirectly build the inroads that female political sectors may or may not chose to 
utilize. This research’s focus on the Muslim Sisters and the female 
representatives i.e. a critical set of actors; will work towards untangling and better 
understanding women’s roles in an Islamist movement and society. The choice of 
methodology and tools applied throughout any research directly affects the 
outcome. As such, the next chapter will explain the applied methods and will 
clarify the rationale behind these choices.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 Methodology  
 
The methodology of this paper is primarily qualitative in nature and 
depends on several practices including: discourse analysis 167  (e.g. journal 
articles, newspapers), content analysis (books, press releases, websites) and 
face-to-face interviews with four categories of subjects: politically active female 
MB members, non-politically active female MB members, politically active male 
MB members and non-politically active MB male members. In addition, political 
analysts and experts in the MB were interviewed, to gather information and 
predictions on the future of the MB in the post-Mubarak era (in particular, its 
newly formed party and its stance on female political participation).  
Qualitative research was most suited for the topic at hand, as it assists in 
examining ‘why and how’ social action occurs in a certain time and place. This 
research assesses and critiques scholarly articles published in the field of Middle 
East politics, as well as the work of authors known to dominate the field of 
gender studies and/or activism within the Middle Eastern region. This dissertation 
is problem-driven;168 it questions the state of female participation in the MB and 
aims to explain it through analyzing the challenges and drawbacks of the case 
study presented in the Muslim Sisters. Throughout this research endeavour, the 
                                            
167 Discourse analysis of texts and interviews during this research effort will not be conducted in 
its most literal sense, i.e. analysis of sources will not include an analysis of language or pictures 
or media used in the sources, and there will be no assessment of hidden meanings within those 
texts. Discourse analysis of sources, in the political sense, will include assessing the variables 
and actors in question - the MB organization and its relationship to, and impression of the Muslim 
Sisters - by connecting different theories that are political in nature. 
168 For a better explanation of problem driven research as opposed to theory-based research, 
refer to Timothy J. Ellis and Yair Levy, “Framework of Problem-Based Research: A Guide for 
Novice Researchers on the Development of a Research-Worthy Problem,” The International 
Journal of an Emerging Transdiscipline 11, (2008): 17-33. 
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triangulation method is used to allow a complete picture and interpretation of the 
case study in its current political and social environment, through the compilation 
of different types of data sources. The use of this method is ideal in limiting 
nonconforming data and increasing the reliability of the research’s results and 
conclusions, through uncovering the similarities and commonalties in the data 
collected.169  
The methodology used is primarily dependent on a bottom-up approach or 
inductive reasoning. As this thesis started with the idea that Muslim Sisters 
desire better representation and a sense of empowerment within the MB and the 
Egyptian state and society, this specific observation eventually expanded to 
include the broader picture of an Islamist movement and a patriarchal and 
traditional society and state. Inductive research at its very core is a more open-
ended form of research that includes investigative and evolving characteristics. 
Its scientific approach involves exploring human nature and the perception of the 
actors being researched.170 The bottom-up approach, of processing information 
from the surrounding world and the actors in question, is largely based on 
examining incoming data from the surrounding environment. Initially, a tentative 
hypothesis is stated, which may or may not be modified or developed depending 
on the existence of other relevant theories that may require “situating the 
inductively gained hypothesis within a larger theoretical framework.”171 The case 
                                            
169 Veronica A. Thurmond, “The Point of Triangulation.” Journal Of Nursing Scholarship 33, no. 3 
(2001): 253. 
170 Adrienne Hertier, “Causal Explanation,” in Approaches and Methodologies in the Social 
Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, edited by Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating 
(Cambridge: The Cambridge Press, 2008), 64. 
171 Ibid., 65. 
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study in qualitative research could “confirm existing theories, infirm existing 
theoretic, or generate new hypothesis,”172 thereby establishing hypothesis and 
theory post-research effort.  
The problem of trying to measure and understand the effects of religion 
and culture on the Muslim Sisters’ level of empowerment, in the midst of a 
traditional and patriarchal society, is quite difficult. This is why conducting a 
survey-based research, instead of face-to-face interviews, would have proven 
inefficient and ineffective. Survey may help understand a situation or a culture on 
an individual level, but it will falter when studying a group or a collective that has 
a common cultural and/or religious descriptor or set of descriptors.173 At the 
same time, preconceived notions and cultural stereotypes may seep into the 
analysis portion of any qualitative research that includes interaction with the 
group or collective that is being researched; through activities of survey-taking or 
conducting interviews. For that reason, Porta and Keating encourage the 
application of a triangulation method in regards to inductive/bottom-up 
approaches that involved ethnographic tools and case studies.174  
 
The Components of the Triangulation Method 
While several background sources allowed for a solid understanding of the 
inner-workings of the MB and their gender-related challenges, interviews were 
still needed to reveal “a deeper level of information in order to capture meaning, 
                                            
172 Landman, 289. 
173 Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, eds. Approaches and Methodologies in the Social 
Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, (Cambridge: The Cambridge Press, 2008), 9. 
174 Ibid. 
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process and context,” 175  as Landman asserts. Translating meaning into 
intelligible words “involves describing and understanding people as conscious 
and social human beings.” 176 The face-to-face interviews significantly helped in 
completing this research effort and in filling in the gaps in primary and secondary 
texts.  
Additionally, given that the January 25 revolution completely altered the 
political course of the MB and its members, interviews were needed to keep up 
with the lack of information that resulted from the rapid changes in Egypt’s 
political situation, especially with regards to the parliamentary and presidential 
elections. The 2011/12 elections occurred in the absence of the traditional 
overpowering government and ruling regime that Egypt has experienced in the 
past;177 in this way, they differed from the elections that preceded them. 
 
Secondary Sources 
As mentioned before, the methodology of this research is wholly 
qualitative, and utilizes an inductive mode of processing information. Inductive 
processing of information includes identifying relevant theories throughout a 
research effort of collecting and compiling data. 178  This is different from a 
                                            
175Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, “How Many Approaches in the Social Sciences? 
An Epistemological Introduction,” in Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A 
Pluralist Perspective, edited by Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, (Cambridge: The 
Cambridge Press, 2008), 20. 
176 Ibid.  
177 Even though the 2011/12 elections were marred by vote-rigging and vote-buying allegations, 
much like the past election seasons; voters were not blocked from accessing polling stations, as 
was the practice during the Mubarak regime when MB supporters and members were barred from 
accessing many polling stations. See analysis Chapters Six and Seven. 
178 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin. Qualitative interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data 
(Thousand Oaks: SAGE publications, 1995), 56. 
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quantitative and positivist method, where the theory and hypothesis need to be 
established before any research effort is taken.179 Both content and discourse 
analysis of secondary texts and primary sources were applied throughout. 
Primary and secondary texts were analyzed and relied on in tracing the evolution 
of the feminist movement in Egypt, through both a secular and an Islamic lens, 
and in relation to the state, the MB party and the antagonistic relationship that 
exists between them. Texts, journals and books that detail the MB’s history, 
events, ideologies and influences were examined. Newspapers and opinion 
articles were heavily relied upon when analyzing the January 25 revolution, the 
transitional period and the post-Mubarak elections. 
A compilation of international and local Egyptian newspapers was 
depended on to minimize the chances of biased reporting. The Associated Press 
and Reuters were the main sources of information as both contain up-to-date 
reports and offer uninterrupted live newsfeeds. As for Arabic newspapers; 
independent newspapers were referred to, for the same purpose of minimizing 
authoritative attempts at restricting information. This same practice was applied 
when researching the history of feminist or women’s movements, and the Muslim 
Sisters’ activities in Egypt. Simultaneously, both subjects were thematically 
examined in light of their relationship with the ruling regime: the Sisters’ non-
electoral participation since the inception of the MB and the Sisters’ electoral 
participation in Egypt’s politics. Both premises reveal that the Muslim Sisters 
were publicly dependent on their male counterparts for the advancement and 
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“growth of the organization. The Muslim Sisters proved indispensable to the 
organization at times when their participation, whether of a political or social 
nature, was a determinant of the MB’s future. 
 
Interviews and Techniques Used 
Interviews with MB members were needed to complete the assessment of 
the role of the Muslim Sisters in Egyptian society and politics. An ethnographic 
approach was used to better understand the social phenomenon of the Muslim 
Sisters within an Islamist movement from a micro-perspective. Ethnographic 
practices, essential for a long time, in the field of anthropology, have proven 
beneficial in the field of social sciences as well. As the actors being examined 
give meaning to their actions and life purposes, ethnographic practices such as 
interviewing actors minimize the creation of ill-researched assumptions that may 
overshadow the purpose of the research work. Bray highlights the importance of 
an ethnographic approach, especially in a bottom-up analysis, in that it is  
“contextual, examining whole situations rather than breaking them 
down into discrete variables whose effects are separate. Theory is 
important for research, but it is not imposed on the situation and is 
developed in the course of the research.”180  
 
Moreover, the ethnographic approach complements the nature and 
direction of this research effort through three fundamental steps: the preliminary 
formulation of the research subject, followed by data-gathering; and ending with 
the analysis and writing of observed data. This naturalistic approach minimizes 
confusion or contradiction in theoretical explanations, where empirical data 
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supersedes that of theoretical arguments. Interaction with the directed subjects 
or actors in a research effort reveals the number of players involved and the level 
of seen or unseen political and/or social power they may wield - which is 
unquantifiable. Ethnography and interviewing subjects reveal the many active 
levels of human social interaction and how those levels may affect and determine 
the creation or the destruction of present political social and economic 
relations.181 The application of process tracing of a subject’s reasons for their 
behaviors and actions reveals the relationship between the actor’s belief system 
and his/her behaviors. Vennesson explains that process tracing is crucial in 
conducting an effective empirical case study research, as it presents the 
researcher with a different outlet to learn the  
“preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their 
goals, their values and their specification of the situations that 
face them. Process tracing helps the researcher to uncover, 
directly and indirectly, what actors want, know and compute.”182  
 
The data-gathering portion of this research entailed one-time interviews 
due to time constraints posed by the time frame in which this research was 
conducted. The field research portion took place during the first few weeks of 
parliamentary sessions: the Legislative Assembly elections and the 2012 
presidential campaigns. As a result, due to the busy schedule of the 
interviewees, the duration of the interviews ranged from 15 - 50 minutes, and 
follow-up interviews were highly difficult to schedule, thereby eliminating the 
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option of in-depth interviews. The interviews were 1) recorded 2) open-ended 3) 
semi-structured with a few defined questions that lead into a more conversational 
interview, and 4) Conducted mostly in Arabic, unless the interviewee was 
comfortable with communicating in English. In addition, participatory observation 
of the Muslim Sisters was not possible, as most workshops, seminars and 
meetings organized by the MB and FJP were closed to the public. However, a 
few rallies and protests were attended with non-MB individuals and groups for 
the purpose of gaining a better understanding of how protest movements, much 
like the 18 days of the revolution, assembled in Egypt. 
Behavioralists in the field of political science depend on human interaction 
and observation of peoples’ reaction to better explain political and social factors 
without passing superficial judgments. Also known as the ideology of positivism, 
behaviouralists acknowledge that by observing political events, actors and 
structures, political scientists can generate informed analytical statements.183 In 
the case of the MB, for both its male and female members, the political climate 
after the 2011 revolution vastly differs from what they have grown accustomed to, 
i.e. the absence of an oppressive government and military regime. As result, the 
subjects participated more openly in interviews, but at the same time, they were 
more careful about their public image and the message it communicates about 
their political aspirations.184 After gaining a parliamentary majority and fielding a 
                                            
183 Porta and Keating, xvii. 
184 During the field research portion, it was not difficult to contact MB members, as they were 
open to being interviewed about their activities, but they were careful to question the interviewer’s 
background and affiliations for fear that the information they provided during the interview is 
leaked to media outlets and becomes exploited in an attempt to portray them in a negative light to 
the public.  
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presidential candidate, the MB has transformed into a public entity from whom 
transparency is now to be expected; in keeping with the demands of the 
revolution. In effect, most interviews that have been conducted with MB members 
in the past, whether male or female, were characterised by a very different 
behaviourists tactic. Before the revolution and in the presence of the constant 
threat of a police or military crackdown, most members who did not belong to the 
MB’s senior echelon,185 were hesitant to identify themselves, during interviews, 
with the banned organization, which resulted in a limited number of interviews 
characterised by hesitant tones or requests for anonymity. 186  Furthermore, 
female members of the MB did not identify themselves in correspondences with 
the MB, for fear of reprimand or harassment from the regime.187 Conducting 
interviews post-revolution highlighted the shift and drastic changes in the MB’s 
approachability and its newfound public place in Egypt’s society and political 
sphere. About 31 individuals were interviewed; their affiliations were established 
using one or more of the following descriptions: their membership in either the 
MB, the FJP or both, their known loyalty or association with the MB; and their 
gender. Also, of the 31 people that were interviewed, MB experts and/or analysts 
were selected based on their academic or research specialization, and their 
                                            
185 Throughout the Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak regimes, the senior members of the MB were 
publicly known and identified in Egyptian society. With their growing popularity and political 
presence during Mubarak’s reign, the senior members became more vocal, appearing on 
television and public events.  
186 During the researcher’s interviews with the Muslim Sisters, it was casually mentioned a few 
times that such public association with the MB wouldn’t have been possible during the Mubarak 
years due to their fear of arrests. Refer to the methodology chapter of Dede’s thesis dissertation; 
Dede refers to MB members by their first name, and on occasion, by their profession.  
187Interviewees were active female MB members who have retreated from the public eye in the 
past and who were hesitant to state their affiliations to the MB during Mubarak’s rule. G.R. 
Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 17, 2012, and H.A.M. Interview 
by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 24, 2012. 
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interactions and publications concerning the MB’s activities and ideologies. After 
narrowing down the desired descriptions the interviewees should posses, the 
practice of snowball sampling was applied when deciding the number of 
individuals interviewed.188 In the case of building up a contact list of interviewees, 
the practice of referrals provided more contacts, as the interviewer gained the 
trust of interviewees by mentioning the names of the interviewees preceding 
them. 
  
Questions Asked During Interviews 189  
Field research applied a combination of a topical oral history and a cultural 
mode of interviewing,190 where the interviewer sought certain individuals who 
have experienced particular historical events, such as the January 25 revolution 
or Egypt’s previous elections, in an attempt to reconstruct events and provide a 
more personal account. Cultural interviews provide an opportunity to ascertain 
the shared meaning and value that the MB members - as a group - develop. 
Topical interviews and cultural interviews differ greatly in how questions are 
posed by the interviewer. Topical interview questions are more specific; the 
interviewer is expected to direct the flow and manner of the conversation, 
whereas cultural interviews wholly depend on active listening. 191  Initially, 
                                            
188 Snowball sampling occurs when the researcher builds up the list of contacts through gathering 
from their initial pool of interviews their personal contacts thereby accessing their personal and 
social networks. See Rowland Atkinson and John Flint, “Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach 
Populations: Snowball Research Strategies,” Social Research Update, University of Surrey, no. 
33, (Summer 2001), accessed April 15, 2012, http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU33.pdf  
189 For a list of the general and specific questions asked refer to Appendix B.  
190 Rubin and Rubin, 29-31.  
191 Ibid., 29-31.  
 81 
questions posed during the interviews were divided into two sections: direct 
descriptive questions and open-ended questions. In the case of interviewing 
male and female members of the MB, the interviews commenced with short 
questions about the interviewees’ professions, affiliation (whether they are a 
member of the FJP and the MB simultaneously) and how long they have been 
members of the MB. These preliminary questions identified the interviewee’s 
level of involvement and exposure to the MB as a mobilizing organization, 
thereby assessing the level of their knowledge of internal MB politics. Both newer 
and older members of the MB were interviewed to provide a comparison and 
contrast of their awareness of MB internal and external politics.  
The second set of questions was tailored to relay the interviewees’ 
thoughts on the reasons for the low female political representation within the MB 
and what possible solutions exist to encourage a stronger female presence in the 
MB and Egypt’s Parliament.192 The questions posed provided an insight as to the 
importance of the concept of gender equality and female representation among 
the MB members before and after the revolution. The long-held belief that the MB 
male members were protecting the majority of the Muslim Sisters from harm or 
harassment by the military and the police was questioned during the 
interviews.193 The same set of questions was posed to political analysts and MB 
experts. These set of questions were direct and targeted a certain timeframe or a 
specific incident, where the interviewer controlled the direction of the discussion 
                                            
192 For statistics on female representation within the MB’s party and Egypt’s Parliament, refer to 
Reem Leila, “On their Own,” Al-Ahram Weekly, no. 1073, 24 - 30 November 2011, accessed 
January 28, 2012, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1073/fo112.htm.  
193 Abdellatif and. Ottaway, 10 and Krahe. 
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to ensure that the interviewee did not go off topic, and at the same time, ensured 
that the interview provided a clearer picture of the interviewee’s experiences and 
opinions.  
However, as the interviews progressed, the interviewer had to adjust and 
tailor the questions in accordance with the interviewees’ background and 
affiliation, to maximize the level of information derived from the interviews.194 
Since the interviews were used in this research as a supplementary tool and not 
as a source to gather statistical data, adapting the questions to the interviewees 
did not compromise the reliability of data. Furthermore, as fieldwork continued, 
new ideas and questions were formed during conversations and interviews with 
the subjects. The continual updating and reworking of the questions 
characterized this fieldwork with an iterative design where interviews were 
customized to ensure accuracy. 195  This approach was the most suited to 
conducting interviews with a group of people joined by a common identity and/or 
belief system that may be similar, but somewhat different from that of the 
author.196  
  The third set of questions took on a more relaxed atmosphere as the 
interviewer asked more open-ended questions to assess the interviewees’ 
sentiments regarding certain issues such as: the absence of female members in 
the senior hierarchy of the organization and whether the structure will change 
and evolve to better integrate the Muslim Sisters. The researcher tried to delve 
                                            
194 For more on flexible research designs, refer to Rubin and Rubin, 45, 92.  
195 Ibid. 92. 
196 Saeeda Shah, “The Researcher/Interviewer in Intercultural Context: A Social Intruder!” British 
Educational Research Journal 30, no. 4 (2004): 552-556, accessed January 4, 2012, 
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into the MB’s changing opinions and attitudes regarding the issue of women 
occupying certain positions such as judges or the nation’s president, through the 
use of the following phrases: freedom of press, freedom to form a political party, 
transparency and equality. By using these words, which the MB and FJP have 
been utilizing in press conferences,197 the interviewer indirectly compared the 
current political climate to that of the Mubarak era. Moreover, the female 
interviewees were asked to discuss and describe their activities within the MB 
and the FJP, in regards to their everyday political activities and their political 
aspirations within the organization and its party.  
 
Ethical Obligation  
Some MB members were wary of the interviewer’s intentions regarding 
the use of the information provided for other purposes besides academic 
research. As a result, some, mostly female members, requested a copy of the 
questions beforehand. Interviewees were first contacted via phone, where the 
interviewer introduced herself, and explained the topic of her research and her 
academic affiliations, to which most of the interviewees responded positively. 
Before the beginning of each interview, the interviewer explained once again her 
research topic and presented the interviewees with an ethics consent form, which 
included the interviewer’s contact details and a confidentiality clause. Prior to 
each interview, it was made clear that a recording device was to be used during 
                                            
197 See press releases published on their official websites: www.ikhwanweb.com and 
www.fjponline.com  
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the interview. Also, interviewees were given the option of opting out on recording 
their interviews. 
 
Challenges Faced: Bias and Limitations  
The ‘interviewer effect’, in which the responses of the subject are 
influenced by the characteristics or behaviours of the interviewer, is an ever-
present issue to be considered in any type of research, whether qualitative or 
quantitative.198 In the latter, there are statistical techniques to minimize and 
estimate the magnitude of bias. In qualitative research, however, some bias will 
always exist, and will be difficult to measure. Typical measures to reduce bias 
include ensuring consistency in questions, structure and tone.  
The situation in this research was potentially more problematic, and 
needed to be considered carefully. In particular, an important task was to 
determine the nature and extent of any bias introduced by the personal 
perceptions and belief system of the author of this research work. As an Egyptian 
Muslim female, the interviewer and author related to the interview subjects on 
three levels: being Egyptian, being a woman, and defining herself as a Muslim. 
Despite the fact that the author would describe herself as a Muslim feminist, as 
opposed to the subjects to be interviewed (who would best be described as 
Islamic feminists or Islamists), the research and the questions posed during the 
interviews were based and established on her preconceived cultural and religious 
                                            
198 Refer to Herbert Stember and Herbert Hyman. “Interviewer Effects in the Classification of 
Responses,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 13, no. 4 (Winter, 1949-1950): 669-682, accessed 
January 14, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2745873  
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notions of Egyptian Muslim women in the public sphere via electoral activities, as 
opposed to the more traditional role of Muslim women as wives and mothers in 
the private sphere. Specifically, the interviewer’s gender could very well have had 
an effect on the behaviour and response of the interviewees.199 Nevertheless, 
interviews conducted in a ‘similarity-based’ environment yield great benefit for the 
research effort as it presents “shared assumptions about the nature of reality 
resulting from known behaviour patterns and shared values, which facilitate 
understanding”.200 Another obstacle to the success of the interview process and 
this research is that the term ‘feminism’ is not positively received by the Muslim 
Sisters, who as discussed in the previous chapter, did not look fondly upon such 
a ‘Western concept’. Despite the fact that Egypt’s history has seen its own brand 
of feminism with a purely Arab identity,201 most Islamist and traditional factions 
still associate that term with Western imperialism and Western ideologies.  
 
The Interviewer’s Advantages  
The interviewer’s close relations and understanding of such a patriarchal 
culture helped bridge the gap between Western and modern Islamic thought 
regarding today’s societal and political perspective of the growing trend of a 
gender-friendly Islamic voice. The author was brought up in a Muslim Egyptian 
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family, and as a result, the frame of her ideals and interpretation can be 
described as possessing an Islamic and Egyptian culture overtone. Karam 
experienced the same societal effects on her research when she interviewed 
Egyptian Muslim subjects. She states: 
“My quest as a woman for ‘freedom’ had to be grounded within 
certain norms and values – supposedly Islamic – which 
predetermined my subjectivity even before I had ventured to 
discover it by myself. It was as if questions of my identity were 
determined for me by others, namely family and legislature, both 
of which functioned within a discourse that claimed moral, 
religious and patriarchal superiority, derived legitimacy from a 
myriad of ‘Islamic’ interpretations of societal norms and values.”202 
 
In addition, the author’s daily use of the Egyptian colloquial language 
facilitated her understanding of the interviewees’ references and cultural sayings. 
The author’s already existing network of friends and family in Cairo, helped 
bridge trust issues that were bound to arise when contacting members of the MB. 
The commonality that existed between the author/interviewer and the people she 
interviewed, inevitably resulted in applying the practice of self-reflexivity, where 
the interviewer tailored her questions and approach in accordance to the people 
she set out to interview.203 
Despite the valuable information that the interviews and content analysis 
have produced to strengthen the analysis portion of this dissertation, a historical 
background chapter is needed to fill in information gaps that may occur during 
the analysis of the MB’s growth as an organization and political entity. The 
historical background chapter precedes the analysis of the Muslim Sisters, to 
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which the triangulation method is implemented. Egypt’s 20th century is filled with 
historical events and incidents that demonstrate the relationship between feminist 
entities and the state, as well as the state and the MB. Such revealing 
information may provide insights into the possible scenarios that may play out 
again in post-revolution Egypt.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Historical Background 
 
The majority of large states in the Middle East have witnessed an 
impressive array of political enlightenment and turmoil during their modern 
history. Like most great movements in world history, feminism and Islamism were 
a response to insufferable authority. In this case, both forces took to Egyptian 
streets in defiance of British occupation and lingering colonial sentiments in the 
early 1900s. An Egyptian lawyer and jurist by the name of Qasim Amin, who was 
also a disciple of Mohamed Abduh, 204  devoted two books to the issue of 
women’s liberation, Tahrir al-Mar’a (the Emancipation of Women, 1899) and al 
Mar’a al Jadida (the New Woman, 1900). Amin was greatly influenced by 
Western feminist thought and contemporary Islamic thinkers who encouraged 
women’s emancipation in order to save the Egyptian society from plunging into 
the dark ages. He sought to modernize Egyptian society by improving the status 
of its female population. Publications such as these gave enough momentum for 
Egyptian female activists like Hoda Shaarawi and Malak Hifni Nasif to stand up 
and make themselves heard, and to battle for a more equal representation. In 
defiance of foreign rule, Hoda Shaarawi and other prominent figures’ wives and 
sisters took to the street in protest, as Shaarawi took off her veil as a sign of 
liberation from old rule, and a promise of new beginnings for women and for 
Egypt.205 In 1923, the EFU was established, which was considered to be the first 
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female organization that catered to female empowerment in Egypt’s social and 
political arenas.206 This organization, also, represented a point of departure for 
al-Ghazali as well.  
Five years after the establishment of the EFU, a schoolteacher by the 
name of Hasan al-Banna formed the MB, initially known as the ‘Society of Muslim 
Brothers’ in 1928. The MB grew into a formidable organization in little time as a 
response to both the Westernization and deterioration of the Egyptian society, as 
al-Banna viewed it. Al-Banna believed that a return to the true and pure 
principles of Islam would save Egypt as a whole from permanently falling into the 
snares of British influence and rule. He believed that the cleansing and 
purification of the society should start on the individual level, from the bottom up, 
and for that, he preached the return to the Islamic way of life, as experienced by 
the Prophet Mohamed and his rightly-guided Caliphs.207 Al-Banna’s ideology and 
actions changed in the course of the overthrow of British occupation, as a result 
of his troubled relationship with his followers and with King Farouk’s rule.208 Al-
Banna’s evolving views can be seen as a reflection and a close representation of 
today’s MB, who continued, on more than one occasion, to change their tactics to 
suit the existing ruling force and appease the majority of the Egyptian 
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population.209 During al-Banna’s life, as the father of the movement, he went from 
leading a purely social movement at the first day of its inception, to a highly 
politicized one, with its activities ranging from grassroots efforts, such as 
spreading the Islamic truth and educating the masses, to a force that resorted to 
violent interactions with those in power, whether British or Egyptian loyalists. 
Eventually, his lack of consistence with regards to his ideologies and actions with 
his peers resulted in the branching off of some of the Brothers, who formed the 
violent and militant branch; the Islamic jihad, and ultimately led to his demise.210 
In regards to the EFU and the MB, the ruling regime or the forces in 
charge, fully utilized them at several points in Egypt’s volatile years of ridding 
itself of foreign occupation and influence. Despite the fact that the women’s 
movement and the MB movement appear to be conflicting in several facets, they 
are, in fact, opposite sides of the same coin. This chapter will highlight several 
historical moments, in both movements, which have taken place in the period 
between the British occupation and the Mubarak regime.  
This first section of this chapter gives an insight into Egypt’s history with 
feminism and women’s movements from its inception as an idea and vision in the 
eyes of a few Egyptian women to today’s infamous active Arab feminist - Nawal 
al-Saadawi. 211  The aforementioned women’s volatile relationship with the 
                                            
209 Mona el-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis Of The Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 391. 
210 Alison Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition. (London: Saqi Books, 
2010), 29-30. 
211 Nawal al-Saadawi has been described within the feminist community and the Arab world, as a 
radical veteran feminist with an outspoken aversion to Islamic political ideologies and the practice 
of FGM. She has been imprisoned by the Egyptian government and subjected to harsh criticisms 
from the Islamic community, where Islamists have tried to force her husband to divorce her, as 
she was branded a heretic and Muslims should not be married to heretics. See Sherifa Zuhur 
“Egypt: Security, Political, and Islamist Challenges,” Strategic Studies Institute (September 2007), 
 91 
government or ruling regime will be highlighted throughout. The second section 
will explain that these women had very different ideas of feminism and women’s 
emancipation, where their ideas were driven from either a purely Western 
concept, to one with an Arab influence entrenched in feminist ideals, or to a 
movement with an Islamic undertone. Moreover, the MB’s negative and violent 
relationship with the regime throughout the years will be discussed as well. The 
ruling government’s relationship with women’s movements and Islamist 
movements is important to focus on, as it was a defining factor in both 
movements’ successes and/or failures.212 The last section will show how both 
ideologies converged when it came to al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali was not the only 
woman to fight for both the Islamist and feminist movements, but she is the only 
one to brand herself publicly as an Ikhwanji 213 and has fought to spread their 
message of ‘Islam is the solution’. Moreover, al-Ghazali, managed to change the 
status quo of women in the MB, i.e. the Muslim Sisters were known to exist but 
rarely publicly associated themselves with the MB.214 She had both an Islamist 
and feminist agenda, and acted on strengthening both ideologies as a way of life. 
She was the first publicly active Muslim Sister - both socially and politically - 
during the Nasser years; when most MB male members were jailed. During that 
time, her actions were pivotal in keeping the MB as a political movement alive, 
until she was imprisoned during the Nasser era.215 
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The Birth of Female Empowerment in Egypt  
 One could argue that the moment that forever changed the future of 
Egyptian women is owed to Khedive Ismail’s wife’s decision to open the first all-
girls school for female youth in 1873.216 The one incident that challenged the 
divide that existed between men and women for centuries in the Egyptian 
society, however, was Shaarawi’s defiance of the status quo; in the act of taking 
off her face veil.217  
 
The Era of British Opposition in Egypt  
Hoda Shaarawi shared more than a common incident with Safiyya 
Zaghlul. She, too, was married to a prominent figure of the Egyptian upper class, 
who was also a member of the Wafd Party. One could argue that their husbands’ 
social and political placement was what fuelled them to take the political stances 
they did. For without their husbands’ strong footing in Egypt’s public sphere, 
Egypt's feminist history would not have been the same.218 Shaarawi and other 
women activists stood side by side with male activists, united by their desire to 
live in a free Egypt, ruled and governed by its people. Sharifah Hanim Riad, the 
wife of Mahmoud Riad Pasha, ran the first women’s committee of the Wafd 
Party.219 As one of its members, Shaarawi “entered the house of the British high 
                                            
216 Khedive Ismail, the viceroy or governor of Egypt and Sudan from 1863-1879, was considered 
a reformer and one of the first men to seek emancipation for women alongside Qasim Amin. 
However, his third wife, Jashem Afet Hanem is the one responsible for opening the first all-girls 
state school in 1873. Refer to Talhami, 24 and Elizabeth Isichei, Histories of North African 
Societies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 282.  
217 Talhami, 13.  
218 Baron, 34.  
219 Mahmoud Riad was an Egyptian statesman, who served as Prime Minister three times during 
his political career.  
 93 
commissioner to present their nationalist demands on November 13, 1919.”220 
Armed with the support and approval of their husbands, the Women’s Wafd held 
all-women’s demonstrations with the most memorable of them taking place on 
March 20, 1919 and January 16, 1920.221 But as the 1919 revolution started and 
ended, the women realized that their aim of gaining suffrage was side-lined to 
make space for the men’s agenda.222  
 
Shaarawi and the EFU 
Disconcerted with being marginalized by issues that concerned a purely 
nationalist agenda, Shaarawi formed the EFU, and, thus, the Western concept of 
feminism was introduced into a Middle Eastern nationalist movement.223 At the 
time, Shaarawi was still a member of the Wafd Party and was strongly involved in 
their nationalist activities. It was in 1924, when Shaarawi attended the 
International Conference on Women in Rome, that she returned to her homeland 
and shed her veil and declared that her feminist identity supersedes her 
nationalist one.224 Along with the formation of the EFU and the Women’s Wafd, 
women from the middle and upper classes formed a variety of organizations in 
the 1920s, including the Society for Egyptian Ladies’ Awakening and Mothers of 
the Future.225  Shaarawi soon left the Women’s Wafd Committee, when she 
realized without a doubt that the Wafd’s vision did not align with her vision for the 
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EFU; a vision that focused on women’s political rights, namely the right to vote 
and “[qualifying] for parliamentary representation”.226  
Despite her activism through the EFU, the focus of her life’s work 
remained within the social realm of women’s welfare, education, health, 
childrearing, family law and divorce rights. It was a natural place, for such a 
young movement and ideology, to start in a country that was still at its early 
stages. As an activist, she had two major accomplishments: ensuring the 
women’s right to enrol in universities and raising the age of marriage for both 
men and women. Shaarawi was viewed as the rising star of women’s rights and 
Arab feminism, and this did not go without official acknowledgment as she was 
honoured by the heads of four Arab governments.227  She also became the 
president of the EFU and vice-president of the International Women’s Union, took 
part in numerous international women’s gatherings as a spokeswoman for 
Egyptian women and founded fifteen more women’s organizations. She also 
conquered the scholarly field by establishing a French language journal and an 
Arabic journal entitled ‘The Egyptian Woman’.228 
Shaarawi was not the only female activist to rise above the masses in her 
feminist fervour and drive to create a society of equality and justice. Both Malak 
Hefni Nasif and Nabawiyya Musa 229 took part in the women’s movement during 
the same time as Shaarawi. During the 1919 revolution, they joined their efforts 
                                            
226 Talhami, 11.  
227 Ibid., 12.  
228 Margot Badran, “Competing Agenda: Feminism, Islam and the State in Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Century Egypt,” in Women, Islam and the State, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1991), 210.  
229 Nasif was an activist and writer who was known as Bahithat al Badiya (Searcher in the 
Desert), Musa was an educator who fought her parents and the Ministry of Education for her right 
to sit her secondary school exams. Refer to Baron 27, 38, 87-88 and T. Philip, 283-287.  
 95 
with that of the Wafd Party, to bring an end to the British occupation. In the end, 
all feminist ideologies were suppressed by concerns of “independence and 
emancipation from the British.”230  
 
Doria Shafik: The New Generation of Egyptian Feminists  
The generation that followed that of Shaarawi, Nasif and Musa was Doria 
Shafik’s; a woman considered as Shaarawi’s disciple and student. It was 
Shaarawi who took Shafik under her wing, supported her studies at Sorbonne 
University in France 231  and ultimately inspired her to continue the fight for 
gender equality in Egypt. After her return from France, and following Shaarawi’s 
death, Shafik founded the Union of the Daughter of the Nile (Ittihad Bint il Nil) in 
1948.232 In solidarity with the EFU after its dissolution, Shafik declared its main 
mission of gaining women’s political rights as Bint il Nil’s chief objective,233 
alongside female literacy. As a result, Shafik continued writing feminist articles 
and arguing for the importance of women’s rights through the many facets of 
national media.234 Shafik was adamant about carrying on the legacy of the EFU, 
only through bigger and more effective means. Her organization was described 
as a “socially and geographically broader organization than its predecessor”.235 
Also, just like its predecessor, the Union of the Daughter of the Nile, focused on 
the nationalist struggle that swept the country by training its members in the 
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effective ways to participate in the nationalist movement through paramilitary 
training.236  
Doria Shafik is most remembered for her extreme political activism as one 
of the first few women to defy the existing governing power. In the critical years 
leading up to the 1952 revolution, Shafik along with 1,000 women flooded the 
parliamentary building to demand the right to vote and run in elections.237 As 
mentioned before, the revolution did not bring about the rights that the women 
organizations were hoping for. With the success of the Free Officers revolution in 
1952, came a new wave of socialist rule. However, the way Nasser’s regime 
operated in regards to other political parties greatly resembled an unbending 
authoritarian rule. Nasser ordered the shutting down of all parties (except for that 
of the MB at the time). Organizations were targeted next, as they closed down 
the offices of the EFU, and the Union of the Daughters of the Nile, under the 
guise that these organizations had a strong political agenda, branding them as a 
political party.238 Unsurprisingly, this did not bring an end to Shafik’s intense 
actions. To this day, she is known as the woman who took the Parliament 
building by storm, alongside one thousand women, to demand equal 
representation and rights in the Egyptian Constitution, and to stand amongst the 
men of the Egyptian Parliament. Further, her militant ideology inspired her to 
head a hunger strike on March 12, 1954, surrounded by her supporters, as she 
“threatened to starve herself to death if the government did not grant women the 
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vote.” Mohamed Naguib 239  responded by giving her his word to seriously 
consider and evaluate her petition for the inclusion of women’s political rights in 
the Egyptian Constitution.240  
It was, two years later, with the new constitution of 1956, that women were 
finally granted their political rights 241 “despite an Islamic legal judgment (fatwa) 
by one of the chief religious authorities in Egypt.”242 In addition, the constitutions 
of 1956 and 1963 declared all Egyptians equal and forbade discrimination on the 
basis of gender. 243 Despite those political gains, Shafik continued with her fight 
to guarantee a better life for the future generations of Egyptian women through 
the attainment of equal rights. As a result, she continued to question Nasser’s 
regime, leading to her house arrest in 1957, where she remained in seclusion 
until her death in 1975.244 
 
 
Female Activism during the Nasser Period  
The tension in Shafik’s and Nasser’s relationship was not, as a matter of 
fact, an accurate reflection of how Nasser and his socialist party viewed feminist 
politics. Nasser actually believed that the power and influence, growing in these 
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organizations, needed to be harnessed and modelled after the socialist agenda, 
to further the socialist transformation of Egyptian society.245 In 1962, women 
gained membership in the Arab Socialist Union “at the level of popular 
committees, housing committees and committees reporting on women’s activities 
to the governor of Cairo.”246 Furthermore, female membership was allotted five 
percent of the total membership of the national party.247 In other words, two seats 
in each committee were reserved for women, not to mention, reserved seats in 
each provincial assembly.248 
The socialist experiment to include female representation in the nation’s 
political units took place well before the formation of the Arab Socialist Union 
(ASU). Women started to contest seats in Parliament as early as 1957, when two 
women were elected.249 In the election that was described as the “first election 
since the female franchise,”250 women’s turnout was less than adequate. 144,983 
women registered as opposed to 5,575,692 men. The number of women elected 
rose slightly until the 1969 session, when it dropped to three women only.251  
 
 
Female Activism During the Sadat Period  
With the Sadat regime (1970 - 1981), one specific dramatic change has 
been seen, by some, as a blemish in the strong history of female empowerment 
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in Egypt: ‘Jihan’s law’. The law, introduced by former first lady, Jihan al-Sadat, 
placed a quota of reserved seats for women in Parliament as part “of a package 
of laws for improving the status of women.”252 Predictably, this action did not 
appeal to either the Islamists or the members of other opposition movements, 
and the law was soon declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional 
Court.253 Since then, women’s representation has declined in both Majlas al-
Shaab (People’s Assembly) and Maljis al Shura (Legislative Assembly/Shura 
Council). In 1990, only fifteen women held seats out of six hundred 
parliamentarians.254  
However, not many setbacks were experienced during Sadat’s reign by 
the feminist movement. On the contrary, a doctor by the name of Nawal al-
Saadawi managed to shock the conservative Egyptian society by bringing up the 
topic of women and sex in her university lectures and books.255 Despite the 
unpopularity that al-Saadawi expectedly attained, she succeeded in forming and 
registering her organization – the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association – in 
1985.256 To many academics in the field of feminist and gender studies, al-
Saadawi represented the second wave of feminist ideology in Egypt.257  Her 
                                            
252 Gamal Abdel Nasser, “Egypt: Succession Politics,” in Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of 
Change, ed. Volker Perthes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004), 127.  
253 Abdel Nasser, 127.  
254 Talhami, 21.  
255 Al-Saadawi’s studies and publications focused on how women can be oppressed and silenced 
through the use of sexual abuse and violence. She also shed light on the criminal practice of 
female genital mutilation. 
256 Sherifa Zuhur, “The Mixed Impact of Feminist Struggles in Egypt During the 1990s” Meria 
Journal 5, no.1 (March 2001). 
257 First-wave feminism refers to movements that called for gender equality, voting and property 
rights. Second wave feminism widened its issues of concern by including the issues of women’s 
sexuality and reproductive rights. Al-Saadawi’s work is considered fundamental to Egypt’s second 
wave of feminism as she focused on issues of sexuality and female genital mutilation. Refer to 
 100 
organization is the first independent entity created for the purpose of women’s 
advancement and equality in Egyptian society, after Nasser’s regime 
circumscribed and limited all women’s activities - both political and social in 
nature - to conform to the needs of the state.258 
 
Several Women – Different Voices  
Despite the vibrant history of the fight for gender equality in Egypt, women 
activists were actually motivated by different ideologies and they envisioned 
different futures for Egyptian women. Academics such as Badran (1995), Nelson 
(1991) and Baron (2005) 259  have paid attention to activists’ upbringing, 
education and experience in an attempt to delineate the triggers and influences 
for each activist. Even though both Shaarawi and Shafik were described as 
‘militant feminists’ with a strong Western influence, they maintained completely 
different ideologies. Shaarawi saw herself as a Muslim reformist first and 
foremost, who sought to improve women’s lives through a ‘rethought Islam’; 
where she could never be accused of betraying her national heritage and history 
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of resisting British imperialism.260 Shaarawi represented the all-Egyptian woman 
who “demands with her loudest voice to be restored her political rights, rights 
granted to her by sharia and dictated to her by the demands of the present.”261 
Feminist activist Malak Hefni Nasif was also viewed as an “authentically Egyptian 
activist”, more so than Shaarawi who depended on Western feminist literature to 
a certain degree.262 At the same time, Shaarawi created a separate fate for her 
and her followers - apart from that of the Islamist feminists - when she discarded 
her veil, defining the point of divergence for both factions.  
  Doria Shafik, on the other hand, was driven by her Western education. 
She focused on ridding the Egyptian society of backward practices such as the 
veil, by targeting that piece of cloth, and everything that represented patriarchal 
Middle Eastern culture and/or religious actions, in most of her rhetoric and 
publications. 263  Nevertheless, her tireless activism was recognized and 
applauded worldwide, as she received calls from more than fifty Arab and 
Western nations and several world women’s organizations as well as from 
individuals supporting her actions.264 Inji Aflatun was yet another activist who 
reflected a Western education, as she believed and defended the “Marxist 
argument that [the] socioeconomic class system underlying the oppression of 
women had to be changed”.265 She was one of the founders of the Lajnaat Al 
Shaabat (Committee of Young Women), which was established to house those 
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who have looked for another entity to replace the EFU, and who were actively 
pro-communist.266  
As the last section of this chapter will reveal, religious rhetoric alongside 
female activism was common during these turbulent times in Egypt’s political 
arena. The Islamist focus of activists like Zaynab al-Ghazali and Labiba Ahmed 
was thoroughly documented, but only a slight mention of Coptic women’s 
organization is evident. Baron discovered a second set of Arabic women’s 
monthlies. Malaka Saad’s al- Jins al-Latif (The Gentle Sex, 1908-25) and Balsam 
Abd al-Malik’s al-Mar’a al-Misriyya (The Egyptian Woman, 1920-39) - were 
among the publications that advocated a secular Egyptian nation. 267  It is 
important to note, however, that despite the vast difference in rhetoric, Islamist 
activist Ahmed and feminist Shaarawi built their movements with a focus on 
traditional female areas of responsibility such as the provision “of social welfare 
services and activities like health care, literacy classes, arts and crafts, and 
vocational studies.”268 
Women were included as part of the overall socialist program under 
Nasser’s regime. As for Sadat’s regime, with him accommodating the Islamist 
movements in a tactic to marginalize leftist and liberalist political strands, a new 
breed of Islamist women infiltrated the Egyptian society at its grassroots; 
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changing the new generation’s mind-sets in regards to a woman’s place in a 
modern Islamic society.269  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood: The Oldest Islamist Movement  
Islamist politics has been a driving force and overwhelming presence in 
Egypt since the 1980s.270 Islamism and the political rhetoric that accompanies it, 
have represented, to Arab Muslims in Egypt and elsewhere, another alternative 
to the secular Western way of life. Seeing that the MB as an organization has 
endured repressive regimes for over eighty years, it could be said that today’s 
Islamist political movements and organizations that have spread throughout the 
Muslim world and even Europe, looked at the MB’s experiences and lessons 
learned for ways to endure and ensure the continuance of their message. 271 
The Muslim Brotherhood of today’s Egypt is completely different from the 
one founded by its leader al-Banna.272 The MB organization, which survived and 
endured four different government rules, while being forced to work underground 
as a banned organization, is testament to the strength of the Islamist 
phenomenon. Its survival sheds light on the complex and strong bond the 
Egyptian people have with their religion. Egyptians – both Muslims and 
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Christians – are irrevocably tied to their faith, as it is an integral part of their 
identity and, inevitably, their culture.273 Also, it would be difficult to divorce the 
MB from the ideology of nationalism, as it was prominent in all its activities during 
the first thirty years of its inception and, currently, in the post-January 25 era.274  
 
Hasan al-Banna and the Creation of the MB  
Education is a main pillar in restructuring or transforming an ailing 
government and rule.275 It is usually the target of politicians, activists and leading 
personalities when trying to rebuild a nation from the bottom up.276 At a time 
when British rule and way of life seemed to take hold of the Egyptian society, 
especially the middle to upper classes, a school teacher felt the urgency to 
reform his country and its people; by returning to the fold of Islam and its guiding 
principles - the Quran and sharia. Hasan al-Banna was a twenty-two year old 
teacher - part of the school state system in Ismaliyya. Al-Banna, like many others 
his age, lived with colonial rule and suffered the feelings of discontentment and 
oppression of having no say in political decisions affecting the country.277 Al-
Banna believed that the alienation of the Egyptian people from their true faith – 
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Islam – was a contributing reason for the persistence of British colonialism.278 He 
called for Muslims to return to the all-encompassing religion of Islam to rectify the 
harm imposed on them by Western political and monetary interests.279  
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded with an Islamic committee that al-
Banna said would encompass “a Salafi mission, a Sunni methodology, a Sufi 
reality, a political committee, an athletic association, an academic and cultural 
association, an economic corporation and a social concept.” 280  Al-Banna’s 
convictions were based on a complete reliance on Islam, so that it became  
 “a way of life as it involved all affairs of life... the starting point was 
the moral realm. The realization of Islamic principles requires strong 
morals, and all these efforts must be accompanied with a clear Islamic 
methodology (minhaj). If applied properly, the Islamic methodology is 
capable of healing all the ills of the society.” 281 
 
Today, the MB is recognized and commended for its strong organizational 
skills that grew from the grassroots level, in all provinces and districts in Egypt, 
and its provision of services for the poor masses; services that the corrupt 
governments failed to deliver.282 Having stated that, the Brotherhood still suffers 
from internal divisions and cracks amongst its authority channels and its different 
generations.283 The presence of divisions in ideologies in the MB’s organization 
is not a new phenomenon. During al-Banna’s brief life, there were many rifts and 
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disagreements amongst the MB organization, especially pertaining to the use of 
violence.284 It is precisely the matter of employing violent means that led to the 
assassination of al-Banna himself as well as that of a prominent prime 
minister.285  
 
The Social and Political Activities of the MB During its Formative Years  
The MB continued their efforts in counteracting the secularization of Egypt 
throughout the late 1930s. They formed a youth organization - the yellow-shirted 
“rovers”- in direct reaction to the Green Shirts of the Young Egypt party and the 
Blue Shirts of the nationalist Wafd. 286  They organized and led rallies and 
demonstrations in the name of sharia law and its implementation in Egypt’s legal 
framework. Expectedly, with their excellent organizational skills and al-Banna’s 
charismatic personality, the MB were so successful in recruiting more followers 
and supporters, that they eventually appeared on the political scene as the Wafd 
party’s main contenders.287 According to Richard Mitchell, on the premises of the 
Cairo University: 
“The main divide was between supporters of the Wafd and of the 
Muslim Brothers. In effect, “the communists were in tactical alliance 
with the Wafd; the Brothers were most usually supported by the 
National Party, the young Egypt party of Ahmed Husayn, and a 
number of smaller groups of various political shadings.” 288  
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Al-Banna’s belief that Islam was an all-comprehensive religion encouraged 
him to influence and infiltrate all segments of Egyptian society. As they formed a 
strong bond with the labour movement, the MB engaged Egypt’s population 
through economic means, and “established enterprises of its own and granted 
workers shareholding rights in those companies.”289 Ultimately, al-Banna’s vision 
did not include the Brotherhood overtaking the current governing power, as he 
would support whichever structure existed, reforming it from the inside by 
continually attempting to implement Islamic guiding laws and principles to the 
existing government’s laws.290 To this effect, al-Banna wrote to King Farouk on 
several occasions, to give him suggestions and alternative plans to a better 
system of governance through the implementation of Islamic principles.291 
  
The MB’s First Attempt at Electoral Participation 
Forming a political party, or functioning like one, was not one of al-Banna’s 
ultimate goals, despite the fact that he ran and lost parliamentary elections in 
1942 and 1945.292 He fielded seventeen candidates in the elections, with him 
running in the governorate of Ismaliyya.293 These events took place, despite his 
aversion to participating in and acknowledging secular institutions and activities, 
as he believed that the practice of elections was against the basic tenets of Islam 
and sharia, and in direct contradiction to the concept of bay‘a. 294 To make 
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matters more difficult for al-Banna and his candidates, the government pressured 
al-Banna and his followers to “make a written statement declaring his loyalty to 
the government and the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which was the legal 
foundation for the British presence in Egypt,”295 in addition to withdrawing from 
elections. Despite his condemnation of political parties as a Western imposition 
that contradicted the concept of bay‘a and unity and promoted fragmentation and 
disunity, he proposed that the Brotherhood join al-Hizb al-Watani (the nationalist 
party). Under the impression that a link with a highly popular party would assist 
his own movement, al-Banna did not mind allowing for an exception to his rule.296 
 
Al-Banna’s Accommodationist Approach and Methods  
Al-Banna’s actions, during his brief rule of the MB organization, are 
reflected in the MB’s evolving relationship with the regimes of Nasser, Sadat, 
Mubarak and the post-revolution era. His ‘accommodationist’ style is evident in 
his changing views of electoral and parliamentarian politics and relationship with 
the governing system; he did not outright forbid or reject the violent tactics of 
many of his fellow Brothers. Despite his own moderate personal vision, he 
accommodated his more militant supporters by forming a secret paramilitary 
group under the name of Nizam al-Khass (Special Apparatus).297 According to 
one of the founding members of the group, al-Banna had in mind an idea of a 
“(military) aspect of da‘wa (proselytizing or preaching of Islam) activity …of a 
military group that would encapsulate the idea of jihad in Islam… he was keen to 
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emphasize military activity in order to demonstrate the idea of jihad. But he was 
frightened.”298  
Al-Banna’s actions during the Second World War marked the turning point 
between him and the monarchy of King Farouk. Al-Banna took part in anti-British 
pro-Axis plotting, which resulted in his banishment from Cairo and the banning of 
the MB’s meetings and publications. 299  In retaliation to the dissolution and 
banning of the MB, the Special Apparatus took matters in their own hands, and 
launched a series of violent attacks against the British, killing an Egyptian judge 
and attempting a bomb attack on a Cairo courthouse in 1948.300 However, it was 
the assassination of Prime Minister Nuqrashi in December 1948 that decided al-
Banna’s tragic fate. By that time, the membership of the MB had reached two 
million people.301 Unaware of the existence of on-going internal tensions within 
the organization, and desperate to appease the government, al-Banna issued a 
public statement declaring that those who perpetrated the acts of violence were 
“neither brothers, nor are they Muslims.”302 His efforts to detach himself from the 
violent forces within his movement were all for naught as he was shot and killed 
by the government’s secret police on February 12, 1949.303  Expectedly, his 
assassination was followed by mass arrests of MB members. The organization 
got a second chance to redeem itself and atone for its actions when the ban on 
the movement was lifted in 1951.304 The MB joined forces with the Free Officers 
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led by Nasser and Mohammed Naguib, and successfully overthrew King Farouk 
in 1952.305 
 
The 1952 Revolution and the Nasser Era  
During his short leadership of the MB, Hasan al-Banna was seen as a 
charismatic leader who single-handedly founded the well-structured organization 
of the MB.306 The only other individual to gain a popular following such as that 
experienced by al-Banna was ideologist Sayyid Qutb, but he was never 
burdened with the responsibility of the highest position of the General Guide of 
the Muslim Brotherhood.307 In effect, Al-Banna’s position remained unoccupied 
for two years until Hasan el-Hudaybi assumed power. El-Hudaybi was appointed 
as the General Guide,308 and with his ties to the palace and the Free Officers,309 
the retired judge led the turbulent and highly unstable organization into a new 
era. Unfortunately, this era was marked by mass arrests, torture and executions, 
as Nasser and the Free Officers rose to power and eradicated any faction or 
institution that might have been a source of threat to their stability.310  
With the expulsion of King Farouk and dissolution of his court and rule, the 
MB had served its purpose, and in 1954 Nasser dissolved the organization of the 
MB.311 The reasons for the dissolution of the organization could be found in the 
events of those two years between the 1952 revolution and 1954 when the MB 
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was banned. The difference in views among the MB members had managed to 
exacerbate quickly after al-Banna’s assassination, and they were manifested in 
one grave and extremely memorable error in judgment: attempting to 
assassinate Nasser.312 In 1952, due to the Brotherhood’s close ties to the Free 
Officers, they were safe from the new government’s actions to eradicate all rivals 
and opposition. 313  Classified as an association, the Brotherhood was not 
disbanded like other organizations.314 As a matter of fact, they even believed that 
they had the necessary leverage to demand of Nasser certain changes to the 
legal code; changes that Nasser refused, as they mostly centred around the full 
application of sharia as the legal basis of the Egyptian government.315 Nasser’s 
conundrum was that while he was not responsive to the continuous protests and 
flow of demands from the Brotherhood, he was not in the position to give up their 
support and popular backing.316 He, thus, invited the MB to join the ‘Freedom 
Organization’ (Hai’at al-Tahrir), which was formed by Nasser and the Free 
Officers. The ‘Freedom Organization’ aimed to “represent the people directly” 
and pool the resources of previous organizations into one political hub. 317 
Suspecting that the MB would lose its independence if it were brought under 
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government control permanently, thereby crippling the organization, el-Hudaybi 
refused Nasser’s invitation.318  
Expectedly, the rift between the MB and Nasser’s government 
exponentially grew. 319  At the same time, el-Hudaybi was struggling to 
communicate and control the paramilitary wing of the organization – the Special 
Apparatus - which had its own views on dealing with the new government, and 
ultimately rejected el-Hudaybi’s authority and rule.320 In October 1954, the more 
zealous members of the Brotherhood tried to assassinate Nasser by shooting 
him eight times in Alexandria. The organization was obliterated in little time; as 
six leaders of the organization were executed and thousands of members were 
imprisoned and tortured.321 
  Among those imprisoned in 1954 was Qutb, who founded a more radical 
definition of jihad, different from al-Banna. Qutb described jihad as a “complete 
armed rebellion against rule by secular laws and as a declaration of the freedom 
of man from servitude to other men.”322 Also, while al-Banna had called for 
reforms of the Egyptian political and legal systems, by urging leaders to 
implement Islamic law, Qutb communicated a more violent message; he declared 
religious war against the Egyptian state. 323 
The members that survived the Free Officer’s crackdown and torture went 
underground. The years between 1954 and 1965 saw two movements taking 
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shape, one in prison with Qutb and his followers, and the other underground 
members as the remaining free members recruited new people using Islamic 
rhetoric and symbolism.324 It was at that time that the women of the Islamist 
movement gave their greatest input and made a lasting impact on the future of 
the movement.325 Qutb’s powerful ideologies, which strongly spoke against the 
regime that targeted the Brothers and tortured them - as a result of their 
popularity among the lower and middle classes - gave way to an identity to which 
many Islamists related. The Qutbist movement was created and grew within the 
organization by the mid 1960s, and was given the name ‘Organization 1965’.326 
Eventually, this movement became a stepping-stone to the formation of the 
militant Takfir wil Hjira group that was established by the Qutbist Mustafa Shukri, 
who opposed the Brotherhood’s accommodationist and pacifist approach 
towards the authoritarian government.327 By the time the Muslim Brotherhood 
was rebuilt in 1965, the government realized that the MB presented a real 
potential threat to the continuity of its rule. Nasser responded quickly and 
destructively, by authorizing twenty thousand arrests, replete with torture and 
executions.328 Qutb was among those executed. 
It has been argued that the government wanted to ensure that they could 
monopolize or at least control Islamist trends and achieve full legitimacy in the 
eyes of Egypt’s Muslim majority.329 As a result, Nasser gained control of Al-
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Azhar; long perceived as the main centre of Islamic learning and 
jurisprudence.330 In addition, Nasser believed that controlling al-Azhar would curb 
the MB’s popularity and influence that threatened the stability of his 
government.331 Nasser’s fears were not unfounded. As Egypt’s defeat in the 
1967 war broke down the nation’s resolve and faith in Nasser’s pan-Arabist 
vision, Egyptians searched for another beacon of hope and unity, eventually 
gravitating towards the growing number of Islamist groups for a “religious 
alternative to Nasser’s secular, socialist political style.”332 
The death of Nasser in 1970 marked the end of Arabism in Egypt. 
Arabism disintegrated due to Sadat’s changes in Egypt’s governing style and 
market economy.333 In effect, he supported more liberal policies such as the 
privatisation of the economy and allowing more political participation.334 Just like 
Nasser, Sadat manipulated the people’s religious sentiments and their high 
regard for religious symbols to further his popularity and political agenda, and to 
counteract Nasser’s loyalists and leftists in the ASU.335  
 
The Sadat era and the Introduction of the MB to Party Politics 
As the MB’s membership steadily grew due to their continuing da‘wa 
movement and popularity amongst student associations and professional 
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syndicates, the government again responded with arrests and interrogations.336 
Despite that, the 1980s saw regular elections and a greater degree of freedom of 
the press of which the MB took full advantage. 337 The 1980s also saw the first of 
many attempts by the MB’s new generation to establish a political party. 
Nevertheless, the Parties Commission continually rejected their applications, as 
religion based political parties were not allowed. 338  At the same time, the 
commission turned down “90 percent of all applications to set up political parties, 
irrespective of the political or religious affiliation of the applicants.”339  
With the support of the Sadat government, the new generation of the MB 
emerged as major players in Egypt’s social and political scene. While the older 
generation was sceptical of the government, due to their experience of arrests 
and torture under Nasser’s rule, the younger generation believed in expanding 
their support base though running in every election to further their national 
exposure.340 Because the organization already had efficient organizational skills 
and the tools to organize political campaigns, the MB’s younger generation which 
included prominent members such Abu-Ala al-Madi, Essam el-Erian and Abd al-
Moneim Abul-Fotouh, easily landed in “leading positions within the unions of their 
respective professional trade.”341 For all intents and purposes, the 1970s saw the 
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resumption of al-Banna’s pragmatic accommodationist style.342 The MB decided 
to fully utilize the newfound freedom by spreading their message through the use 
of the constitutional channels that were presented by Sadat’s government.343 To 
further prove their commitment to accommodating the government, the third 
General Guide Omar al-Tilmisani was pushing for the MB to become more of a 
civil society organization without a violent entity. On the other hand, the older 
members of the MB, especially those belonging to the Special Apparatus like 
Mustafa Mashhur and Kamal al-Sananiri, fiercely opposed this move. 344 
However, the MB’s renunciation of violence as a strategy, and their redefinition of 
the concept of jihad to represent more of a personal and collective struggle for 
social justice for the purpose of building an Islamic state, 345 set the MB apart 
from militant Islamist groups such as al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, which was 
ultimately responsible for Sadat’s assassination.346  
For the next several national elections, the MB ran in alliance with other 
parties.347 In the 1984 People’s Assembly elections, the MB ran as part of the 
Wafd Party’s list. It was a situation that suited both sides. The Wafd was one of 
the oldest political parties dating back to the early 1900s and was fully legitimized 
and ingrained in Egypt’s political culture; and the Brotherhood had the popular 
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backing and numbers to ensure a sufficient number of votes. 348 This alliance 
gained fifteen percent of the vote, 58 seats, where eight seats went to the MB’s 
candidates.349 Proving that the organization had an agenda of its own and was 
only loyal to its vision, the MB switched allying fronts and decided to run with the 
Labour and Liberal Parties for the 1987 elections.350 Because those parties were 
not as dedicated to their vision and mission as the Wafd party was, the MB was 
able to convince the Labour and Liberal Parties to adopt their goal: to include the 
implementation of sharia as part of its program.351 This alliance came to be 
known as the Islamic Alliance, which won seventeen percent of the vote, 56 
seats, with the MB occupying 36 seats.352  
 
The MB’s Growing Political Exposure  
The 1990s marked a drastic change in the relationship between the MB 
and the government. The Mubarak regime sought to cut down and undermine the 
MB’s power and societal influence through the introduction of a new electoral law 
that favoured Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP).353  In the months 
leading up to the 1990 parliamentary elections, this law was introduced which 
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resulted in the MB and Wafd Party boycotting the elections in protest.354 The 
1995 elections were marred by undemocratic practices of discrimination by the 
government and the NDP against opposition parties such as the MB. Expectedly, 
the women nominees suffered as well. In addition, the MB’s popularity in 
professional syndicates led the government to freeze elections within these 
syndicates to prevent their further success and advancement, despite the fact 
that the MB never constituted more than fifteen percent of the syndicates’ 
membership, which according to Ottaway is only reflective of a protest vote.355  
In 1995, aware of the threat presented by the MB as a result of its forceful 
voice in professional syndicates, Mubarak publicly denounced the society for its 
politicization of the unions during his Labour Day speech.356 To make matters 
worse for the MB, an assassination attempt on Mubarak’s life took place in June 
1995, while he was in Addis Ababa for a meeting of the Organization of African 
Unity. The MB denied any prior knowledge of the attack and condemned such 
violence, but it was reprimanded and accused of communicating with the 
responsible parties: the Sudanese National Front and the Egyptian Jihad and al-
Jama‘at Islamiyya groups.357 MB members were rounded up by the thousands 
and were subjected to military trials.358 Fifty-four MB members received three to 
five years of hard labour, including the most influential members for the new 
generation: el-Eryan, Muhammad Khayrat, Muhammad Habib, and Abul-
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Fotouh.359 The events that took place that year were regarded as the most 
corrupt and most violent forms of abuse of power shown by the Mubarak 
government against the non-NDP candidates contesting for parliamentary 
seats.360  The MB was able to field seventeen candidates, triggering violent 
reactions and demonstrations at the doors of voting stations, as the Mubarak 
regime scrambled to stop the MB from securing one-third of Parliament seats.361 
The police killed dozens and hundreds were injured as the Mubarak regime 
secured a 94 percent majority.362 Just one Brother was elected, and was later 
disqualified for “belonging to a banned organization.”363  
 
The Organization and its Ideologies  
The MB is internationally known for its Islamic ideology and its well-
organized movement. Robert Mitchell’s book “The Society of Muslim Brothers” 
offers the most meticulous and detailed description of the Brotherhood’s 
hierarchical structures.364 It is important to note that following the Arab Spring; 
the MB has announced that there will be changes within the MB regarding its 
hierarchy and the internal elections for its Shura Council and Guidance 
Bureau.365 
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The MB’s Hierarchy and Structure  
The most senior position in the Brotherhood’s hierarchy is the General 
Guide, who is both head of the organization and chairman of its major governing 
bodies: the General Guidance Council and the Shura Council. The Guidance 
Council was legally composed of twelve members, nine from Cairo and three 
from the provinces. Theoretically, the three components of the central leadership 
– the General Guide, the Guidance Council, and the Shura Council – meet and 
reform the various functions in the general headquarters located in Cairo. The 
leading figure at the headquarters is the Secretary-General, and both his 
secretariat and that of the General Guide were defined as ‘the officials of the 
general headquarters.’ The General Guide must be at least forty years of age 
and must be elected by an absolute majority in the Shura Council, from 
candidates nominated by the Guidance Bureau.366 In reality, decision-making 
takes place amongst few senior leaders.367  The 100-member Shura Council 
(majlis al-shura) is the group’s legislative body, responsible for issuing 
resolutions and reviewing the annual report and budget. The Council is supposed 
to convene every six months; where its members serve four-year terms and 
should be at least thirty years old. However, the Shura Council whose members 
are elected by provincial councils, have not met since 1995 according to public 
knowledge.368 The fifteen-members of the Guidance Council (majlis al-irshad) are 
selected from the Shura Council and monitor the decisions in informal 
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consultation with governorate-level leadership. Members of the Bureau should 
also serve four-year terms and must be at least thirty years of age. 
 
The MB’s Principal Documents and Structural Defragmentation  
“The Fundamental Law of the Organization of the Muslim Brothers” and 
“General Internal Regulations” are two primary sources for the MB’s 
“organizational structures and its administrative and technical operations.”369 The 
MB”s technical operations have two aspects. First, its administrative operation is 
comprised of six committees (lijan), directly responsible to the Guidance Council: 
financial; policy; legal; statistics; services; and legal opinions.370 Second, there 
are ten sections (aqsam) concerned with ideology or indoctrination: propagation 
of the MB’s message (nashr al-da’wa); labour; peasants; family (ūsra); students; 
liaison with the Islamic world; bodily training; professions; press and translation; 
and the Muslim Sisters.371 
  According to el-Ghobashy, this organizational structure stayed the same 
until 1992 when a provision was introduced calling for the re-election of the 
General Guide and setting the term of office at five years, without specific term 
limits specified.372 The MB described itself as an organization that follows these 
eight principles:  
“(1) a da‘wa from the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet Mohamed 
(2) a method that adheres to the Sunna (3) a reality whose core is the 
purity of the soul (4) a political association (5) an athletic association 
                                            
369 Mitchell, 163. 
370 Ibid.  
371 Ibid., 170. 
372 El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis Of The Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 377. 
 122 
(6) an educational and cultural organization (7) an economic 
enterprise and (8) a social concept.”373  
 
Due to the organization’s illegal and underground status, it was difficult to 
convene and meet with the MB’s committees in the frequency and manner 
stipulated in the organization’s by-laws.374 
 
The Evolution of al-Banna’s Vision and The Present MB  
Most of the influential ideologies the MB follows originated from al-Banna, 
as he introduced the concept of Islam “as a comprehensive system (nizam 
shamil).”375 With the MB being originally a grassroots movement, working within 
the current governing system, its ideology centred on working to change the 
existing political culture as a prelude to transforming the state.376 It continually 
changed and adapted to different political opportunities, all the while building on 
its popularity and following.  
As mentioned earlier, al-Banna was not in full support of multiparty 
representation. In his opinion, without multiple parties “parliamentary life is 
perfectly compatible with the teaching of Islam; because parties create ‘disunity’ 
in the nation making them incompatible with Islam.”377 At the same time, al-
Banna had several ideas for reforming the Egyptian Parliament and parties. His 
propositions included:  
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“(1) the establishment of a catalogue of ‘qualities’ which should inhere 
in candidates whether they are representative of an ‘organization’ or 
not; (2) the definition of a limit to electioneering; (3) the reform of 
election schedules and voting procedures to free them from tampering 
of vested interests and compulsory voting; (4) ‘harsh punishment’ for 
election ‘forgery and bribery.’ ”378 
 
It cannot be denied that, as an organization, the Brotherhood endured more 
incidents of violence and oppression than most organizations in the region.379 As 
a result, the Brotherhood continues to be distrustful of the government or any 
governing entity.380 The same caution is exercised in their dealings with most 
organizations and political parties, to the extent that the MB has become 
characterized by many as an elusive unit with a well-hidden agenda.381 More 
often than not, the women of the MB executed these agendas, with al-Ghazali 
being the most active da‘iya and Muslim Sister, during the Nasser era of MB 
oppression and imprisonment.  
 
Point of Convergence: Zaynab al-Ghazali  
Islamist influences have been evident in feminist writing since the birth of 
the women’s rights movement in Egypt. In 1907, Jamileh Hafez was the first 
Egyptian woman to publish a journal which she dedicated mostly to detailing and 
explaining women’s rights in Islam.382 The Islamist and feminist movements have 
experienced similar interactions with the Egyptian regime, and have battled on 
the same grounds against the authoritarian powers of the Egyptian government. 
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Nevertheless, they have always been on opposite sides in regards to women’s 
rights and liberties.383 According to Hafez, Zaynab al-Ghazali’s work was a strong 
force, which aimed to improve the lives of those belonging to both movements.384 
As stated previously in this chapter, al-Ghazali started her activist career 
in the fold of Shaarawi’s EFU. Soon enough, she became disillusioned with the 
Union’s lack of religious direction, and at the age of eighteen, al-Ghazali formed 
her own women’s organization: the MLA in 1937.385 Al-Ghazali represented the 
new generation of Islamist feminists that sprouted from Shaarawi’s rich grounds 
of female activism. She differed from Shaarawi in two major aspects. First, she 
championed women’s rights as long as it was in the name of Islam and within an 
Islamic framework.386 Second, she actively opposed the governing rule through 
her literary contributions, whether it was the British rule or that of Nasser and the 
Free Officers. 387  More often than not, her opposition was in line with the 
underground banned movement – the Muslim Brotherhood.  
Al-Ghazali gained worldwide recognition due to her autobiography.388 
Many academics and analysts have studied and presented their findings and 
conclusions on al-Ghazali’s life and achievements within the MB and her MLA 
organization. 389  In effect, she still remains the first of many female Muslim 
activists in Egypt. Yet, there is some contention, as to whether she led her life as 
an Islamist; and an integral part of the MB, or as an Islamic feminist - a person 
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who dedicated her life’s work for the advancement of women’s rights within the 
margins of Islam.390 Al-Ghazali’s literary work in the form of books, articles, and 
editorials focus on the woman’s first and foremost duty as a mother and a wife. 
She insisted that without the successful fulfilment of those roles, the Islamic 
ūmma will fail and regress into another dark age - jahiliyya - driven by 
Westernized influences. 391  During the MLA’s active years (1936-1964), al-
Ghazali added on to the responsibilities of the MLA by training women the virtues 
and responsibilities of da‘wa. The MLA’s da‘wa operation was known as the 
‘Centre for Preaching and Advice’ and was affiliated with the al-Azhar University. 
Al-Ghazali’s organization continued to train women in the skills of da‘wa until the 
late 1950s.392 
Egypt’s history of women’s movements had just as many Islamist activists 
as secular voices.393 Al-Ghazali’s legacy stands on its own, however, as she was 
the only female activist to publicly state her loyalty and affiliation to the MB, all 
while keeping her organization separate and independent. When she declined al-
Banna’s invitation to fold her organization into the MB’s, al-Ghazali responded: 
“Zaynab al-Ghazali al-Jubayli approaches you as a slave who has 
nothing but her worship of God and her total devotion to the 
service of God’s call. You are the only one today who can sell this 
slave at the price he wishes for the cause of God, the exalted.” 394  
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As a result of declining al-Banna’s invitation, the MLA openly developed 118 
branches with over three million members, until it was taken apart by the Nasser 
regime in 1964.395 Nevertheless, al-Ghazali was an integral part of the MB’s 
activities, especially when they were banned in 1954, and many of its senior 
members were arrested and imprisoned. Al-Ghazali continued their work on the 
grassroots level by integrating herself into their Egyptian da’wa movement. Due 
to the nature of al-Ghazali’s organization - which was viewed as a woman’s 
philanthropic gathering - it escaped the wrath of the Nasser regime.396 In 1957, 
the MLA gained official recognition under the auspices of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. 397 
When al-Ghazali refused to cohort with the Nasser regime and spy on the 
MB, her organization was disbanded, and she was forced to continue to meet 
with other MLA members in the privacy of her home.398 At the same time, her 
home also served as a meeting place for the MB’s younger members. 399 
Organizing underground activities and cooperating with the MB were enough to 
anger the ruling regime, and to get her arrested in 1965, along with many MB 
members. 400 In 1966, she stood trial and was sentenced to hard labour for life, 
and her association was banned permanently.401 In 1971 she was released as an 
act of good grace on behalf of Sadat. 402 
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Throughout her life, even after she was released from prison, she 
advocated women’s rights and female participation in the Egyptian society, but 
strictly within the confines of an Islamic framework.403 Due to her strong aversion 
to secular feminism and to anything with a Western theme, her da‘was centred 
on spirituality and conservatism.404  But the fact of the matter was that her 
ideologies contained a strong feminist influence as she continually fought for the 
inclusion of women in the Egyptian society, to fulfil their calling and take their 
place in building a strong Egyptian Islamic state.405 At the same time, all her 
efforts to include women within the Egyptian society were tinged with her support 
of maintaining a patriarchal traditional establishment within every Egyptian 
household and institution.406 She believed that Islam contained no issues that 
were women-centric, as the religion viewed men and women in a in a unified 
sense with clearly defined roles for each. In effect, al-Ghazali believed that both 
sexes were equal in the eyes of God in terms of ‘divine blessing’. However, when 
it came to worldly issues, she believed in gender roles and responsibilities such 
that leadership roles were made for men, while roles that depended on nurturing 
characteristics were of the women’s specialty; seeing that women represent the 
mothers and caregivers of partnerships between men and women in an Islamic 
society.407 
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But what was most memorable about al-Ghazali, and a matter of 
extensive research, 408  is the contradiction between her ideologies and her 
personal life and work. When researching her life’s work, one finds that she is 
presented as a strong courageous woman who stood as an equal amongst the 
Muslim Brothers and contested the government’s secularism, and was jailed for 
it.409 However, she was the same ikhwanji who called for Muslim women to stay 
at home and to tend to their most important job: being a good role model as a 
mother and educating the future mujhadeen (singular of mujahid: those who 
struggle or strive through jihad) and tomorrow’s Muslim mothers.410 Furthermore, 
she did not heed her own call to obey and fulfil one’s husband’s needs, as she 
divorced her first husband for standing in the way of her activities of da‘wa and 
supporting the Brotherhood.411 When she married her second husband, it was 
not before he agreed to allow her to continue with her work, and to uphold her 
right to request a divorce as well, if he could not bear her prioritizing her vision for 
an Islamic state over that of her wifely duties.412 Al-Ghazali believed that Muslim 
women were tasked with responsibilities that far exceeded that of fighting for 
equal political representation. She expected a good Muslim woman to:  
“be well educated, cultured, knowing the precepts of the Quran and 
the Sunna, knowing world politics, why we are backward, why we 
don’t have technology. The Muslim woman must study all these 
things, and then raise her son in the conviction that he must possess 
the scientific tools of the age, and at the same time he must 
understand Islam, politics, geography, and current events…Islam 
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does not forbid women to actively participate in public life…as long 
as that does not interfere with her first duty as a mother…”413  
 
Further, it is because of the Muslim women’s important mission to educate the 
young, that makes her “duty of da‘wa” more important than that of a man’s, in al-
Ghazali’s opinion.414 On the political level, al-Ghazali asserted that a woman is 
equal to a man, in that she is eligible to vote and for political representation in a 
secular or Islamic government, in accordance with the rights bestowed on her by 
Islam.415 After her release in 1971, al-Ghazali continued to advocate for the 
formation of an Islamic state void of any secular rhetoric or structure.416 Al-
Ghazali held lectures and wrote about her vision for an Islamic society, where 
women’s rights were realized and respected, in al-Da‘wa and in Liwa al-Islam 
magazines.417 
According to al-Ghazali, it is the woman - the Muslim mother - who is 
capable of steering the Islamic ūmma in the right direction, by being the role 
model at home for the future generation of leaders and warriors. However, what 
made several female writers investigate the life of al-Ghazali further was the 
contradiction of her da‘wa, her words of advice to Muslim women and her 
personal life. At first glance, it would be easy to label her as a hypocrite when 
she urged women to conform to household and wifely duties; whilst she worked 
side-by-side with MB activists and outlaws during the Nasser years, divorced her 
husband when he denied her the freedom to do ‘God’s work’, and chose to heed 
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‘her calling’ towards God and the MB over her obligations towards her second 
husband, as well as her choice not to bear children.418 Al-Ghazali, in fact, viewed 
herself as one of the ‘chosen’ few who were given the strength and willpower to 
withstand the oppressive Nasser regime, hence sacrificing her biological duty as 
mother and wife for the realisation of an Islamic ūmma. Mahmood’s interpretation 
of al-Ghazali’s verification of her life choices reveals that  
“only in situations where a women’s loyalty to God is compromised by her 
obligations toward her husband and family, is there space for debate on 
this issue, and it is within this space that al-Ghazali formulates her dissent 
against her husband.”419  
 
Moreover, al-Ghazali particularises in her memoir her experience in prison, 
where she had first spent a year in the state’s military prison with men like Sayyid 
Qutb, as well as thousands of MB members, giving her further reason to 
separate her life experiences from that of other Muslim Sisters. Her prison 
experience presented her with an additional starting point to further compare her 
experiences to that of the MB’s men, who were not bound with overwhelming 
household duties.420 
Throughout her da‘wa movement, she spoke of her duty and that of 
Muslim women as two separate - but equally important - set of responsibilities.421 
She was to continue the legacy of al-Banna by fighting the corruption of Nasser’s 
regime, and to continue her politically-infused da‘wa movement during the Sadat 
and Mubarak regimes through the publication of weekly editorials as well as 
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heading the occasional workshop or conference organized to battle Westernized 
feminist movements that she viewed as an attempt to cripple the Islamic society 
from within.422 She described in her books her close relationship with al-Banna, 
her respect and admiration of his organization and her loyalty to the MB, whilst 
keeping her autonomy by refusing to combine the MLA with the Muslim Sisters 
Division. Cooke argues that al-Ghazali feared that if she grouped her association 
with that of al-Banna’s, her voice would be drowned out by al-Banna’s formidable 
organization and she would lose her equal standing, reducing her association 
and her skills to a “position of complementarity at best, subordination at worst.”423 
Al-Ghazali continued to instil in her many readers and followers the virtues 
of staying at home attending to what is a ‘natural place’ for a woman, as opposed 
to trying to juggle both a job, amongst strange and unfamiliar men, as well as her 
duties at home. She further emphasises that it is the splitting of a mother’s time 
between her job and her home that leads to the degradation of the Islamic 
society, as she becomes absent in her own home.424  Many female Islamist 
activists and academics agreed with her views regarding the focus on the family 
unit from within, such as Ezzat.425 Today’s Muslim Sisters agenda complements 
those views as well, as they are mainly responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of an Islamic curriculum within the homes of the MB members, 
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and continuing their da‘wa movement for the purpose of creating a healthy and 
strong Islamic society in Egypt and eventually on a global level.426 
In al-Ghazali’s perspective, there was no contradiction between the way 
she lived her life and the ideas she preached. She explained that she did not 
have any child-rearing obligations, and she knew of her calling at the age of 
eighteen. Additionally, it was before she was married that she pledged her life to 
God and to the achievement of an Islamic ūmma. 427  Cooke provides an 
alternative interpretation to al-Ghazali’s mixed messages. She argues that if al-
Ghazali had practised what she preached, i.e. encouraged the Sisters and all 
women to set aside their responsibilities towards their husbands and worked 
outside of their homes in matters that did not concern her family, she might have 
posed a serious threat to the men in religious movements such as the MB. In 
effect, al-Ghazali “pragmatically chose a rhetoric of domesticity which allowed 
her to live a life of public activism.” 428  It must be noted that despite the 
recognition that al-Ghazali attained as a da‘iya and MB member, there have been 
some questions as to the reliability of her information. Her books recounting her 
days in prison detailed her visions and dreams of her conversations with the 
Prophet and al-Banna.429 There is, thus, some reluctance to depend completely 
on her published work and speeches as viable sources of factual information.430 
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When comparing her memoir to that of Abdel-Hadi’s, it becomes obvious that 
while the latter contained facts, dates and details, the former’s accounts were 
overwhelmed with passion and fervour for the Islamic cause and the road to 
martyrdom.431  
It is important to note that Zaynab al-Ghazali was not the only activist who 
was considered an Islamist feminist.432 Labiba Ahmed also paved the way for 
today’s Islamist feminists, but she mostly stayed out of the limelight.433 She, too, 
pushed for the Islamization of the Egyptian society, but not necessarily the 
state.434 She wanted Islam as a guide to a way of life and to ensure women’s 
equality in her society.435 At the same time, she maintained strong bonds with 
pivotal personalities who were responsible for the 1919 revolution. 436  For 
example, she preferred the Islamic influence evident in the nationalist Watani 
Party to that of the liberal Wafdist party, as the members of the Watani party 
were avid supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and the concept of gender 
segregation.437  
At a time when secular feminists were active and defiant of British rule, 
Labiba’s nationalist and feminist efforts can be traced through her activities within 
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the Society of Ladies’ Awakening to the Muslim Sisters. Labiba and her fellow 
sisters set certain codes a woman should live by, which included actions that 
resulted in the following outcomes:  
“The happiness of her household; to maintain proper modesty in the 
street; to wear traditional Egyptian dress and to cover her face, 
hands, and other body parts stipulated by Islamic law; to avoid 
theaters and comedy houses; and to leave behind corrupt ancient 
customs.”438 
 
A delegation from the Society of Ladies’ Awakening marched in a 
women’s demonstration on 22 March 1921 in support “of ‘Adli Yakan’s ministry, 
which the Wafd opposed.”439 During their march, the women carried banners with 
the name of the organization in unison to that of their president under the sign of 
three stars, a cross, and crescent – a common combination of symbols that 
reflected Egyptian national unity at the time.440 However, her rhetoric started to 
take on a more Islamist tone as she joined the Muslim Sisters. During that period, 
Labiba focused on mobilizing women from working-class neighbourhoods against 
the British occupation. An example of her mobilization methods could be seen in 
her encouragement of Egyptian women to sew their own clothes that were 
manufactured using Egyptian cotton during the boycott of British goods in 
1922. 441  Labiba participated in demonstrations, gave speeches, founded 
associations, published a periodical and spoke on the radio and to gatherings, 
where she was heard throughout the region.  
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Even though there is not much literature about Labiba, her 
accomplishments seem to rival those of al-Ghazali’s. Labiba connected different 
factions and ideologies throughout her active years. She supported the Watani 
party, and at the same time was linked to the Wafdists and later Islamic 
nationalists. She also represented a connection between the Salafis 442 and the 
MB as she encouraged the abolition of Western practices such as going to the 
cinemas and modern dress, and at the same time fought for politicizing Islam.443 
Despite the fact that the modes of mobilizing the female masses used by Labiba 
were mostly modern and were mostly practiced in Western and democratic 
societies, she tirelessly fought to counteract the feminist and secularist strains 
that were infiltrating Egyptian homes. Labiba was also described in some 
instances as a Salafist, as she opposed folk customs (much like the Salafis living 
in Egypt today) that deviated from Islamic practices and disdained the “blind 
adoption of Western practices by Egyptian Muslims” that was prominent due to 
the existence of French and British influences in Egypt at the time. 444 Moreover, 
Labiba maintained a close relationship with al-Banna himself due to the 
similarities in their organizations’ vision and missions. Labiba ensured that al-
Banna’s words were immortalized by documenting his speeches in her journal.445 
It is important to highlight al-Banna’s relationship with a strong female figure, as it 
reflected the MB’s view of women as active agents in Egypt’s society and is an 
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acknowledgement of their equal footing with men in society. However, the MB’s 
stance regarding female political participation in today’s political sphere might not 
necessary complement, or mirror, al-Banna’s views and practices.  
In the 1930s, Labiba began to lay the grounds for her alternative ideas of 
women’s activism. At a time when women still did not have the right to vote, or 
take on official political positions, Labiba chose to make women’s presence felt 
through the written word. She founded the journal al-Nahda al-Nisa’iyya (The 
Women’s Awakening), to disseminate her views, and to contest the images and 
works of secular feminists, by calling on women to return to their Islamic roots 
through modesty and conservative practices.446 Labiba claimed that hers was 
“the first Egyptian women’s journal” to research “social and religious affairs.”447 
Coincidentally, it was in this journal that al-Ghazali announced the formation of 
her Muslim Ladies Association. In addition, Labiba supported young writers, both 
men and women, including Aisha ‘Abd al-Rahman, who wrote articles and poems 
under the pen name Bint al-Shati’ (Daughter of the Coast).448 
Nationalism, Islamism and feminism were three ideologies that took root 
and were nurtured during that transitional period.449 Likewise, the transitional 
period that Egypt is experiencing post-Mubarak and post January 25 revolution, 
is characterized with the same focus on trying to establish a new Egypt and a 
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new system of governance.450 The only difference is that the ideologies present 
at the turn of the 20th century formed and grew in reaction to an authoritarian 
force and oppressive rule.451 At first, after the toppling of the Mubarak regime, 
there was no point of contention where these ideologies can work together. That 
temporary power vacuum resulted in a plethora of political organizations and 
parties scrambling to undermine one another. One thing is certain: in a political 
movement, where more pressing issues need to be resolved, such as Egypt’s 
deteriorating economy or its relations with the West and Israel, feminist issues 
could once again be neglected as other aspects take precedence in the priority 
ladder.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Muslim Sisters Division and their Non-electoral Participation in Egypt’s 
Politics and Society 
 
The first half of the 20th century witnessed Egypt’s changing political 
atmosphere, where a flurry of ideologies and movements surfaced and that 
intended to characterize the different pockets of Egyptian society. Providing an 
overview of that time period with the historical background chapter was crucial to 
explaining the evolution of women’s movements in a post-colonial Egypt, as well 
as the birth of a grassroots Islamist ideology and organization. While, according 
to some, the feminist movement in Egypt was one of the fastest and most 
impressive collaborations of strong-willed and educated women within the Middle 
East,452 Nasser’s reign saw all non-socialist organizations and their respective 
activities silenced, with political activists, outside of Nasser’s circle, retreating to 
the dark corners of society.453 An even more violent fate awaited the MB and its 
Islamist tones. Consequently, the Muslim Sisters did not fare well either.  
 
Al-Banna and the Muslim Sisters  
To this day, the MB has yet to experience a leader as charismatic and 
influential as al-Banna. He preached and lectured groups of Muslims in their 
homes, coffee shops and mosques, pushing forward Egypt’s religious revival.454 
This was part of al-Banna’s strategy to “counter the secularizing trends evident in 
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Egyptian society and to spread Islamic teaching,”455 much like the attempts of 
Islamist feminists Labiba Ahmed and Zaynab al-Ghazali in forming the Society of 
Ladies’ Awakening and the Muslim Ladies Association (MLA) respectively.  
Al-Banna and his followers also established primary schools that included 
Islamic teachings and traditions within Egypt’s purely secular educational system. 
In addition, al-Banna supported Egyptian women and young girls by creating a 
school in Ismaliyya to teach girls (“future mothers”) about their religion.456 In 
1932, his “Institute for Mothers of the Believers” developed into the first branch of 
the Muslim Sisters (al-Akhwat al-Muslimat), which consisted mostly of the female 
relatives and wives of the Muslim Brothers.457 The Muslim Sisters eventually 
opened a branch in Cairo, with some sources indicating that Labiba Ahmed was 
in charge of its activities.458 In effect, al-Banna took part in the social and political 
movements, that were brought on by Western and Arab influences in 
acknowledging and empowering women, by setting up a division dedicated to 
dealing with those ‘women-friendly’ interests mentioned above.459 Branches of 
the Muslim Sisters spread throughout Egypt and numbered fifty within four years, 
with a membership of five thousand.460 
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The Extensive Arrests of MB Members and the Underground Mobilization of the 
Muslim Sisters  
When the MB joined forces with the Free Officers to overthrow the 
monarchy, it seemed that Egypt would enter a new phase of political freedom; 
free from oppression and unjust persecution. 461  Whereas Nasser and his 
comrades had always intended for socialist rule, and only relied on the MB for its 
impressive human resources and ability to mobilize and steer large numbers of 
Egyptians for political means.462 Soon enough, the alliance that existed between 
both entities dissolved rapidly. With the widespread arrests and disappearances 
of MB male members that started in 1954, the MB families were left with no 
means to support themselves, and were at the mercy of any charitable outlet. 
The Muslim Sisters took it upon themselves to do what they were trained to do 
best: provide support and gather donations from the public and MB supporters 
and sympathizers. 463  Abdel-Hadi explained in her memoirs how the Sisters 
divided their tasks and responsibilities: 
“We divided up all our time and tasks in the Muslim Sisters Division. 
Several of the Sisters were delegated to collecting donations and 
sending them to the homes and families of the imprisoned MB 
members and MB fugitives. For each region in Egypt, there was a 
delegate that gathered those donations from the MB supporters 
living in her region/district. Each delegate had a list of names of 
those arrested and their respective addresses and the number of 
family members left behind. The delegates would then relay this 
information and data, as we proceed to divide up the rations and 
donations to distribute in accordance to the data provided. I was in 
charge of organizing and directing the delegates.”464 
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As the Sisters began to regroup and ease the financial difficulties of the MB 
homes that were left without a breadwinner amongst them, the police and federal 
authorities monitored their activities, homes and daily routines. The Sisters also 
used to attempt to deliver food to the MB inmates at prison. On more than one 
occasion, Abdel-Hadi and Qutb’s sister Amina would prepare the food and head 
out to the prison to feed the Organization 1965 imprisoned members. Abdel-Hadi 
described one of the visits:  
“I was standing in front of the prison gates looking for a way to 
deliver the meals, when gunshots were fired, and we proceeded to 
run away as federal police agents pursued Amina and I. We narrowly 
escaped.”465  
 
Abdel-Hadi’s husband had managed to avoid arrest for eight to ten months.466 
During that time period, the police came by her house periodically, subjecting her 
to routine checks in search of her fugitive husband. Abdel-Hadi recounted one 
police visit:  
“I called out: who’s there? To which he countered: ‘Open the door or 
I will break it down. He aimed his gun at my chest and pushed me to 
the wall. I responded with controlled anger: ‘This house has been 
searched many times. To which he answered ‘and we will continue 
to search it many times more.”467 
 
 Despite the continuous police visits and surveillance, Abdel-Hadi succeeded in 
meeting with her husband once or twice, after ensuring that she had managed to 
lose the police officers assigned to follow her. Eventually though, her husband 
was caught and imprisoned.468 
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The Muslim Sisters also faced imprisonment, but before that period the 
Sisters continued the MB’s political activities by serving as messengers and 
points of contact between their imprisoned family members and those who 
managed to escape the Egyptian authority. 469  The correspondences and 
information shared led to the formation of the ‘Organization 1965’ which 
inevitably led to the arrests of many of the Muslim Sisters including Abdel-Hadi 
and al-Ghazali.470 Al-Ghazali represented one faction of the “tripartite rule of the 
MB” from 1957 until her imprisonment in 1965, when she received a twenty-five 
year sentence for conspiring to assassinate the president.471  The two other 
personalities were Abdel-Fattah Ismail and Sayyid Qutb. It was in these military 
prisons that al-Ghazali realized her Islamic calling and her duty towards the MB 
and the Islamic ūmma. Her prison memoirs “The Return of the Pharaoh” shed 
light on the tough experience the Sisters had to endure, and the arrests of both 
young girls as well as women over the age of sixty, solely because of their 
connection with MB members: 
“We were eight women crammed into a small prison cell. Mrs 
Naeema, the wife of the General Guide el-Hudaybi was with me as 
well. She was almost seventy years of age…they did not take into 
account her age or her physical limitations. Her prison days 
witnessed a number of trials and harsh situations. Federal agents 
arrested dozens of Sisters from across Egypt - Mothers and Sisters 
of the MB male members, as well as women who had no relation to 
the MB, in addition to the Sisters who are officially charged with 
partaking in Organization 1965’s covert activities like Zaynab al-
Ghazali, as well as Amina and Hamida Qutb.”472 
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As opposed to regular female prisoners, Abdel-Hadi recalled that the women of 
the MB were subjected to harsh conditions in military prisons before being sent to 
the women’s prison.473  
When assessing women’s roles during the Nasser years through a 
socialist lens, it is evident that women did attain a few rights and freedoms. With 
women gaining the right to vote in 1956 and Nasser’s socialist program, Egyptian 
women were encouraged to engage society both socially and politically, and had 
greater access to all forms of social services. However, those political privileges 
did not extend to the Muslim Sisters due to their illegal association. The same 
restrictions on individual rights were felt by women who were part of the feminist 
movement and who have had their organizations closed and disbanded in the 
face of an overbearing socialist government.474 Moreover, the new opportunities 
presented to women in the public social domain were not felt in political arenas, 
which were influenced by the controlling socialist government. The 1957 
elections saw only two female Parliament members.475  
 
The Result of Sadat’s Forgiving Reign: The Flourishing of the MB and its 
Activities  
The Sadat and Mubarak years did not witness the rise of another 
commanding personality such as al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali continued her da‘wa 
activities well through the Sadat and Mubarak years until her death in 2005. 
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Many of today’s leading female personalities in the MB and FJP joined the MB 
and their cause because of her charismatic persona and her ability to 
successfully recruit new members through her da‘wa. 
Sadat’s rule was much gentler on the Muslim Sisters as well as on the MB 
as a whole. With the release of hundreds of MB members from jail and the 
resumption of their newspaper and magazine, al-Da‘wa, the Sadat years 
presented a more liberal political environment than those of Nasser’s with 
regards to the MB’s movement. During the time it was in circulation, it published 
women-related pieces encouraging the minimization of women’s role outside of 
the home and urging women not to leave their homes except under extraneous 
circumstances. In addition, if women were to work, the commentaries and 
editorials suggested that they occupy positions that were complementary to 
women’s gender roles like that of a teacher or gynaecologist and steer away from 
occupations with negative stigma that surrounded such an administrative role, as 
a secretary for example, which would leave the female employee exposed to 
male employees.476 As Sadat focused on creating an image of a tolerant Egypt 
through his liberal economic polices, he had also decided to loosen government’s 
restrictions on political activity. 477  This was also a response to “mounting 
pressure for political freedom emanating from a more pluralistic society.” 478 He 
allowed the MB to resume their activities, but did not grant them legitimacy, by 
legally recognizing them as an organization. He also allowed the MB to 
temporarily resume the publication of its old monthly magazine: Al Da’wa, in 
                                            
476 A.R.A Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 30, 2012. 
477 Linjakumpu, 82.  
478 Ibid.  
 146 
1976.479 Even though the publication was banned again in 1981, it efficiently 
served its purpose as an outlet to the development and dispersal of its Islamist 
views. The end result was that the 1980s and 1990s in Egypt were described as 
a time when Islamist activities dominated and started to infiltrate Egyptian 
popular culture. Young Islamists who were affiliated with the MB led many of 
these activities including:  
“attending (or helping organize) Islamic seminars, plays, and public 
prayer sessions; voting for (or running as) Brotherhood candidates in 
student union, faculty club, professional associations or parliamentary 
elections; distributing campaign literature and running errands during 
the lead-up to electoral campaigns; and participating in peaceful 
marches, sit-ins, and demonstrations.”480 
  
The second wave of Islamic sentiment was spearheaded by the MB’s 
desire to see an Islamic society within Egypt’s borders. In keeping with their 
accommodationist style, the MB chose to let go of the idea of an Islamic state 
that would encompass the majority of the Middle Eastern region, and settled for 
the more reachable goal of an Islamic theocracy that replaces Egypt’s secular 
government. As Sadat allowed the MB more freedom to carry out its activities, he 
felt the rising pressure with regards the implementation of sharia and Islamic law 
in Egypt. With Sadat’s amendment of Article two of the constitution in 1971, 
making sharia a source of legislation, the MB felt they were gaining ground within 
this regime.481 At the same time, Sadat embarked upon a liberation program 
starting with establishing women’s rights in an effort to counter the MB’s growing 
popularity and powerful Islamic wave. It was in this context that Sadat, in 1979, 
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passed new laws that guaranteed women thirty seats in the National Assembly, 
well known as Jihan’s Law.482  
 
The Scaling Back of the Muslim Sisters’ Activities Post-Nasser 
The MB were allowed to resume their activities but were still considered a 
banned organization.483 As Sadat relied on the MB to counter the effects of 
Nasser, social conservatism began to be widely visible in Egyptian society in the 
change in dress, appearance and language. This was initially instigated by 
Muslim and Islamist women, and later by the Muslim Sisters.484 In effect, Sadat 
ensured the termination of the Nasserist influence in the face of strengthening 
political Islam in Egypt. As the MB adopted an accommodationist style yet again 
with the regime, so did the Muslim Sisters in assuming a complementary role to 
the MB social movement. The MB chose to focus on its da‘wa activities, and 
whenever possible, access the public sphere though the democratic means that 
were available to them, such as activities on university campuses and within 
professional syndicates.485 Jihan el-Halafawy recounted that when she joined the 
MB, “Sadat was opening up a bit and politics were thriving at the universities. … 
the Muslim Brotherhood seemed closer to [her] views because it taught that 
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Islam was a way of life.”486 The men that joined the MB during their rising 
popularity on university campuses represent today’s MB middle generation. 
Moreover, like el-Halafawy and her husband, this generation of Islamic activists 
originally represented the core of the more active Islamic group al-Jama‘a al-
Islamiyya.487 The eventual politicization of the MB during the Sadat years and the 
creation of their accommodating tactics of political bargaining and compromise, 
led to the moderation of the middle generation, and eventually to their resignation 
or expulsion from the MB during the Mubarak years.488  
 Drawing from al-Banna’s early vision that the rebuilding of an Islamic 
ūmma starts from inside the Muslim home, the MB turned their focus to the 
Muslim Sisters yet again, to work on rehabilitating the individual, the family unit 
and eventually the society. As a result, the Muslim Sisters went back to their 
original roles of assisting the MB male members behind the scenes. In a sense, 
the Muslim Sisters Division adopted the MB’s accommodationist attitude by 
helping their male counterpart, in favour of their own aspirations to take a more 
political and public role in Egyptian politics; similar to the MB’s attitude towards 
operating under the watchful gaze of the Sadat and Mubarak governments. The 
Sadat era, according to Badran, included the second Islamist wave, where all the 
advantages that women had accessed during Nasser’s reign - especially in 
regards to their presence in the workplace - began to diminish, as more women 
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were attracted to the appeal of the growing Islamist trend; and were reassigned 
to the home.489 The Muslim Sisters started to cement the curriculum, set by the 
MB, into their daily routine with regards to the MB’s educational programme for 
young MB children, as well as the informative guides for Sisters which were 
created to achieve a true Muslim home for their husbands and children.490 
Moreover, with the Islamist trend came a new frame of reference and social 
discourse that led to the rise of the ‘mosque movement’. Moghadam explained 
that the 1970s in the Middle East and Egypt witnessed the replacement of the 
secular frame of reference by an Islamist one where “the mosque movement 
emerged . . . in response to the perception that religious knowledge, as a means 
for organizing daily conduct, had become marginalized under modern structures 
of secular governance.” 491  With the MB expanding their popularity base, a 
parallel universe began to thrive in Egypt. Wickham described it as a “parallel 
Islamic sector…that include[d] private mosques, Islamic voluntary associations, 
and Islamic businesses.”492 
As the women temporarily disappeared into their homes taking over 
gender-suitable roles of education and da‘wa, the men were occupied with re-
entering Egypt’s public and political space, a feat now made possible through 
Sadat’s tactic of encouraging greater political freedom than his predecessor.493 
Professional syndicates were overtaken with a large number of MB members, 
and their presence was felt in major public universities such as Cairo University 
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and Ain Shams University. In effect, the women activists of the Nasser era 
retreated into a ‘period of hibernation.’494 The continued absence of a structure or 
plan of the Sisters discouraged any ideas of joining the MB men in reconstructing 
the organization through more visible roles. Instead, the roles of women within 
the MB were reduced to the occasional individual effort prompted only by one of 
the Muslim Sisters. 495  Overall, the Muslim Sisters were engaged in areas 
concerning education, where MB female university students supported MB male 
members running for Student Union positions, and at the same time, 
disseminated the MB’s message and vision of an Islamic society.  
The 1970s and 1980s saw the rising trend of re-veiling on university 
grounds and on Egypt’s streets - an expression of religious identity and a political 
statement - against the secular hold of the Sadat and Mubarak governments. The 
return of the veil also highlighted the growing popularity of the MB organization 
and its socially active Muslim Sisters Division.496 As the MB’s services grew more 
popular on university campuses, they began to recruit and organize the Muslim 
Sisters’ roles to better provide the MB’s useful services to young MB students 
such as free transportation, lecture notes and medical care.497 Expectedly, the 
leaders of those teams of Muslim Sisters were always men. Such measures were 
justified by their belief that the MB male members were more knowledgeable 
about Islam than women. 498  As the MB’s influences infiltrated academic 
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campuses, their teachings began to spread out to Egypt’s streets. People altered 
their everyday mannerisms, such as greetings, dress code and artistic tastes in 
regards to film, art and music, to something more acceptable for an Islamic way 
of living.499 
 
Women’s Descriptive Representation and the Quota System in Egypt’s 
Parliament 
Even though the Muslim Sisters were still absent from the political scene 
until the 2000 elections, the number of women who gained seats in the 1979 
elections as opposed to the 1987 elections, is indicative of the level of support 
women received when running for parliamentarian or governmental roles. The 
1979 elections saw the highest number of women in Parliament in Egypt’s history 
at nine percent of the total number of representatives.500 In 1984, women gained 
36 seats (8.25 percent) due to Sadat’s law requiring the presence of one female 
candidate on each list for all 31 constituencies.501 Soon after the assassination of 
Sadat, in 1985, the quota system that reserved seats for women in both the 
People’s Assembly and Legislative Assembly was declared unconstitutional.502 
 With the dissolution of Sadat’s favourable law to female representation 
and with the introduction of a new system of mixed elections in 1986,503 only 
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eighteen women succeeded in the 1987 elections, bringing down the percentage 
of women in Parliament to 3.9 percent. Hatem described such results as a 
negative impression of Mubarak’s new rule and his NDP, showing a decline of 
female nominees within the all-powerful party.504 Women did not fare well either 
in the 1990 elections, occupying only fifteen out of 600 seats.505 The percentage 
of female representation dropped to 2.2 percent in 1990, and to 1.6 percent in 
the 1995 elections.506 
During the 1995 elections campaign, eighty-seven women filed for 
candidacy as independents, not as candidates of a political party.507 Only ten 
women succeeded, but as a result of the events that took place during the 
elections, the government was pressured by the public to allow a runoff election, 
where only eight women were elected.508 In addition, as a reaction to seeing 
women occupying parliamentary positions in Egypt, the first half of Mubarak’s 
presidency was subjected to a growing Islamist opposition to women in politics. 
According to Sorenson, the opposition viewed it as “Coptic efforts to mobilize 
women and partly due to the reform efforts of Jihan Sadat…whom many 
Islamists regarded as a heretic.”509  
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Female political participation originating from the MB cadres was nearly 
impossible to document during the Nasser era, due to the banned status of the 
organization. Instead, the Muslim Sisters were occupied with their da‘wa 
movement and in assisting the MB male members. Even al-Ghazali’s activities 
prior to her arrest could be described as complementary to that of the MB’s roles 
and responsibilities as leaders of the Islamist organization. However, the Muslim 
Sisters were able to show their skills and strength in the absence of the MB male 
members by pooling their available resources and mobilizing people to provide 
financial assistance to MB families. The Nasser era witnessed the beginnings of 
the Muslim Sisters’ social and political participation, which ultimately gave way to 
other activities on university campuses as well as in educational institutions and 
professional syndicates during the Sadat and Mubarak years. The Muslim 
Sisters’ activities during the Sadat era were mostly restricted to da‘wa activities, 
as the MB took the decision to engage the government for the first time through 
electoral activities and fielding male candidates. Electioneering 510 for the MB 
was still an uncharted territory during the Sadat years, which is why issues such 
as female representation did not register as a priority in the campaigning 
activities under the Sadat regime. The Muslim Sisters’ practice of 
‘accommodating’ may prove effective in the long term as it is assisting them in 
gaining the necessary tools to negotiate a greater range of freedom from within 
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the unbending structure of a patriarchal society and its traditions.511  In the 
meantime, with their experience in electoral campaigns and running as 
candidates for the MB, the Muslim Sisters continue to focus on their religious 
activities that almost always happen amongst other women and other Muslim 
Sisters. This can, in fact, give way to the formation of their own collection of ‘sub-
societies’, which can enhance the Muslim Sisters’ position in negotiating with the 
male members of the MB.512 However, the segregation of the sexes as seen 
between the MB and the Muslim Sisters Division may also hinder the women 
from ever occupying leadership positions of any sort. 
The tense relationship that existed between the MB and the Mubarak 
regime in particular (due to the MB’s participation in the elections) gave rise to 
what has been described by Noha Antar as a “mutual fear reflex.”513 This reflex 
required the MB, in the past, to adopt a strategy of secrecy that prevented them 
from executing any of their activities in a transparent manner due to security 
reasons. At the same time, incidents of violence increased amongst other party 
supporters and constituents in the street, due to the feelings of resentment and 
lack of faith in any party’s ability to fully engage the regime as opposition 
parties.514 
 Under the previous regimes, when MB members were repeatedly 
harassed and arrested, the Sisters were responsible for ensuring that the work 
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and mission of the MB continued to exist and thrive under an authoritarian 
governmental power. Continuous arrests of MB members and violence in Egypt’s 
streets further discouraged women from participating in elections altogether. At 
the same time, a small number of women rose to the occasion when the MB 
decided to field female candidates in 2000-2010 elections. However, the barring 
of women from senior and more public positions within the MB, as a survival 
tactic used by the MB for years, may no longer be applicable in the post-January 
25 era in Egypt.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Muslim Sisters and the 18-Day Revolution 
 
The obvious vote rigging and the absence of any democratic principles 
and governance in the 2010 elections were the ‘straws that broke the camel’s 
back’.515 The 420 seats allocated to the NDP – out of 518 People’s Assembly 
seats – have been viewed by some as a sure way for the NDP to overtake any 
future opposition, a tactic which Sadiki argues was “either a sixth term for 
Mubarak senior or a first term for Mubarak junior.” 516The suppression of all 
opposing voices of the authoritarian regime was more than the Egyptian people 
could bear. In particular, it was the Egyptian youth that could no longer accept 
the status quo that maintained the economic deterioration of their country and the 
rising inflation and unemployment rates.517 The Egyptian youth had watched their 
parents struggle under the injustices of the corrupt government for years, and 
saw an inevitable repeat of their parents’ oppressed rights and freedoms, as 
more graduates entered the market only to lead a life of unemployment in 
Egypt’s current economy. Over the past couple of years, Egypt’s economy has 
slowly improved, but this improvement did not trickle down to the masses. 
Corruptive habits persisted as profits were enjoyed mostly by the wealthy elite 
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while the rising rates of inflation were mostly felt by the lower to middle income 
families.518  
 
The Beginnings of a People’s Protest: The January 25 Revolution  
The movement that started as a small protest initiated by a frenzy of 
Internet activity, and exploded into a full-fledged revolution, was a youth 
movement. The sight of Tahrir Square filled to maximum capacity, with both men 
and women from different backgrounds and social classes united for one 
common purpose, was a sight that most Egyptians never thought would ever 
take place. These 18 days brought together different political currents for the 
purpose of building a better Egypt, a country where democracy can finally take 
root after decades of corruption and authoritarianism weeding its way into every 
Egyptian household. The impression was that when people left their homes and 
camped out in Tahrir Square during the 18 days, they were joining the uprising 
as Egyptians, and not as liberals or Islamists or leftists, and most definitely not as 
representative of any particular gender. It was believed that women of different 
backgrounds and religions had a common goal: to see Mubarak leave and give 
back to all Egyptians their will to choose. Niqab-wearing conservatives were part 
of a cohesive entity alongside liberal and secular Egyptian women. 519  The 
revolution was a demonstration of human will and the desire to achieve 
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something bigger and more important that transcends the different divisions that 
existed between people. Furthermore, the high participation of women – who 
during the Mubarak regime had experienced limited involvement in politics and 
politically infused situations – was quite memorable during those 18 days of the 
revolution. 
 
The Presence and Numbers of the MB  
Initially, the MB was aware of the plans of the protest and it had been 
decided that the MB is not to take part.520 But as the days passed and the 
situation in Tahrir Square became more dramatic, the protest movement started 
to take on a whole new persona of nationalistic anger and indignation directed at 
a failed government regardless of people’s different affiliations. The protestors 
emanated from all classes, educational backgrounds and from all walks of life. 
When the MB later decided to join demonstrators in Tahrir, they did so as 
Egyptians and not as a socio-religious movement. The goal of the revolution was 
clear: to regain the dignity and rights of the Egyptian people. According to Essam 
el-Erian, the MB was careful not to give religious characteristics to the revolution 
whenever members of the MB were allowed (by the General Guide’s office) to 
join in the protests without pushing the MB’s agenda or chanting any of its 
Islamist slogans.521 In addition, the MB received several threats by state security 
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forces to stay away form the rising protests, to avoid the arrest of their General 
Guide Mohammed Badie.522 Nonetheless, their presence was felt as the days 
passed in Tahrir Square, especially when security issues became a serious 
concern. Amr Hamzawy noticed that those who stood at the security checkpoints 
at Tahrir Square were Muslim Brothers, ensuring the safety of the Square’s 
inhabitants. They were also responsible for providing tents, blankets and tea for 
people who chose to stay in the Square until Mubarak stepped down.523 The MB 
was taking an active role in the revolution, but only to provide their greatest 
asset: their organizational and mobilizing strengths. 
 A Muslim Sister recounted her experience before those days were 
defined as a revolution. She had left her home the day of January 25 with her 
daughter and other Muslim Sisters to join one of the many protests the MB were 
known to stage, not understanding that they would soon be swept into an even 
bigger protest movement. She recalled that as she headed towards the Supreme 
Court (close proximity to Tahrir Square) to demonstrate alongside other MB 
members:  
“We did not know it was going to turn into a revolution. Whoever 
claims that they knew all along that this was a revolution is a liar. 
We arrived at the Supreme Court a little early, and we decided to 
go into the Journalism Syndicate building to wait for instructions 
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from Dr. Beltaji. We then went to the Supreme Court and were met 
with many armored police cars and trucks. Our demonstration 
consisted of 16 men and four women. We had been demonstrating 
for almost two hours, when we realized that more people from the 
street were starting to join us, as the demonstration turned into one 
against the security forces. We shouted at them: ‘this is our land, 
this is our country,’ to reaffirm that we were not going anywhere. 
With more and more people joining our demonstration, the size and 
momentum of the protest eventually spilled into Tahrir Square and I 
- amongst others – pushed aside steel fences and barricades to 
make way for those behind us.”524  
 
Initially, the plan laid out by the organizers for the January 25 protests was 
announced on Facebook and to the press a day earlier, with the time and 
locations of said protests. The plan included a march down side streets of 
downtown Cairo, to encourage more people to join and increase the size of the 
marches. The hope was that the magnitude of the protest flooding into the 
downtown area would be too big for the security forces to control.525 The Muslim 
Sisters found themselves spilling into Tahrir Square, where some MB men 
proceeded to the People’s Assembly building. The women stayed behind in the 
Square for fear that they get trapped in the narrow Mohamed Mahmoud street 
that lead to the People’s Assembly and where several MB members were 
eventually beaten including MP Amr Zaky.526 The use of tear gas started after 
four pm that day and the Sister and her daughters were caught in the line of fire. 
By the end of the day, the number of protesters had exponentially 
increased and yet the state-owned broadcasting channels still insisted on 
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describing the situation as minor skirmishes of thugs.527 However, al-Jazeera and 
al-Arabiya news channels were broadcasting live at the Square, revealing a more 
accurate representation of the disputes between state security forces and 
protesters. 528  Another Sister described the challenges present that made it 
difficult for people to reach the Square safely:  
“I left home on the 26th and headed towards the Square via the 
Lawyer’s Syndicate building road. I was amongst a group of my 
work colleagues when we got surrounded by police that stopped us 
from getting through. As tear gas filled the air in the vicinity, we saw 
an opportunity to run past the police forces. As we made our way to 
the Square, and as we were passing Maspero (National Radio and 
Television building), we saw men capture protesters and throw 
them into an unmarked van. As a result, my colleagues and I opted 
to take refuge in Al-Jazeera’s office in Maspero, where we watched 
the events unfold.”529 
 
The Square was only occupied on the 28th of January. On that day – 
dubbed the Day of Rage – a direct message was sent from the MB’s Guidance 
down the hierarchy of the MB, stating that their participation was mandatory.530 
The MB soon joined the rest of the protesters mostly due to the pressure from 
the youth on the leadership.531 MB members were instructed by their ūsra leader 
via telephone to mobilize and head towards Tahrir Square.532 Still, while they 
encouraged their youth to participate and engage Egypt’s society of different 
ideologies and faiths, the MB was not participating formally in the protests.533 
According to a female supporter of the MB, who was present in Tahrir Square, 
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there was a directive to all MB members – on a national level – to head to Tahrir 
Square on February 2, 2011 – the Day of the Camel.534 For example, Mohamed 
el-Beltaji, a MB politician, rounded up almost 3,000 - 4,000 people in his stead to 
unite with the protesters in the Square.535 One of the daughters of a Muslim 
Sister, who was pregnant and present on the Day of the Camel, explained:  
“My daughter Fadwa was walking in the Square with a camel right by 
her side. The Sisters and I formed a circle around her to protect her 
from the camels and the water hoses. Khairat al-Shater’s wife 
covered her with a thick blanket to keep her warm after the water 
hoses had drenched her. It was at this moment that we saw people 
coming out of side streets and buildings asking us if we needed 
anything. We replied that we were in need of blankets due to the cold 
weather.”536  
 
The goals of the revolution remained unchanged and the MB still refused 
to join in its formal capacity. It was careful not to disrupt the diversity and 
cohesion of the people within the Square.537 Meanwhile, the MB cadres were 
spread out, lending a helping hand whenever they deemed necessary. They 
assisted in organizing rallies, providing loudspeakers and engaging the crowd 
without the use of Islamic rhetoric or themes of an Islamist nature.538 A temporary 
hospital was set up with the help of protestors who had medical degrees, who 
organized shifts to help the injured. Security checkpoints were set up all around 
the Square, to ensure that no acts of thuggery would taint the pure revolutionary 
goals. The first security checkpoint set up by the MB was at the Square’s 
                                            
534 "Day of the Camel” or Battle of the Camel” refers to the day when men on horses and camels 
entered Cairo's Tahrir Square to disperse the week long sit-in calling for the ousting of President 
Hosni Mubarak. Protesters went head to head with Mubarak loyalists in a fight that lasted well 
into the next day and which left 11 dead, and over 600 injured. 
N.S., Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, March 25, 2012. 
535 Ibid.  
536 H. A. M, Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 24, 2012. 
537 “Interview with Heba Morayef.”  
538 H.M., Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 30, 2012. 
 163 
entrance by Qasr al-Nil bridge when it was obvious that hired thugs armed with 
weapons and knives were slipping into the Square, in an attempt to scare 
protesters and disturb their unity. In effect, the MB directed all the MB members 
and people via telephone to enter through this route until they were assigned at 
every entry point. 539  A MB supporter explained that when she joined the 
revolution on January 28 – the Day of Rage – security checkpoints were set up at 
every possible entry point into the Square, with a majority of those stationed at 
the points being MB members. Moreover, MB shu‘bas were organized and 
mobilized according to a schedule to secure those entrances to Tahrir.540 At the 
time of setting up security checkpoints run by civilians and MB members, Muslim 
Sister H.A.M. and her daughters were approaching police officers trying to warn 
them of thugs and their plan to sabotage the protests:  
“My daughter went to an officer in charge, at one of the security 
checkpoints at the Square, and said: ‘Can’t you see those men with 
knives? Don’t you know they are only here to bully people and cause 
trouble? He replied: ‘How would I recognize them amongst all those 
people?’ And when she pointed out that the thugs were armed with 
knives and sharp objects, pushing over carts filled with food and 
supplies for the protestors, her complaints were ignored. We 
searched for different checkpoints to enter the Square until we were 
directed via mobile phone to the first checkpoint manned by the MB 
men. When my brother-in-law chose to exit from another checkpoint 
with food supplies, he was shot at.”541 
 
The MB provided food, water and blankets during those cold nights in the 
Square. Technology-savvy youth and those with media outlets and professional 
expertise headed several information units within the Square, to ensure that a 
continuous flow of information and images were being transmitted to international 
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news agencies; even during the days when internet access was suspended and 
cellular phone lines were severed.542  
 
The Muslim Sisters in Tahrir Square  
Within each of these initiatives that flourished and supported the protest, 
MB members were partaking in the process to ensure its success. With the 
organization’s extensive history in mobilizing and thriving under extreme 
conditions, the revolution was just another chapter in their continuous struggle 
against an oppressive regime. Naturally, the Muslim Sisters were part of the 
continuous support system that transformed Tahrir Square into an “exercise in 
nation-building”– as described by one activist blogger taking part in the protests. 
543 While in the past, the Muslim Sisters were perceived as the MB’s silent 
partners, after the revolution, they acquired a different image of active 
participants in the process that toppled the old government. This gave way to a 
more public and transparent role for the Muslim Sisters within the MB and its 
political party.  
The history of the Muslim Sisters is one of thriving behind the scenes; 
quietly bustling and mobilizing to support the organization of the Muslim Brothers 
and its movement. However, the 18-day revolution revealed the role of the 
Muslim Sisters. They were responsible for ensuring the security of the Square, by 
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stationing themselves at security checkpoints and patting down female 
entrants. 544  The Sisters especially thrived in the area that they were most 
accustomed to: support services. They provided unremitting support to all 
activists in the form of food, shelter, medical supplies and aid. The Sisters even 
took part in helping the protestors fight against acts of thuggery, by providing 
ammunition in the form of rubble and blocks of stones that they carried and 
transported in their long, conservative pieces of clothing.545  
Years of working underground as part of a large and well-organized 
grassroots movement provided them with a strong sense of responsibility and 
support towards their brothers, sons, husbands and male counterparts overall. A 
Muslim Sister who had been a member of the MB since 1977 portrayed the 
events that took place on January 25 when she was protesting with other Muslim 
Sisters that proved to be quite revealing of their years of oppression under 
Mubarak. She described how she continually pulled young boys and men away 
from the grasps of the police, who were trying to arrest and beat them down 
during the initial protest that took place not far from Tahrir Square.546 The youths 
she was trying to protect, were not MB affiliated, but were average Egyptian 
youths who shared her same vision of a future of social and democratic equality 
for future generations. She would grab them out of the police officers’ grasps 
shouting ‘he is my son, leave him alone!’ to which the officers would reply 
sarcastically: ‘all these young men are your sons?’547 Another Muslim Sister who 
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is an editor for the Al-Azhar Journal (Sout al- Azhar), described her daily 
activities during the later days of the uprising: 
“I like being useful in a field or task that I excel at… so I put my skills 
and expertise to the best possible use. I set up several units and 
offices around the Square as outlets for both the protesters and news 
agencies to exchange information, images and general news bites; 
to ensure that the most comprehensive story was spread globally 
through the several mediums available that day. At first, I 
communicated via phone with people, then contacted al-Jazeera and 
other media outlets. Due to security units trying to shut down all 
modes of communication, I moved from location to location as soon 
as the phones and other communication devices were discovered 
and dismantled.” 548 
 
She recalled spending two days in the office of the Democratic Front Party 549 
dissipating valuable information to protestors such as the best methods of 
protecting oneself from tear gas and pressure from water hoses.550  As the 
revolution progressed, she set up a media centre to document and monitor 
activities of thugs and collect evidence against them such as the types of 
weapons used, and communicated with the temporary hospital unit set up in 
Tahrir Square to keep a log of personal information of the wounded and killed.551  
A majority of the Muslim Sisters did not sleep overnight in Tahrir Square 
opting to return home late at night and join the fight early in the morning. 
However, this was not the case for all Sisters. The Muslim Sister that was 
nominated to run in the 2010 elections, only to have her husband arrested to 
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discourage her from running;552 could not go home the night of January 24, as 
the national security forces were stationed at her home in fulfilment of their 
directive to harass and bully her family.553 M.A.E. explained that: 
 “The MB was in a state of revolution from the 2010 elections in late 
November up until the days of the revolution. Security Services 
were in pursuit of my family and were monitoring our every move. 
They were stationed outside of my home from the dawn of January 
24, 2011 - to ensure that we do not join any demonstrations or 
protests.” 554  
 
She left with her family before January 24 and did not return home until the end 
of the uprising. She spent the 18 days in Tahrir Square in a tent set up by her 
son with the sign “Bansion al-Hurrieya” (Freedom Inn) pinned on it. In addition, 
her other son engaged in information disseminating activities, as he contacted 
foreign press outlets through his Facebook page before the internet blackout that 
was imposed on January 28, 2011.555 
Tahrir Square was always filled with women in large numbers, as they 
were given an equal footing in the face of a violent authoritarian force, and in the 
absence of any sexual harassment concerns. However, Nesrine Malik describes 
the presence of women during the 18 days as a practice of ‘tokenism’ as many 
viewed them as “the ultimate downtrodden victims, the sign that things are 
desperate, that even members of the fairer sex are leaving their hearths and 
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taking to the streets.”556 One Muslim Sister made use of that representation of 
woman as the fairer weaker sex to co-opt men into remaining steadfast in their 
protests. She sat down on a pavement in Tahrir Square, one night, holding her 
baby, in an attempt to shame men into staying. The rationale was that if a woman 
with her child is staying strong in the square, then the men should stay as well.557 
 
The January 25 Revolution: New Prospects, New Possibilities  
With the January 25 revolution and the dissolution of the Mubarak regime, 
anything is possible for the MB. The MB organization is adamant that it portrays 
its party - FJP 558 - in a friendly liberal light, with its quota of female and Christian 
Copt members. 559  After decades of oppression and intricate underground 
networks, the MB has emerged as the most organized collective in modern 
Egyptian politics.560 The year 2011 witnessed the Domino effect that led to the 
Arab Spring, where a chain reaction of social movements and people uprisings 
swept the region, and began to shape and define the new Middle East. The spark 
that ignited these protests across the Middle East had originated in Tunisia in 
2010, with the self-immolation of a street vendor in protest of the corrupt regime 
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that Tunisia had endured for decades. Soon after that unforgettable incident, the 
Arab spring spilled over and transformed the Middle East into the focal point for 
the submerged Islamist factions and organizations to burst out of their hiding 
places, and to freely contest for their place and rights in Arab society and 
government. With the dominant Islamist trend, came a series of pivotal questions 
and concerns, in the event that some of these countries will function now with a 
more Islamist agenda than ever seen before. For several political analysts and 
academics, the Arab Spring gave way to an Islamist Autumn and even a more 
sombre Islamist Winter, with Arab populations giving their votes to Islamist 
political parties, moving towards Islamist-led governments instead of Arab 
governments slowly transitioning into a democratic-like system.561 In the case of 
Egypt, the concerns circled around two main subjects: Coptic rights and women’s 
rights.  
It is evident, in light of the Muslim Sisters’ personal testaments of the 18-
day revolution, that they are an integral and active part of the MB organization. 
Within this movement, the Muslim Sisters have proven to be both a descriptive 
and substantive representation of Egyptian women within their organization. 
However, as academia furthers its study and research on the topic of women’s 
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representation, it becomes clear that understanding the definition and implication 
of women’s political participation is “much more complicated than counting the 
number of women present in a particular political institution and judging the 
actions of women representatives against a ‘feminist’ shopping list of 
demands.”562 With the formation of the FJP and the MB’s parliamentary activities, 
it has become impossible to ignore the conservative element in the 
representation of women in politics. Childs pointed out that acknowledging the 
conservatives in gender politics would push the studies of women in politics to 
eradicate “assumptions that the substantive representation of women equals the 
feminist substantive representation of women…. [and] also raise the possibility of 
non- and anti-feminist representative claims and actions ‘for’ women.”563 In the 
case of the Muslim Sisters, assessing their input and movement outside a 
parliamentary and electoral role is crucial in understanding the magnitude of their 
role and responsibility within an overwhelmingly patriarchal and Islamist 
organization. Women’s representation in the rising popularity of social movement 
and civil society organizations further highlights the importance of studying 
descriptive and substantive representation outside the confinement of 
governments and parliaments.  
With the deposing of Egypt’s ruling elite and change in government 
direction after January 2011, an assessment of MB’s activities in relation to 
women’s issues will take place, to pinpoint differences in leadership and direction 
within the organization and its party, if any. The next part of this research will 
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present the MB’s activities and political mobilization during and after the January 
25 revolution, and how it has affected the public roles of the Muslim Sisters on 
the street and in Egypt’s People’s Assembly and Shura Council elections. A 
discussion will ensue on the reality of the MB’s plan for reformulating the dated 
structure of the MB, and the possibility of women occupying senior positions in 
the MB and its Shura Council and Guidance Bureau. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Muslim Sisters’ Political and Social Activities 
 Prior to Elections 
 
 As the Muslim Sisters belonged to an organization that was mostly 
banned since its inception, their electoral activities were severely restricted and 
were delegated to a small number of elections. Part I highlighted how the Muslim 
Sisters were an integral faction within the MB organization through their great 
performance in non-electoral political activities. Part II will focus on the events 
that led to their increase in electoral activities and participation prior to elections 
and during the campaigning period, as well as demonstrate their trials and 
tribulations during and after election season. 
For Egyptian women, the victories achieved in the battle for equal rights in 
the first half of the 20th century can be summarised in the stipulations of the 
Constitution of 1923. The state affirmed women’s equal civil and political rights 
and equal public responsibilities as men, in the right to vote that women gained 
during Nasser’s reign in 1956 and in the stipulations of the Constitution of 1971 
under Sadat. The state  
“guaranteed a balance and accord between a woman’s duties 
towards her family on the one hand and towards her work in society 
and her equality with man in the political, social, and cultural spheres 
on the other without violating the laws of the Islamic shariah.”564 
 
The Muslim Sisters may have been active since their early beginnings and 
throughout the Nasser era, but there was an absence of any form of essential 
political participation on their part, except for al-Ghazali’s experience. To this day, 
al-Ghazali’s legacy and teachings are evident through the works of the other 
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Muslim Sisters. A legal consultant - H.A.M., who worked on the campaign of a 
Muslim Sister’s electoral candidate in 2005, 2010 and 2011, owes her activism to 
al-Ghazali. H.A.M. was singled out from the crowds of students during her 
college years due to her active background as the head of the Women’s Union in 
the College of Law at a Cairo state university.565 It was al-Ghazali that made her 
join the MB at the age of seventeen, where she was mentored by al-Ghazali at 
her home - twice a week - alongside nine other girls. During those meetings, they 
watched al-Ghazali carry out everyday chores like cooking and observed her 
dinner table decorum. They also studied her habits in the treatment of household 
employees and proper etiquette. Each of these women later became a leading 
figure who aimed to propagate the Islamic message and the Islamic way of 
life.566 This active Sister believed that she is eternally indebted to al-Ghazali for 
having taught her the principles and methodologies of da‘wa; in addition to her 
contribution to the development of interpersonal skills that are crucial in da‘wa- 
related activities, without compromising her values and public image.567  Al-
Ghazali was also the reason why another prominent Muslim Sister - Azza el-Garf 
- joined the MB aged only fifteen. 568 El-Garf worked with al-Ghazali for 4-5 years 
throughout her time in college where she completed a BA degree in Social Work. 
Her academic background in Social Work assisted with al-Ghazali’s desire to 
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568 For more details on Azza el-Garf’s political activities refer to Chapter Ten. 
 175 
apply an Islamic frame of reference to the many social issues in Egyptian 
society.569  
The Muslim Sisters’ stance within the MB is quite an ambiguous one. On 
the one hand, as discussed above, they have managed to prove that their skills 
are indispensible to the MB. On the other hand, they still accept a position that is 
subordinate to male leadership. The Muslim Sisters did engage in the MB’s 
political movement before the 2000 elections, when, in 1992, Dr. Wafa Ramadan 
ran in the Doctors Syndicate elections in 1992 on the MB’s slate.570 Yet, the 
Muslim Sisters do not demand greater roles in Egypt’s public space. They 
continue, nevertheless, to be politically and socially present in impressive 
numbers, during election season, commanding the attention of their senior male 
counterparts.  
 
The 1994 MB Document  
 As the MB made its way back to the center of the political arena by 
winning a number of seats during the 1984 and 1987 Parliamentary elections,571 
and with its impressive presence in professional syndicates, the MB realized that 
it is crucial to circulate documents that detailed their views regarding certain 
issues, such as women’s rights and party politics. In 1994, the document that the 
MB published entitled “Women and Political Pluralism” included several issues 
pertaining to women, such as matters of ownership and financial 
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independence. 572  That document reflected the organization’s complete 
transformation regarding its perception of the status and role of women in an 
Islamic society, both in practice and in reality. It was published by Ma’moun el-
Hudaybi, who was the official spokesperson of the MB at the time, before he 
eventually assumed the position of Deputy to the Supreme Guide. 573  The 
document laid out the MB’s beliefs regarding a woman’s right to occupy positions 
in public office and government and her right as a voter. Expectedly, the 
positions that women were permitted to occupy excluded that of the highest 
position in a state or Islamic ūmma; also known as al-Imama al-kubra or the 
position of the caliphate.574 The MB wanted to clearly assert there was nothing in 
sharia law that would conflict with a woman’s right to vote and run for Parliament.  
Many believed that the 1994 document was published as an introductory 
step to the MB’s plan to field a female candidate during the upcoming 2000 
elections.575 However, MB expert and analyst Abdel-Raheem Ali stressed that 
the document provided extensive details on women’s issues and their roles as 
voters, yet it did not delve too much into a women’s vital role as a candidate.576 
The document demonstrated how women’s rights issues necessitate a 
reinterpretation of some Quranic verses, in an attempt to break away from the 
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Old Guide’s traditionalist views. 577 Still, the document contained a chapter that 
focused on the Western model of women’s liberation. It described that model as 
one “based on a decadent philosophy that goes in contradiction with Sharia 
principles,” a statement that reflected the dominant outlook amongst a large 
segment of female Islamic activists.578 The 1994 document succeeded in what it 
set out to do: market the MB as an organization that does not stand against a 
woman’s God-given rights stated in sharia law. However, there was no mention 
of the Muslim Sisters in regards to their status and function inside the MB 
organization. Moreover, it did not expunge statements made by the older 
generation in regards to women’s role in society. For example, the former 
General Guide Omar el-Tilmisani reaffirmed his long-held view against equal 
rights, opting for a more acceptable complementarity role between genders: 
“I do not like to talk about women. Modern people may find this 
shameful, or cowardly, but I want nothing to do with modern theories 
and the equality of men and women. I still believe that a man is a 
man and a woman is a woman and that’s why God created her. A 
woman who believes that she is equal to a man is a woman who has 
lost her femininity, virtue and dignity.”579 
 
The MB did not come to its decision to field a female candidate quite so 
easily. First came the 1994 document, followed by the task of picking the right 
person to represent the organization. In addition to their desire to present the MB 
as a more tolerant and democratic organization, the MB estimated that a female 
candidate would minimize the acts of strong-arming that the government was 
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known to apply on the MB prior to and during previous election periods.580 
Ironically, and as mentioned before, avoiding this potential violence against the 
Muslim Sisters was the same reason the MB used during the 1984, 1987 and 
1995 elections.581 In effect, the MB hoped that including the women in elections 
would ensure that they do not face the same security clampdowns they endured 
in the past. 582  Several male candidates were already arrested during the 
campaigning period prior to the 2000 elections.583 Furthermore, due to the MB’s 
long history of arrests; many of the MB’s public personalities were imprisoned at 
least once, thus affecting their public appeal and popularity. The MB needed new 
faces and representatives who did not have a grim history with the state’s 
security forces. Thirty years after the first series of arrests of Muslim Sisters, the 
MB decided that women could finally assume a more public role.584 
 
Campaigning Activities and Methods  
The 2000 Elections - Placing a female candidate within the MB cadres was not 
received warmly at first, as several Salafi-oriented MB members and other 
conservative members were against it, stating that the situation was still too 
‘premature’ to allow women to run for seats.585 Nevertheless, the MB’s Guidance 
Bureau went ahead with its plans, selecting Jihan el-Halafawy as the candidate 
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in Alexandria. El-Halafawy described the mood of political upheaval that soon 
followed the announcement of her candidacy: “When I ran, the world was turned 
upside down, within the Brotherhood but also within the regime… It was a big 
crisis for the regime, which was saying that the Brotherhood was a backward 
organisation.” 586 Ali Abdel-Fattah, a MB’s spokesperson described that decision 
as a “practical application of the fact that women are half of the society.”587 
Abdel-Latif explains that the idea of a MB female candidate was devised by two 
MB members from the Alexandria division: Dr. Ibrahim el-Zaafarani (el-
Halafawy’s husband) and Abdel-Fattah. 588  The international community may 
have been surprised to see a woman represent the MB’s male-dominated 
political candidates, but several older members of the MB were not. 589  El-
Halafawy belonged to the politically active middle-generation of the MB that 
spearheaded the movements of re-entering Egyptian society and the application 
of the accommodationist tactic in regards to the government. In addition, el-
Halafawy was married to one of the Muslim Brothers’ leading architects of MB’s 
electoral strategy. Both el-Halafawy and her husband have been members of the 
MB since 1983.590 Originally, both belonged to another Islamist organization in 
the late 1970s; Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, which was the only outlet for a social 
Islamist movement at that time; as most of the MB’s senior members were in 
prison.591  
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El-Halafawy’s history is a further indication of her dedication to a life of 
Islamist activism in Egypt: 
“I had the support and approval of my husband. He worked with 
me during the election as my campaign manager, as he had 
plenty of experience with electoral campaigning and with the 
government’s security forces. He ran in elections three times 
before and was the Chairman of Alexandria’s Doctors Syndicate. 
However, due to his previous arrests and three prison terms 
during past elections; he was not eligible to run in the 2000 
elections.”592  
 
This information gave rise to speculations that el-Halafawy was running in his 
stead. El-Halafawy holds a Bachelors degree of Art (BA) in Finance, and a MA 
degree in Theology from al-Ahzar University, as well as a diploma in Political and 
Diplomatic Studies from the School of Commerce. Consequently, the MB 
believed el-Halafawi’s credentials made her more qualified than any other 
potential candidate from the Muslims Sisters Division.593 However, the mother of 
six was a homemaker for almost twenty years prior to the elections, which limited 
her exposure to any political activities. 594 Still, el-Halafawy and her husband’s 
ideologies were in line with that of the MB’s middle generation’s more politically 
active and flexible ideologies. El-Halafawy was eager to reflect the MB’s 
progressive views regarding women’s participation in elections as voters and 
candidates; in keeping with the MB’s 1994 document. El-Halafawy explained that 
she wanted to run: 
“to make use of the opportunity presented by the state’s desire to 
integrate women into the political process, and to clarify that Islam 
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does not compromise women’s rights… Women are very active in 
the [Muslim Brotherhood], though perhaps not visible. Remember 
that women voters are responsible for the success of the seventeen 
Ikhwan members of Parliament.”595 
 
The MB readied itself and took the necessary steps towards fielding its 
first female candidate in the 2000 elections with the publication of the 1994 
documents on women’s rights, as the organization repositioned its views 
regarding the contentious issue of women’s rights and their place within society, 
to better complement its evolving politicized image.596 According to one male MB 
member, the lack of female candidates in the elections in which the MB 
competed in 1984, 1987, and 1995 was due to two main reasons: 1- the lack of 
experience of the MB male members in regards to the electoral process in the 
1984 elections, which revealed the lack of competent cadres to represent the MB 
in Parliament and, 2- the security clampdown and continuous arrests to which the 
MB members were subjected, as seen in the days leading up to the 1995 
elections.597  
The 2000 elections marked the year the MB attempted to counter the 
accusations levelled at them for being traditionalist and undemocratic, by 
nominating Jihan el-Halafawy as their candidate in the el-Raml district of 
Alexandria. Nevertheless, after the challenges set forth by the government during 
el-Halafawy’s campaign activities, the representation of women in the arliament 
of 2000 reached only 2.5 percent (four women), marking a decrease from the 
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previous elections.598 Such results also highlighted the fact that there was a 
significant problem regarding female representation in all political parties; as 
independent candidates and eventually as parliamentarians. The NDP had six 
women nominees out of 444 candidates. Meanwhile, the 22 opposition parties 
nominated seven women out of 222 candidates. For example, the el-Ghad and 
el-Karama parties each nominated three women. The rest of the female 
candidates – 111 women – ran as independents.599 However, a woman from the 
NDP party list (i.e. did not run as an independent) was awarded the position of 
second deputy speaker in the 2000 parliament.600 Additionally, it did not help 
Egypt’s electoral process that a large majority of the population did not 
participate in the voting process, as they viewed it in its entirety as fraudulent. 
The opposition parties had no real staying power - due to the restrictive 
Mubarak’s 1983 Electoral Law - and were seen as nothing more than decorative 
ornaments to the false construct of party pluralism and democratic practices.601 
That same year saw the formation of the National Council for Women 
(NCW) headed by the First Lady Suzanne Mubarak. The NCW aimed to improve 
the status of women and promote their political presence. The Council was made 
up of governmental and non-governmental organizations that focused on the 
following: providing empowering political skills for women nominees, the creation 
of an environment supportive of political participation of women, and included 
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projects in advocating political participation.602 However, the one function of the 
NCW that drew the wrath of the MB and other Islamists was its research efforts 
in pinpointing the effective ways of studying existing problems women face within 
‘social and family contexts.’603  The existence of such an entity is pivotal in 
gaining a better understanding of the MB’s and the Islamists’ dislike of several 
amended laws. These laws directly affected women’s rights and were passed 
under the supervision and approval of the former First Lady and her many 
initiatives that have been branded as a tool to encourage the growth of Western 
feminist ideals on Egyptian soil.604 The MB opposed the NCW activities, but due 
to their banned status, they were unable to actively oppose or promote a public 
show of opposition to Suzanne Mubarak’s women’s initiative or the NCW’s roles 
in changing the personal status laws of Egypt. The rejection of laws passed in 
the presence of Suzanne Mubarak - meant to protect women and children - have 
been lumped in with the MB’s campaign against the influences of the old regime, 
and the ‘invisible hand’ that is systematically trying to destroy the advances 
gained during the post-revolution era. In effect, a war has been launched against 
the ‘Suzanne Mubarak’ laws, and her NCW association - irrespective of whether 
or not these laws already exist or not – which touched upon issues of FGM, 
divorce, and custody rights; laws that were beneficial to Egyptian women. Some 
activists credit the NCW for launching and supporting a range of initiatives to 
tackle women’s human rights, including the campaign to fight against practices of 
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FGM, sex trafficking and domestic violence.605 According to a researcher at the 
Human Rights Watch, the MB was against the government’s move to criminalize 
female genital mutilation (FGM).606 The MB were not entirely opposed to the 
practice of FGM, but believed that it should be up to each individual family 
whether or not to administer such procedures. Similarly, the MB was also against 
setting a legal age of marriage for children in 2008, which they saw as the 
government’s attempt to interfere in personal and private matters of families.607 
The formation of the NCW under the direction of Suzanne Mubarak for the 
purpose of educating future candidates in the electoral process, further 
convinced MB candidates such as A.G. that  
“women who did not belong to an Islamist agenda or organization 
were given the tools necessary to win, irrespective of whether or not 
they possessed the necessary qualifications such as experience 
and a relevant knowledge base of Egypt’s electoral and 
governmental systems.”608 
 
The reactions of the Muslim Sisters, and the MB overall, to the NCW illuminate 
the stark difference between the Muslim Sisters’ representation in politics and 
that of female politicians and activities belonging to secular entities. Moreover, 
due to the NCW’s prevalence in Egypt’s gender politics, the NCW’s role in 
affecting state laws has been a source of debate, and has been the focus of the 
MB’s FJP in regards to writing up their mission statement and party principles.609 
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The 2005 Elections - According to one Brotherhood leader, three factors led to 
the MB’s success in the 2005 elections: “preparation, planning, and reliance on 
highly qualified and competent activists.” 610  The preparations for the 2005 
elections began more than a year in advance as the MB carefully studied the 
sociopolitical maps of the constituencies.611 Moreover, the MB prepared three 
tiers of electoral candidates in the event that the government engaged in its usual 
targeted arrests. Even though Mubarak’s security apparatus was aware of the 
candidates that comprised the first and second tiers, they were generally not 
privy to the third layer’s names.612 The 2005 elections was a great presentation 
of the MB’s popularity and campaigning skills before the January 25 revolution. 
With 88 seats in Egypt’s Parliament, the MB succeeded in presenting a true 
threat to the Mubarak regime. Still, the MB managed to field only one female 
candidate by the name of Makarim el-Deiry, a widow whose husband - Ibrahim 
Sharaf - was a former assistant to the MB’s Supreme Guide and was also jailed 
from 1965 to 1974.613 El-Halafawy chose not to run in this round of elections due 
to family obligations, and explained that her experience in the 2000 elections 
might have been why the MB had only one Muslim Sister running in the 2005 
election.614 Originally, the MB had planned to field between 14-21 women on 
their list. However, in light of the constraints put forth by security officials, and in 
the midst of opposing sentiments and reactions from the female candidates’ 
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family members, the MB reduced their candidates to just one woman who was to 
run in Cairo.615 
Before the 2005 elections, the MB fully utilized the many benefits of its 
female members by organizing a campaign for the Muslim Sisters to encourage 
women to vote. Mekarim el-Deiry and Jihan el-Halafawy headed the campaign to 
encourage women to exercise their right to vote for the person or organization 
that they deemed fit, to represent them in Parliament. Of the many 
responsibilities delegated to the Muslim Sisters, the most important included the 
distribution of voting cards amongst MB members and voters, and the collection 
of the lists of registered voters in each constituency, for the purpose of screening 
them for possible errors or fraud.616 Moreover, young Muslim Sisters went door-
to-door lobbying for votes in the districts that the MB were known to run, such as 
el-Deiry’s Madinat Nasr and el-Halafawy’s el-Raml district. According to Abdel-
Latif, women in el-Deiry’s campaign were a lot more visible than in el-Halafawy’s 
campaign as el-Deiry’s campaign manager - Manal Aboul-Hassan - worked with 
a team of young women who were mostly recent university graduates and more 
politically active. Expectedly, el-Deiry’s campaign platform focused on ‘women-
friendly’ topics regarding social services and issues related to women, such as 
children’s rights, family, and education.617 El-Deiry and her campaign team - 
which included the female legal consultant who also participated in the 2010 
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elections - were responsible for several gatherings in the streets that included 
electoral speeches and public prayers, under the watchful eye of security 
forces.618 Muslim Sister, Nermin Hassan, described the Sisters’ campaigning 
efforts and their first all-women rally in 2005:  
“When men saw what we could accomplish in elections, they started 
to change the way they look at us… the men were giving us 
instructions all the time, telling us not to lose our temper, not to 
appear too emotional. But then they were impressed - the Sisters 
carried their children with them and marched, and we were clever in 
how we dealt with the street, we didn’t even disrupt traffic.”619 
 
The MB spokesperson, Essam el-Erian, boasted during a 2005 press 
interview, that the MB had an “army of 25,000 volunteers who knock on doors 
urging people to vote for Brotherhood candidates, produce election songs, set up 
Brotherhood websites [and] send out mass e-mails.”620 Furthermore el-Erian, 
asserted that women were the most important facet of this volunteer work, due to 
their ability to recruit more volunteers and supporters amongst their ‘sub-
societies’ of women.621  Due to the fluidity of the Muslim Sisters’ movement 
whether in the privacy of homes, mosques, clubs or university campuses, the 
Sisters had a better opportunity to garner support. MB male members are usually 
placed under surveillance and they were unable to execute their roles ‘under-the-
radar’ as efficiently as the Muslim Sisters. In addition, many in the MB believe 
that the larger the presence of women in campaigning events or polling stations, 
the less likely it is that violent incidents will occur. According to a few accounts, 
the women of the MB – both members of the Division and supporters - were 
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deployed by the MB during election time, in attempts to subdue and/or deter 
tensions and episodes of confrontation usually arising between the MB and the 
state’s security apparatus. 622  M.A.E. tells of the MB’s determination in 
participating and excelling during the 2005 elections: 
“The MB invested impressive energy and dedication during that 
time to win seats in Parliament. It was either do or die. The 
revolution has always been in the MB, it is never-ending. They 
stood against the idea of transferring authority by birth from father 
to son (from Hosni Mubarak to Gamal Mubarak) and they 
withstood military crackdowns, military trials and the aggressive 
force used to access MB homes and money.”623 
 
Ismail argues that in the context of this turbulent and violent relationship, the 
intervention of the Muslim Sisters to ease the tension demonstrates how 
womanhood “is constructed as an asset and a shield to be deployed in the face 
of abusive authorities [where] the men will not tolerate the abuse.”624  
The 2010 Elections - The 2010 elections were described by the media as 
one of the most flagrant shows of oppressive, undemocratic and fraudulent 
authoritarian rule during Mubarak’s reign.625 In addition to the military’s actions in 
rounding up MB candidates and supporters, many changes took place over the 
course of the five years leading up to the 2010 elections. Those changes 
included the constitutional amendment of law 88, which required judges to 
oversee the electoral process to ensure no violations were taking place.626 In 
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2007, that role of the judges was changed to include overseeing voter 
participation, but they were stripped of their jurisdiction to take action against any 
violations they witnessed.627 Several local organizations 628 such as the Center 
for Trade Union and Workers' Services had approached the regime in 2010 
offering their services in monitoring the elections, but all were rejected, as the 
government insisted that it had the situation under control.629 Also, human rights 
groups and organizations were prevented from monitoring the Shura Council 
elections that took place in early 2010 when “judicial supervision has been 
replaced by a judicial commission which has refused to respect a previous court 
ruling allowing civil society groups to monitor elections.”630 This signalled the 
continuation of the government with its long-standing tradition of voter bribery 
and vote rigging. It is for that reason that many will likely remember the 2010 
elections as the worst alleged ‘democratic’ action ever to take place. Even in the 
face of requests put forth by the Obama administration to allow international 
monitors to ensure that legitimate elections take place, Mubarak’s NDP refused 
on the grounds that an international presence would threaten the nation’s 
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sovereignty and enable outsiders to interfere in Egypt's internal affairs.631 It is 
worth nothing here that, in this particular instance, the MB was welcoming - 
despite its strong anti-Western stance - of international monitors. The change in 
heart was spurred by the MB’s realization that the 2010 elections were at stake 
due to the government’s fraudulent interference. In effect, the MB openly called 
for the presence of international observers prior to election season.632  
In the midst of the MB’s preparations for the 2010 elections, they tried to 
approach other parties such el-Tagammu, the Nasserist party and the Wafd 
party. However, all three decided not to ally with the MB as they differed on 
several issues, most notably the MB’s viewpoint regarding women and 
Christians’ rights to run for the presidency and other senior positions, as well as 
the MB’s rigid Islamic frame of reference. 633  The MB’s Saad el-Katatni 
proclaimed that the members of the MB would not compromise their beliefs and 
principles in order to strike a deal with other parties.634 As for the Muslim Sisters, 
politically seasoned women like Dr. Manal Aboul-Hassan and Dr. Amal Abdel-
Kareem were nominated to run.635 A professor of mass communication at Al-
Azhar University, Aboul-Hassan competed for a seat in the presidential 
constituency during the 2010 elections.636 Concurrently, most of the campaign 
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activities set forth by the MB and the Muslim Sisters have been halted or 
sabotaged by security forces and regime crackdowns. 
 
A New Era, a New Party - 2011/2012 Elections 
With the commencement of election season in the summer of 2011, 
decrees were released by the temporary overseeing power - SCAF - that altered 
the Mubarak law’s stipulation about the seats allocated for women. The 
amendment stated that for a party to be allowed to run, it has to include at least 
one female candidate in its party list, in order for the party to be allowed to run.637 
Scholars look upon such practices in new or forming democracies favorably. 
Theoretically, descriptive representation is justifiable “via its contribution to 
democratic fairness, believing that electing members of historically 
disadvantaged subgroups deepens democratic legitimacy.”638 However, such a 
stipulation did not guarantee a large percentage of women would win seats, 
whether in the People’s Assembly (PA) or the Shura Council (SC). The FJP was 
founded on April 30 of 2011, and from that moment onwards, its members and its 
‘helicopter parent’639 - the MB’s mammoth organization - have been working 
tirelessly to fully participate in elections as a legal party and movement since its 
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inception in 1928. Presently, the FJP offices are located throughout the country, 
as they were built on existing connections and relations that were established by 
the MB. At first, the MB intended to participate and not dominate the 2011 
elections, however this stance soon changed as the MB’s popularity grew rapidly 
in the absence of a stronghold regime. With their growing popularity, the MB’s 
ambitions began to take root and increase. According to Brown, the MB realized 
their advantage for having attained mass support prior to the revolution. This 
support has been established as a “virtuous alternative to the corrupt system that 
governed Egyptians for so long and that allowed political, social and economic 
power to be deployed for private benefit.”640 Brown explains that the MB’s plan 
for a new constitution lacked a ‘liberal,’ ‘leftist,’ or ‘progressive’ characteristic, 
focusing more on delivering to the people a more democratic Egypt, that allows 
citizens to experience a separation of powers and the protection of one’s political 
rights, with an always existing and contentious grey area in regards to human 
rights and women’s rights.641  
Both the Muslim Sisters and the MB seemed dedicated to the realization 
of a descriptive representation of women in Parliament. That was the first step 
towards integrating a bigger standing of the female population in Parliament and 
it would also open avenues for women-related issues to reach center stage and 
command greater attention in law-making. The next step in the evolution of 
women in politics, in the midst of a new government and state, is to fight for 
gender equality. However, in the current political climate with its traditional 
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outlook evident in all parties, including the FJP, such idea risks being perceived 
as radical and premature. Piscopo adds to this line by explaining that today’s 
scholars are beginning to explore how political institutions and sociocultural 
norms change the level of women’s descriptive representation, and whether 
female legislators substantively act for their ascriptive groups.642 In addition to 
assessing whether the Muslim Sisters are empowered within the MB and FJP, 
the Sisters have the added burden of representing all women in Parliament – 
both in a descriptive and substantive manner. Nevertheless, the political parties 
accepted the SCAF’s decision to implement a women’s quota law, in an attempt 
to guarantee that every faction of society is represented in Parliament. Ideally, 
Piscopo supports the use of Quota laws, which would deepen the “substantive 
representation of women’s group interests,” in addition to the expected 
descriptive representation of women as a group.643  
 
The Freedom and Justice Party: An Introduction 
The FJP’s organizational structure somewhat mirrors the meticulous 
defragmentation of the MB’s structure; a structure that intricately connects the 
MB’s Supreme Guide to all levels, including the smallest unit known as the 
“family unit.”644 The FJP’s structure operates as an extension to the MB General 
Guide and the Bureau; as evident in the ages of its senior executives which 
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exceed fifty-five. When the MB formed a party platform, it did not include anyone 
outside of its older generation bloc.645  
Comparable to the MB’s structure, the FJP is made up of many 
committees that cover a range of public concerns such as media, political 
awareness, membership, education, social work and local development.646 Each 
governorate in Egypt is further divided up in areas or sections, using a system 
that has been in use for years and is widely known by the public. The system 
identifies each district and its boundaries according to police stations’ 
geographical estimates of each district.647 During election season, the FJP and 
the MB divided the largest city - Cairo - into four regions, in order to more 
efficiently divide the electoral responsibilities and the duties of their campaigning 
strategy, and to better represent the FJP, by making the party more accessible to 
the people.648  The MB financially supported the FJP from its inception and 
throughout election season, by setting up offices and funding media-related 
expenses and educational and training workshops in preparation for elections.649  
 
The FJP’s Mission Statement and Party Platform  
The founding statement of the FJP affirmed the MB’s and the party’s 
dedication towards the full implementation of sharia as law and a way of life. The 
statement affirmed the FJP’s  
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“deep belief in the need to state in the Constitution that Islam is 
the official religion of the state, Arabic is the official state language 
and that the principles of Islamic sharia are the main source of 
legislation, and thus, the application of sharia in all walks of 
life.”650 
 
Such an affirmation of the importance of sharia is reflective of the organization’s 
and the party’s belief that sharia is the right tool to guarantee the advancement 
and progress of the Egyptian people. This corresponds to the Founding 
Statement of the FJP: Applying sharia is a 
“response to the demands of the majority of the Egyptian people 
who believe that the Sharia is the best method to ensure the 
reformation of the conditions of our society that will lead it to 
happiness and progress, as well as guaranteeing the rights of our 
fellow Christians and their freedom of belief and worship 
according to their laws and rules.”651 
 
Furthermore, the FJP affirms in their statement that Egypt as a nation shares the 
same ideology as that of the FJP and MB – where they described Egypt as “a 
civil state with an Islamic reference.”652  The mission statement continues to 
explain the FJP methodology as Islamic; yet affirms that alongside its list of 
principles that insists that sharia is the first and foremost principle; the FJP is to 
“recognize and emphasize the civility of the state, and thus, there would not be a 
military state or a religious state (a theocracy).”653 The fine lines that are drawn 
within the terms: civil state, Islamic reference, Islamic methodology and full 
implementation of sharia are problematic, as Egyptian masses are yet to fully 
grasp the differences and divergences of such terminologies and practices. 
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Moreover, extremist entities such as the highly vocal Salafist parties and their 
social currents fail to comprehend the differences entailed in implementing sharia 
principles and transforming Egypt into a theocratic state. In effect, Salafis have 
time and again called for the implementation of the strictest interpretation of 
sharia in regards to issues that negatively affect women, such as reducing the 
age of marriage to eight years of age, and other issues pertaining to human 
development.654 Even though the Salafist current in Egypt was not very strong or 
obvious prior to the revolution, and even though the Salafis have never taken a 
political stance before, the MB was well aware of the Salafist influence and clout 
in Egyptian society. This was evident in how they carefully weighed the backlash 
they would receive from their Salafi brothers when they fielded female 
candidates. For example, during the 2000 elections, Abdel-Latif explained that 
the senior MB leadership was worried that “the Salafists, would try to discredit 
the Brotherhood in the eyes of the public by portraying them as less Islamic. 
They worried the decision might even antagonize their conservative followers as 
well as sympathizers within the Salafist circles.”655 
Expectedly, the FJP - similarly to the MB - included the importance of the 
family unit in its methodology. The founding statement described the family as a 
“smaller essential part of the community, which is a building block in 
the society and the greater national sphere where the methodology 
[would] formulate the foundations and principles upon which the 
sound family stands safe, while dividing the duties and responsibilities 
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equitably among its members in a way that is based on the values of 
love, loyalty, fidelity and constructiveness.”656 
 
The FJP published several of its programs for the 2011 party platform and 
that included the following: Tourism and Civil Aviation, Urban Development, 
Social Justice, Religious Leadership, Productivity Development, Political 
Leadership, Economic Development, Freedoms and Political Reform and Human 
Development.657  
The Program on Freedoms and Political Reform establishes that all 
Egyptians are equal and have the right to the same freedoms and privileges, as 
the FJP affirms that it will “guarantee non-discrimination among citizens in rights 
and duties on the basis of religion, sex or colour.”658 However, the next line 
rationalizes that the FJP aims to “ensure women's access to all their rights, 
consistent with the values of Islamic law, maintaining the balance between their 
duties and rights.”659 The latter statement begs the question: whose values? And 
which principle and teaching of Islamic law will the FJP follow?660 Divergent 
solutions on the best course of action and ideology to follow in the 
implementation of sharia law, have caused some conflicts amongst the MB’s 
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different generational blocs, resulting in many of the MB’s youth leaving the MB’s 
fold and creating their own party.661  
Women-related issues were also recognized in the FJP’s Program on 
Human Development that, yet again, point out the importance of ensuring that 
women are able to perform their roles and duties within society, alongside their 
“active participation in elections and membership of the elected legislative and 
local councils.”662 The human development program focuses more on the rights 
and roles of mothers and children, while clearly stating that a woman’s concern is 
as equal as a man’s. In effect, the FJP confirms its  
“respect, appreciation and support for women's roles as wives, 
mothers and makers of men; and aims to better prepare them for this 
role. The party aims for society to benefit from women’s capabilities 
and resources, and realises that their giving is more, not less, than 
men’s giving.”663 
 
Moreover, the human development program focuses on the injustices and 
failures of the NCW and the CEDAW, for its inability to understand and better 
complement Egypt’s traditions and cultures. The MB described the NCW as "a 
weapon of the former regime [utilized] to break up and destroy families" in an 
official statement found on the MB’s website.664 The FJP blames the exposure of 
Egypt’s systematic corruption affected by several parties, on the NCW and the 
National Council for Motherhood and Childhood which “receive[s] foreign funds 
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from suspicious sources,” 665  and should be abolished for its role as “the 
intelligence arm of the international players in Egypt,” and to be replaced by a 
national council for the family affairs and security. 666  The FJP condemned 
Egypt’s decision to join the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which they state was a decision made 
without consulting the general public, especially that the convention allows it to 
meddle in private marital and family issues.667 This is seen as a departure from 
the earlier generation of leaders who would have halted any talk of rights within 
an Islamic reference according to Brown. The current leaders have no trouble 
overriding human rights for the implementation of sharia-based rights. 668  In 
effect, the FJP declares it its right to insist on the “re-consideration of those 
agreements,” as they may not be complementary to Egypt’s religion; in this case: 
Islam and its traditions.669  
The human development program reveals the FJP’s interest to integrate 
traditional family values in Egypt’s education curricula.670 The MB’s educational 
process is paramount to the complete integration of the individual and family into 
the fold of the MB movement. The MB’s educational project known as tarbiyah or 
training “represents the social activity tool of eradicating traditional society bonds. 
Educators of religious lessons - especially the Islamic history - are affected by 
religious ideological romantic impacts.” 671  It is unclear whether such an 
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educational tool could be practically applied to the current educational system, 
where more secular and less Islamic-oriented curriculum is used.672 In regards to 
women’s rights, the MB had long aired its rejection and disdain of Egypt’s 
personal status laws, which stipulates a woman’s right to divorce in accordance 
to sharia; an interpretation they have refused.673 As a result, the FJP’s program 
highlights its objective to “make personal status laws comply with Islamic law, 
while reserving the right of Copts to their own personal status laws.”674 The 
program concludes with the party’s long-term vision, which includes: 
“developing a road map to achieve complete independence for the 
Egyptian state, in all matters pertaining to family, women and children, 
beginning with a review of the CEDAW and CRC (Committee on the 
Rights of the Child) international conventions, and ending with a 
popular decision on those, so that Egyptian policy, in this regard, 
stems from the inherent pure values of the Egyptian people, not from 
some international agenda.”675 
 
With the dissolution of the Mubarak regime, the FJP and its ‘helicopter 
parent’ intend to eradicate any remnants of the old regime, including its ties to 
secular NGOs and international conventions and agreements. Before the 
revolution, the MB had always used an ambiguous tone in regards to 
international human rights instruments, but it was clear in the fight for human 
rights, as it focused on political rights; due to their impressive show of strength in 
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Egypt’s elections during the Mubarak era. For example, the MB did not always 
reject all Western human rights organizations. During the Mubarak era, the MB 
was continually cooperating with organizations such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch to document the injustices and cruel treatment of MB 
members by Mubarak’s security apparatuses.676 For all intents and purposes, the 
CEDAW and NCW may be viewed, by secular-minded women and Copts, as 
insurance tactics to prevent the complete Islamization of Egyptian society and 
government. Lastly, the FJP echoed the MB’s previous role in providing social 
services where the government has failed to do so - under Mubarak’s regime - by 
identifying the practice of political pluralism in their program on Freedoms and 
Political Reform. The FJP recognized the existence of political pluralism as “one 
of the assets of the political process,” and their intention to “establish the rules of 
partnership between the state and civil society organizations to carry burdens of 
rejuvenation and development of the homeland.”677 In effect, if such a program 
were to be executed, the MB and FJP’s presence will be seen and felt in both 
Egypt’s civil society and government, thereby creating an all-encompassing and 
all-powerful entity much like the old regime.  
The FJP has tried marketing itself as a party for all people, yet there is still 
doubt as to whether non-MB members can join the FJP, with the exception being 
the ‘token’ Coptic Christian member Rafik Habib - as its third in command.678 
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According to Abdel-Raheem Ali, Habib’s situation is quite a unique one. For 
example, the Coptic member does not believe in the concept of party pluralism, 
where his academic research work focuses on how the notion of party pluralism 
does not complement the political climate of the Arabian peninsula and the ‘Arab 
bloc’.679 Furthermore, Ali claims that Habib joined the ranks of the FJP because it 
was a representative of the MB, and not that it was an autonomous political party 
engaging in the current democratic process. 680 An interview was conducted with 
a young male graduate, who joined the FJP without being a member of the MB, 
due to his conviction in the FJP’s party platform.681 He joined a month before the 
start of parliamentary elections due to his admiration for the FJP party platform 
and the MB’s community-based movement, where the daily micro-development 
of their people, positively contributed to the society. Furthermore, he was 
surprised to find that a majority of people that he knew (friends and family) were 
MB members. However, he chose not to become a MB member due to the deep 
commitment that is required of its members and the difference of ideologies.682 
He believes that when more liberal people (such as himself) infiltrate the party, 
they will eventually influence and change the idea within the FJP, and eventually, 
the MB. However, his case is not necessarily a demonstration of the FJP’s 
willingness to accept non-MB members, as the interviewees’ extended family 
includes several senior MB members. 
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The FJP and the Muslim Sisters  
The Muslim Sisters are active members of the party and have already 
established a system of communication with every female party member within 
Egypt. According to Abdel Moaty Zaki, a prominent MB member, the FJP 
membership amounts to about 10,000, with ten percent of that total number 
being women.683  Recently, the MB released a statement affirming that it is 
working on “increasing the women’s involvement on all levels to play a role in 
shaping Egypt's future.”684 The female party members with senior roles meet 
weekly and monthly, to discuss present complications and future solutions.685 As 
mentioned before, the city of Cairo is divided into four districts: Central, North, 
East and West. Each region is headed by a female secretary, who is also the 
head of the women’s committee of her assigned region. Similarly, the FJP’s 
women committees have assigned its assistant secretaries in accordance with 
those pre-existing areas. In addition, there is a female secretary position that is 
responsible for overseeing all the women committees in Cairo. Dr. Manal Aboul-
Hassan currently occupies this position. The four regional secretaries meet with 
the head of Cairo’s women committees on a monthly basis. For example, Hoda 
Abdel-Moneim heads the region of East Cairo, where her assistant secretaries 
are assigned to seventeen sections/areas. Each section has one to four women 
aiding the assistant secretaries and secretaries.686 Such division of labour is 
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necessary to ensure that the FJP covers each region’s needs and at the same 
time, covers the party’s needs in providing ‘welcome seminars’ for new members, 
and to plan and organize educational workshops and training sessions. 687 
According to one FJP member’s experience, it seemed that the women have the 
freedom to move across the FJP structure and change their roles. For example, 
while she was preliminarily given the role of the secretary of the women’s 
committee in the 6th of October region, she opted to assume the position of 
secretary of media relations for that same region due to her broad media 
relations background.688 The political awareness committee has been a very 
active entity within the FJP and amongst its female members. This was essential 
because the majority of the Muslim Sisters, who have become FJP members, 
lacked real experience and exposure to extensive political educational tools in 
respect to understanding Egypt’s political history, as well as the current structure 
and function of governmental entities.689 
The female members of the FJP are educated, well organized and 
unwavering in their involvement with Egyptian society through political and social 
means. 690  However, not all FJP and MB members are comfortable seeing 
women occupy political positions. For instance, the head of the Muslim Sisters 
Division in East Cairo - a male MB member - does not find it socially acceptable 
or fitting for a woman to be outside of her home at late hours of the night, 
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something that is typically required of Members of Parliament.691 The same 
argument applies if the MB were to integrate the Muslim Sisters and allow them 
to run in internal elections for a position in the MB’s Guidance Bureau Office, 
where the late hours do not comply with social norms and sharia principles.692 
After the revolution, the Muslim Sisters Division of the MB organization still 
remains a separate entity and does not fall under the organization’s hierarchical 
structure.693  
As aforementioned, the exclusion of the Muslim Sisters Division from the 
MB’s organizational structure was attributed to the MB’s concern for the women’s 
safety in regards to the constant political crackdowns that were targeting all MB-
related activities and members. This is not the case anymore as all members of 
both the organization and the party proudly identify their association and political 
standing.694 Currently, the MB organization is looking to revitalise its out-dated 
structure and intend to integrate the Sisters within the new and democratically-
charged organizational hierarchy.695 Nevertheless, Essam el-Erian, the FJP’s 
vice president, vowed that the party intends to employ its female cadres in all 
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fields and disciplines; women are currently present in the FJP’s various 
secretariats, as well as provincial and party unit secretariats.696 
 
The FJP’s Pre-election Activities 
According to a MB member, the MB’s internal nomination system has 
been operating for almost 22 years. The FJP adopted the same practice when 
choosing its candidates for the 2011/2012 elections. Each shu‘ba would choose 
two individuals (after consulting the group on those wishing to run), and then they 
would run for the internal elections of their area/section. 697  This process 
continues for each area, district, and governorate until the final list is presented to 
the Guidance Bureau. This process may resume for a month.698 After the final list 
of FJP candidates is confirmed, the order, with which MB candidates are placed 
on the party’s list for each district and area, depends on their popularity within 
that area.699 
Amr Zaky - a MB member and a Member of Parliament - has stated that 
there are three eligibility requirements to represent the MB in elections:  
“The MB candidate had to be 1- well known in their district; 2- 
competent and has the right set of skills to participate in the FJP’s 
project of regenerating the Egyptian society; and 3- have a 
spotless reputation, and no ‘image-tarnishing’ past.”700  
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Zaky further explained that the right candidate could be experienced in the fields 
of commerce, economic-related issues, industry or even sports in his opinion.701 
In regards to FJP female candidates, very few women possessed all three 
requirements due to the MB’s long history with security fears and concerns 
during the Mubarak era. Hence, the female candidates were placed lower on the 
FJP’s electoral lists.702 Nevertheless, a prominent Muslim Sister, Hoda Abdel 
Moniem, the secretary of the FJP’s women’s committee in East Cairo was 
approached to run in the district of East Cairo (different from her place of 
residence), as number three on the FJP list, but she declined due to the fact that 
she lacked street presence in that district and she only knew a limited number of 
the district’s residents.703 It was common for people to run in other districts where 
they did not reside, such as Dr. Amr Hamzawy who resided in the Mohandessein 
area, but chose to run in the Masr el-Jadida district during the People’s Assembly 
elections of 2011.  
 
FJP Workshops and Training Sessions 
Prior to election day, the FJP sent its electoral cadres to training 
workshops and seminars to get them familiarized with campaigning activities and 
responsibilities. A MB supporter who headed the Cultural Programs Office at the 
MADA foundation, which was responsible for conducting such training sessions, 
explained that the duration of the workshops extends to six months divided into 
four to six training sessions. The supporter, a PhD candidate researching the rise 
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of Salafist parties, described her respect and admiration for the MB. However, 
she explained that she did not join in order to retain her autonomy and objectivity, 
especially in regards to her academic studies. She trained several political 
parties prior to the elections including: el-Nour Party (Salafist), the FJP Party 
(MB), el-Karama Party (left-wing Nasserist), el-Adl (Liberal, Centrist, Secular) 
and el-Wasat Party (moderate, centrist, Islamic-oriented).704 N.A. explained that 
the training courses contained three learning objectives and themes:  
“1- How to present to the public general political awareness, 2- 
How to manage the electoral campaigns, including presidential 
campaign management skills, if required, 3- Raise awareness of 
the meaning, roles and responsibilities of a party member.”705 
 
The course also dealt with techniques in responding to opposing views, and in 
differentiating between political activities and the management of such activities.  
When N.A. announced training dates, each party nominated three 
members to attend the courses. However, the number of women who were sent 
to attend was disappointing. Either only one woman or none at all were sent from 
each party at every round of training sessions.706 The Salafist party sent a fully 
veiled woman and el-Wasat party sent a total of two women. She explained that 
female participation in Egypt: 
“does not depend on whether the ideology that is adhered to is 
Liberal or Islamist. In fact, female participation is more of a cultural 
issue, one that might also have to do with education. Having 
women as a front is still not a favorable option for any party. This, 
naturally, led to women being placed at the bottom of their parties’ 
lists.”707  
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In addition to signing up their candidates for training workshops, the FJP 
provided and distributed pamphlets with the aim of calming the country’s fears of 
an Islamist takeover by providing extensive answers to questions concerning 
women’s rights, the veiling of the female population and restrictions on 
tourism.708 
Despite the lack of importance given to the Shura Council (SC) elections, 
the FJP trained its candidates for the SC campaigning activities. Ms. Sabah el-
Saqqari - who won a seat in the SC in 2012 - secured her place in the SC as a 
MB representative. El-Saqqari explained that her training course was stretched 
over a three-month period. All candidates had to attend to regain general and 
specific knowledge of electoral districts as well as develop their interpersonal and 
communication skills. During her campaign, el-Saqqari asserted that female and 
male candidates were treated equally within the FJP and were respected by their 
voters on the street irrespective of gender. El-Saqqari, who had previous 
electoral experience when she joined campaign efforts of MB candidate Adel 
Hamed in 2005,709 explains that her 2011/2012 campaign trail included walking in 
her district’s streets and shops in order to engage the public and introduce 
herself, and listening to the residents’ social grievances and concerns. She 
explained her view of women in politics:  
“I believe in women occupying political positions where they would 
have executive roles, as women in developing countries are more 
aware of the economic and social needs of family units, and 
therefore more competent in certain fields than men. A woman is 
aware of financial difficulties that face both men and women, even 
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if it meant dealing with her husband’s unemployment state, and 
the restrictions and drawbacks such an event has on household 
finances.”710  
 
Due to her belief that a society’s development is measured by the development 
of its female population, she asserts the importance of government entities 
including and employing women, who represent half of the nation’s population. 
 
Regime’s Actions of Deterrence  
 Experiencing aggressive reaction from security forces was not new to the 
MB. From Nasser’s rule up to the 2011 revolution, the MB has been targeted 
especially when it was politically active on the streets. The 2000 parliamentary 
elections witnessed more of the MB, as Islamist MPs fielded nineteen seats, with 
seventeen of them allocated to the MB.711 Even though the Mubarak regime won 
an overwhelming majority, the second largest number of votes still belonged to a 
banned organization, which was continuing to threaten the stability of Mubarak’s 
authoritarian hold.712 Despite the reality that the MB only managed to secure 
seventeen seats, it came as a shock in light of the major security clampdown the 
government enforced before and during voting procedures.713 One telling incident 
occurred when a NDP member competed against Mamoun el-Hudaybi, a senior 
MB member and its official spokesman, in the same district. Voters were 
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“surrounded by policemen armed with rifles and tear gas canisters who icily 
refused to let people into the polling station.” 714 As the judge who was assigned 
to monitor the station tried to intervene on behalf of the abused voters, the officer 
in charge told him that “judges were only responsible for the ballot box inside and 
had no authority outside the polling station.” 715 
The 2000 elections in el-Raml district was an unforgettable show of the 
government’s determination to prevent any MB candidate, especially a woman, 
from winning. According to el-Halafawy, the idea of an Islamist woman competing 
with a secular force was catastrophic; the ramifications were great in terms of the 
damage done to the image of the Mubarak regime.716 Presenting an Islamist 
woman in such a positive light, competing against men for a politically visible 
position in Parliament would weaken the government’s ability to counter the 
popularity of the MB.717 It came as no surprise then that el-Halafawy’s husband 
and campaign manager was arrested during the early days of the campaign. El-
Zaafarani was accused of instigating violence and rioting, and he was jailed for 
45 days; then sent to prison for four months to await his trial.718 El-Zaafarani was 
labeled by national newspapers as the “hostage held by the government over a 
woman.” 719  Soon afterwards, security officials approached el-Halafawy and 
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offered to free her husband if she withdraws from the elections.720 Fearing for her 
husband’s life, she contemplated her withdrawal, but soon discarded the notion 
when she received a message from him through his lawyer urging her to 
continue with her campaign efforts.721 When government officials witnessed the 
masses of people marching and supporting her candidacy, they outlawed large 
gatherings with the help of a law released from the Ministry of Justice that limited 
rallies to ten people. 722  Due to time constraints and the small window of 
opportunity for voting activities, the MB failed to respond effectively to these 
measures. Moreover, many MB members and supporters were arrested during 
her campaign activities. Police and security officials arrested her delegates and 
campaigners, including her son, who was held for two days. In the midst of the 
mass arrests, el-Halafawy was struck in the head by the bottom end of a 
shotgun.723 The arrest of her fifty delegates, 48 hours before election day, was 
problematic; as they were responsible for overseeing the voting process to 
ensure that no fraud would take place in the polling stations during the voting 
process. 724  The remainder of her constituency organized marches and 
demonstrations to help her mobilize voters to take part in the electoral 
process.725 
In 2005, however, the MB won twenty percent of the 444 seats, thereby 
creating a real threat to the NDP’s political weight and popularity. As a result, the 
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years from 2005 to 2010 were some of the worst that the MB had to endure in 
terms of political oppression; the regime systematically closed down MB’s 
businesses, revoked MB’s licences and, continuously and freely, arrested many 
members via the Emergency Law, which allowed such actions without probable 
cause.726 It was the worst military crackdown on the MB since the first days of 
Mubarak’s reign.727  In May 2007, the use of Islam in political slogans and 
campaigns, such as the Brotherhood’s “Islam is the Solution”, was banned.728 
Furthermore, the People’s Assembly approved of excluding independent 
candidates from running in elections.729 As a result, the MB was unable to take 
part in the Upper House of Parliament, the Shura Council election in June 2007 
and the local elections of April 2008. 730  In April 2008, a military tribunal 
condemned twenty-five members of the MB to between three and ten years in 
prison.731 Muhammad Ali Bashar and Khairat al-Shater, both members of the 
MB’s ruling body, were sentenced to seven years for the financing of an ‘illegal 
organization.’732  
The MB reacted to the political and judicial campaign against them by 
drafting a political program of their own, to calm the fears of the Coptic society 
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and the concerns of the secular intellectuals.733 The desired effect was far from 
achieved. As the draft was circulated and studied by numerous intellectuals, 
politicians and ulama’, the reaction that the MB received was anything but 
positive. 734  The 128-page document affirmed the MB’s commitment to a 
parliamentary democracy and was comprised of a general description of what the 
party would look like through the application of the MB’s social vision. 735 
However, it contained several amendments that were far from democratic in 
regards to women and the Coptic minority, as well as the affirmation and 
inclusion of the laws of sharia in defining every policy. 736  The democratic 
program included “the banning of women and Copts from becoming head of 
state…and the creation of a body of ulama’ to advise Parliament on the Islamic 
validity of its legislation”737. This resulted from the conviction that only Muslims 
are eligible for the presidency; it is the president has the power to oversee and 
act on Islamic issues, such as the implementation of sharia, and that it would 
therefore be ‘unjust’ for a non-Muslim to become Egypt’s president.738 Inevitably, 
the publishing of the MB’s program was postponed indefinitely due to its negative 
reception.739 
Prior to the formation of the April 6th movement in 2008, the MB was the 
only entity to represent an opposition and a real threat to the state, which 
resulted in the continuous harassment of its members through arrests, financial 
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confiscation and home searches. 740  In addition to the military’s actions of 
rounding up MB candidates and supporters, changes such as the constitutional 
amendment of law 88 took place, which required judges to oversee the electoral 
process to ensure that no violations take place.741 It was the overwhelming lack 
of transparency and continuous bullying that ensured the failure of the MB and 
any other party. Such a strike was expected, argued Amr Hamzawy.742 He stated 
that statements made by several NDP leaders pointed towards “the ruling 
establishment’s intent to minimize the Brotherhood’s presence in the new 
assembly.”743 Most opposition parties called for a boycott of the 2010 elections - 
with the MB unsure of its stance - after the elections for the Shura Council proved 
to be unfair and rigged.744 
In the months leading up to the 2010 elections, over 1,000 MB members – 
candidates included – were arrested,745 to improve the chances for the NDP to 
gain the majority vote and to ensure the failure of other political parties, in 
addition to the MB. 746  Moreover, it was a tactical attempt to halt the MB 
                                            
740 H.A.M. Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 24, 2012. 
741 “The Citizen’s Guide to Ballot on Constitutional Amendments in March 26, 2007,” on the 
official government website set up at the time, http://constitution.sis.gov.eg/en/enconst1.htm in 
“Elections in Egypt: State of Permanent Emergency Incompatible with Free and Fair Vote,” 
Human Rights Watch, November 23, 2010, accessed June 3, 2011, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/11/23/elections-egypt 
742Amr Hamzawy was a research director of Carnegie Middle East Centre and an expert on 
Islamist politics. Hamzawy ran as a candidate for the Egyptian bloc during the People’s Assembly 
elections in 2011.  
743 Amr Hamzawy and Michele Dunne, “Brotherhood Enters Elections in a Weakened State,” 
Carnegie Commentary, November 15, 2010, accessed November 25, 2010, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41934 
744 Mahmoud Gaweesh, Adel el-Daragli and Ebtessam Talab, “Opposition Parties Label Shura 
Council Elections 'Terrorism',” Egypt Independent, June 4, 2010, accessed March 20, 2012, 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/opposition-parties-label-shura-council-elections-terrorism 
745 Matt Bradley, “Ruling Party Risks Egypt Slipping through Tight Grip,” The National, November 
28, 2010, accessed November 29, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/unassigned-
content/polls/ruling-party-risks-egypt-slipping-through-tight-grip?pageCount=0  
746 Hauslohner, “Egypt's Elections and the Impersonation of Democracy.” 
 216 
organization’s many activities and preparations that had been set in place.747 
Other tactics were used to curb the pro-MB voters from casting their vote. Many 
voting stations were closed down at the last minute – most of these stations were 
located in areas known for their MB affiliations – and the presence of the military 
was evident at every station.748  
El-Deiry’s legal consultant also served as Aboul-Hassan’s legal consultant 
for the 2010 elections, where she was running against the NDP’s Sameh Fahmy 
- the Minister of Petroleum at the time.749 The women of the MB were harassed 
and physically assaulted on the streets during one of the peaceful processions 
they normally conducted as part of their campaign strategy. Moreover, what 
started as a march of twenty-five people, dwindled to a group of five people, as 
the security forces declared that such large gatherings posed a security threat. 
Furthermore, ever since the MB stated that it would contest one-third of the 
parliamentary seats, almost 400 MB members were arrested, and security forces 
attacked their privately owned MB businesses.750 It was reported by a Muslim 
Sister that, during one of the marches, a group of thugs attacked them while the 
police watched and did nothing. 751 In fact, the government was known to hire 
female thugs to physically attack and verbally assault the MB women during their 
marches.752 The schemes of vote rigging and voter fraud were extreme to the 
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point that one Muslim Sister found the name of her deceased son on a voters’ 
list.753 Another Sister ran in that election as part of the quota system knowing 
fully well the elections were going to be rigged.754 A.A.K. recalled: 
“I was harassed and interrogated by security officials and sent to 
court, I could not officially reveal my political affiliations in writing, 
despite the fact that they were well aware of my allegiances; but 
there lacked any documentation to prove my association to a 
banned entity.”755 
 
 In addition, campaigning as an illegal organization, in an inequitable election, 
doubled the challenges facing the MB and the Muslim Sisters. One Sister argued 
that banning their slogan because it had a religious connotation was 
unacceptable as sharia was stated as the source of legislation in Egypt’s 
Constitution.756 Such a statement was indicative of two possibilities: either the 
MB as an organization did not acknowledge Mubarak’s amendment of that 
particular article, or that the internal knowledge base and political awareness of 
the MB and its Muslim Sisters Division was not as extensive as it should have 
been. When Azza el-Garf tried to submit her nomination to the electoral office, 
after she won the MB’s internal election to represent the MB in the 6th of October 
region, they refused her nomination documents; claiming that there were several 
required documents missing. El-Garf described her experience: 
“The electoral office made it increasingly difficult for me to run in 
the elections that I eventually had to drop out of the race. My 
husband was arrested as an additional plan to intimidate and 
discourage me from running, as I was a well-known figure in my 
constituency. I held many seminars, where I engaged the public - 
both men and women - in my district to prove my dedication, 
                                            
753 H.A.M. Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 24, 2012. 
754 A.A.K, Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 22, 2012. 
755 Ibid. 
756 Ibid. 
 218 
competence and ability to deliver public services and effectively 
present the residents’ grievances in the Assembly.”757  
 
The harassment was so alarming that the Freedoms Committee at the 
Journalists Syndicate organized a protest on behalf of the writer and 
journalist, Badr Mohamed Badr (el-Garf’s husband), following the security forces’ 
raid of his house; where they confiscated his money and personal documents.758 
M.A.E. affirmed the strong-arming of the government as she explained:  
 “The MB has always been in a state of revolution against the 
regime. The MB’s revolution started when it decided to stand 
against authority in election. Contesting in the political field is via 
elections. But with the unlawful practices of the regime, our efforts 
never had a chance to bear fruit. No law allows such practices 
where an entity engages in elections while forces try to stop it, and 
where this entity wins seats and has overwhelming support via 
votes. This was exactly how the regime behaved. A state’s laws 
and constitution should not be undermined in such a way that it 
eradicates the Egyptian people’s rights and freedoms. You should 
not be allowed to convene a false Parliament and elect a 
fabricated representation of the people’s will.”759  
 
During another significant incident, when a Sister decided to run in the 
Moqattam district in Cairo, her husband was arrested less than a day after her 
name appeared in newspapers. 760 This resulted in her withdrawal from the 
elections; and her husband was released from jail shortly before the revolution. 
She explained that a security official, in a phone conversation, told her to make a 
choice between a seat in the PA or her husband’s freedom. 761 However, the 
national security forces continued to harass and monitor her family even after the 
                                            
757 A.A.K, Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 22, 2012. 
758 “Freedoms Committee Calls for Demonstration against the Arrest of Badr Mohamed Badr,” 
IkhwanWeb, December 15, 2010, accessed January 10, 2012, 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=27538&ref=search.php 
759 M.A.E Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2012. 
760 Ibid. 
761 Ibid. 
 219 
elections, and until the days leading up to the revolution, bringing the total of 
visits to her home to eight during that time frame.762 Hoda Ghaniya represented 
the MB in a small town in Nile River Delta where her husband Hesham Khafagy 
was arrested following her nomination. In other regions and districts, the Sisters 
had an easier time campaigning for Seham el-Gamal as the MB candidate in city 
of Daheqleya.763 Susan Saad Zaghloul was to represent the MB in the female 
quota seats.764  
The publication of the MB’s 1994 document and the participation of the 
Muslim Sisters in the 2000-2010 elections as candidates, voters, recruiters and 
campaigners; have given rise to the realization of the MB’s position of women 
within Egypt’s society. The MB insists that it has always been in favor of women’s 
rights maintaining that “limiting the Muslim woman’s right to participate in 
elections weakens the winning chances of Islamist candidates.”765  However, 
such a statement may only reflect the MB’s determination in succeeding in 
elections, through the participation of the Muslim Sisters and the resources they 
possess in campaigning and voter participation. Blaydes points out that the MB’s 
electoral participation was constant due to the organization’s belief that the 
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corrupt regime would cease to function eventually, and the MB will become “well-
positioned to move from opposition in Parliament to a more active leadership 
role.”766 
 The 2011/2012 elections was remembered as the first time Egypt’s 
political realm experienced the first taste of democracy, as parties were free to 
assemble, congregate and campaign without any restrictions. It was a liberating 
experience for the MB; especially as they gathered their wealth of human cadres 
to campaign and collect votes without fear of arrests or harassment from security 
forces and/or military. Whether the MB is truly dedicated to placing women in 
general, and the Muslim Sisters in particular, in more public and more senior 
positions within Egypt’s government and Parliament is yet to be seen. History 
shows that the majority of the female candidates, who contested parliamentary 
seats on behalf of the MB, were mostly wives of prominent MB members. Hosam 
Tammam, an expert on the MB, argued that placing MB female candidates in 
elections was done only to enhance the group’s image; the MB maintained that 
it’s in its interest to “challenge stereotypes about its animosity to women. Yet, it 
was a paradoxical move because that same female candidate that they fielded 
did not have the right to run or vote for [the MB’s] internal offices.”767 The idea 
that a woman is first and foremost a mother and a wife, is still a concept that is 
prevalent in Islamic feminist rhetoric and in the MB; pushing many to accuse the 
MB of using women as means to justify its end of presenting a more democratic 
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and a less-hardline Islamist image of the oldest Islamist movement in Egypt. 
However, el-Halafawy had the required qualifications and experience, and she 
was well known and respected in her district, so it was expected she would run 
with her husband’s approval.768 Also, women activists and politicians, such as 
Mekarim el-Deiry and Amany Abul-Fadl, have proven capable, which further 
highlights the application of their individual efforts, and the absence of any 
agenda or plan put forth by the MB to prepare women for leadership positions or 
related activities. In addition to fighting against the conservative views of the MB, 
women in general and the Muslim Sisters in particular still have to tackle the 
traditionalist and overly patriarchal society that dominate everyday life in Egypt.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Muslim Sisters’ Electoral Activities During Elections  
 
Both the Sadat and Mubarak regime used the MB and its influence to 
carry out their own agendas, much like that of the Nasser regime. Sadat used the 
MB and their Islamic rhetoric to counter Nasser’s leftist influence, while Mubarak 
used the MB to counter the threat emanating from the militant Islamic groups. In 
spite of their banned status, the MB was able to survive in trying times due to the 
support of those authoritarian regimes. Moreover, since abandoning all forms of 
violence in the 1970s after the execution of Sayyid Qutb, the MB has 
experienced varying levels of both political freedom and control from both 
regimes. Participating in Egypt’s elections was the only viable way for the MB to 
reassert its existence and influence, as well as present itself as an oppositional 
force, without openly challenging the existence or longevity of the regime. At the 
same time, the elections were their only available opportunity to practice and 
improve political skills they might need when and if they eventually attain political 
leadership. Blaydes asserts that this is a very important reason for the MB’s 
presence in a variety of elections “including for leadership of university groups 
and professional syndicates, not just parliamentary contests.” 769  
 
The 2000 Elections– Jihan el-Halafawy 
 The initial vote count indicated that el-Halafawy was winning, but an official 
decree was released cancelling the elections in the el-Raml constituency, which 
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remained without representation in the People’s Assembly for two years.770 El-
Halafawy did not give up her rightful place in the People’s Assembly as she 
fought the state in court for two years, until a Supreme Administrative Court 
finally decided to hold a by-election.771 The Court gave the candidates only three 
weeks to prepare and on election day, an enormous security force was 
present.772 El- Halaway recounts:  
“After two years, the Parliament remembered that there was a district 
in Alexandria that lacked a MP or representative. During the by-
election, this one district in the whole of Egypt had an overwhelming 
presence and number of National Security forces. It was impossible 
for most of us to reach the ballot box to cast our vote, to the point 
that it turned into a competition - a running joke - where one would 
win a prize if they ever made it through the maze of security 
checkpoints to vote. The Forces were there to bar most people from 
voting, knowing fully well that they were voting for me and no one 
else.”773 
 
Security officers also arrested el-Halafawy´s legal team along with 101 of her 
supporters, clearing the way for public-sector workers who were brought in from 
outside the district on buses to vote for her rival who belonged to the NDP.774 At 
the end, the ruling party’s candidate won the seat, as it was stipulated that all the 
votes collected by el-Halafawy, in the first round two years ago, were awarded to 
the NDP candidate during the second round of elections.775 Yet, the MB emerged 
as the largest opposition in Parliament, winning seventeen seats as 
independents despite the government-sanctioned harassment of the MB. 
Basically, the MB may have won more seats if it were not for the several arrests 
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that took place before the elections. Twenty MB leaders were placed on trial by a 
military court and several more members were arrested on unspecified 
charges.776 
El-Halafawy’s experience with the government was a trying one, but she 
was confident in the message she was sending to the Egyptian society and 
government with the backing of the MB’s impressive organizational skills and 
overwhelming human cadres. Furthermore, el-Halafawy was adamant about 
showing that Islam awarded women political rights and that she had never 
experienced gender discrimination from the MB’s male members during her thirty 
years in the movement. 777  She has referred to the MB 1994 document in 
previous interviews and reiterates the MB’s vision that a woman’s primary role is 
in the family unit first, and in society, later.778 On the other hand, el-Halafawy said 
she disagreed with a portion of the MB’s 1994 document in regards to women’s 
roles in politics; as she believes that women are fit to occupy the position of state 
presidency. However, due to the existence of an authoritarian regime, el-
Halafawy explained: “I don’t like it, but it doesn’t reach the point of my taking 
offence because the regime in Egypt is so confused. No men or women have the 
right to nominate themselves for the presidency.”779 Additionally, el-Halafawy has 
been one of many MB members who had consistently asked for more official 
positions for the Muslim Sisters within the MB.  
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The 2005 Elections – Makarim el-Deiry  
The MB’s 2005 election campaign used words such as ‘democracy’ and 
‘equal rights’ to participate freely in elections, in an attempt to garner enough 
support and votes from the public. El-Deiry was quick to point out that the MB’s 
views on democracy were not a tool to gain ‘absolute freedom’, as the MB 
desired a “freedom controlled by the values of religion.”780 What made el-Deiry’s 
run even more interesting is that she was registered to run against a well-known 
male NDP candidate and businessman in the Madinat Nasr/Masr El-Jadida 
district in Cairo - where the president of Egypt resided and casted his vote -, 
which was historically referred to as the ‘president’s constituency.’781  
When the votes were counted, it was revealed that el-Deiry was 1,500 
votes ahead of her opponent Mustapha el-Sallab. However, despite getting 
almost double the votes of her opponent,782 it was el-Sallab who was announced 
the winner of the seat representing the presidential constituency. This left many 
to conclude that the votes gained by the two candidates have been switched.783 
Muslim Sister H.A.M. described the situation:  
“the announcement started a protest by hundreds of el-Deiry’s 
supporters - mostly women - in front of the vote-counting station. 
The crowds accused the government of vote-rigging and only 
dispersed when el-Deiry addressed the protestors, thanked them 
for their time and support and confirmed her strong belief that ‘the 
flag of Islam will never fall.’”784  
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Nevertheless, el-Dairy’s legal team headed to Egypt’s national judicial courts and 
filed their case at the Court of Cassation. Although they won the case, the Court 
opted not to pass the decision. At the time, the Court had the right to choose to 
pass a verdict or refrain from doing so, depending on the preference of the 
judicial council.785  In this instance, it exercised that right by refraining from 
passing the decision.  
The 2005 elections resulted in only six women winning seats.786 The low 
number of female representatives in Parliament was yet again due to the failure 
of all parties to place women on their party lists. The women who won seats ran 
as independents without the support or help of any party, campaign or familial 
ties. In effect, female representation decreased from two and a half percent in 
2000 to two percent in 2005. With voter registration at thirty percent or less 
before the January 25 revolution, the MB was well aware that every vote 
counted. On election days, the women of the MB were often assigned with the 
task of trying to deter or decrease incidents of tampering with the ballot boxes.787 
Furthermore, reports of MB supporters - both men and women - climbing over 
walls and fences of polling stations through the use of ladders were astounding. 
In several cases, men and women would lie down on the road to deter the NDP 
from bussing in their supporters from other constituencies or districts as was 
previously done in the 2000 elections during el-Halafawy’s nomination. 
Additionally, Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim reported from one city, in reference to the 
MB voters or Islamist supporters, stating that the number of voters from each 
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gender was almost equal, even more slightly in favour of the women.788 Most of 
the female voters were over forty years old while the percentage of young voters 
and senior voters (younger than thirty and older than sixty years old) were quite 
scarce in comparison. Moreover, Ibrahim described the women’s determination 
to cast their vote as if it were a patriotic duty or a military order.789 Ibrahim 
deduced that the middle-aged Islamic-oriented women voters (between 40-60 
years of age) are those women whose life phases of pregnancy, childbearing and 
child-rearing are behind them, leaving them less constrained by housework and 
motherly duties; and allowing them a chance to be more politically active than 
other women in different age groups.790 Incidentally, Ibrahim’s conclusion is in 
keeping with the MB’s view of a woman’s role and duties in an Islamic society. 
Moreover, Blaydes and el-Tarouty describe the vision of veiled women 
supporting an Islamist candidate and movement as a powerful one, as it 
encourages other women to vote in the same manner and support the same 
organization or party. 791  Blaydes and el-Tarouty further explain that “the 
willingness of Islamist women to make personal sacrifices to support 
Brotherhood candidates creates a strong emotional pull for other Brotherhood 
sympathizers to support the cause.”792 
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The 2010 Elections – The NDP Wins 83 Percent of Seats793 
In hindsight, there were numerous reasons for the uprising in 2011. 
Unjustified actions by the government against the MB since its impressive win in 
the 2005 elections and the government’s overall effort to undermine the 
freedoms of its people such as significantly decreasing freedom of speech and 
opinion by shutting down several TV stations and newspapers. The highly rigged 
2010 elections 794 concluded with the NDP gaining most of the seats, the Wafd 
party serving as the opposition with their win of minimal seats, and the MB losing 
all 88 seats it won in the 2005 elections, thereby being stripped of any 
representation in the Egyptian government. After the elections and the encounter 
with the regime’s tactics in eliminating its opposition, one had to ask the question: 
What was next for the most organized and effective opposition movement? 
The number of women in Parliament did not exceed fifteen between the 
years of 2000-2010. In an attempt to understand why the low number of female 
representation is a recurring theme in Egypt’s Parliament, a survey was 
performed to assess women’s opinions, where 38 percent reject the concept of 
gender equality. This result indicates the depth of cultural and social problems 
from which the Egyptian woman suffers; it also sheds light on the magnitude of 
the challenge ahead. 795 Furthermore, the Egyptian society does not seem ready 
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to accept a woman or a Coptic citizen in other political positions such as the 
President or the Vice President in Egypt. In June 2010, security forces prevented 
access to the polling stations and none of the MB’s fifteen candidates were 
elected. The opposition parties saw this as a strong indication of how poorly they 
would perform if they decided to participate in the parliamentary elections. 
Nevertheless, the MB continued its mission to participate and contend for seats 
against the all-powerful NDP. This was not anticipated seeing that nearly a 
quarter of its candidates has been disqualified and their main slogan - Islam is 
the solution - has been declared illegal. 
 In the face of internal dispute within the MB regarding the decision to 
participate in the 2010 elections, the MB nominated 135 candidates seats (26 
percent of the total seats) that included fifteen women contesting the 64 women's 
quota seats, as opposed to the 2005 elections in which they contested 36 
percent of the total seats.796 A report by the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights 
(ECWR) published a report prior to the elections entitled “Egyptian Women 
between the Anvil of Political Parties and the Hammer of the Quota,” that stated 
that the MB “nominated women for the People’s Assembly elections after internal 
polling within the Brotherhood; 95 percent agreed on women participating.”797 
Sobhi el-Salah, a MB leader and MP assured the public that the MB would 
contest one-third of the parliamentary seats. Furthermore, el-Salah explained 
that the MB’s participation in an obviously fraudulent election was mandatory. He 
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explained that if it were not for their participation, "the [current] system would 
have gone on in this tricky deceptive manner. Refraining from participating 
means [they] surrender to the status quo."798 The 2010 elections saw over 4,000 
registered candidates competing for the 508 elected seats of the PA; 378 of them 
were women competing for the quota seats; an impressive feat when seen in 
comparison to the 127 women who ran in the 2005 elections.799 However, due to 
the government barring the MB and its candidates from the elections, the MB 
only managed to register a little over 100 of its candidates, which included only 
five female candidates, thereby putting forward the lowest number of female 
candidates of all the political parties.800 
With the arrival of election day, security forces and the MB were engaged 
in violent scuffles in six districts in one day. Thirty police officers were wounded 
and 250 MB members and supporters were arrested.801  As a result of the 
violence that ensued during the first round of elections, the MB decided to 
boycott the run-off elections.802 Many voting stations were closed down at the last 
minute in areas known for its MB affiliations, and the presence of the military was 
evident at every station.803 At the end, the calls for boycott had little or no effect 
on the election outcome. In addition to the vote rigging tactics of Mubarak’s 
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regime, voter turnout was low at 27 percent.804 Even though many Egyptians 
boycotted the 2010 elections, Dr. Amr el-Chobaky stated that the low voter 
turnout was not primarily motivated by a political stance; the truth is that people 
had little or no faith in the 30-year old system.805 This was evident in the less 
than thirty percent turnout in the 2005 elections to vote, and the less than ten 
percent turnout in the 2010 Shura Council elections. 806 
 
The 2011/2012 People’s Assembly Elections807 
At first, the MB engaged the first free election since its inception, as an 
organization that followed the same tactics of “participation, not domination” 
starting with contesting one-third of the Parliament seats. Brown discovered that 
this number was  
“a direct carryover from the ceiling the movement had set under the 
old regime, where seeking more than one-third of the seats would 
have given it a veto over constitutional changes and thus, in its own 
eyes, been tantamount to seeking a seat at the table of political 
authority.”808 
 
In essence, the MB wanted to play it safe while also ensuring that it wins enough 
seats to alter the direction of the nation’s future in regards to the constitutional 
amendments. However, as the months passed, the MB became more ambitious 
as it gradually became aware of the level of unpreparedness of the leftist and 
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liberal parties; so much more ambitious that they declared that they would vie for 
fifty percent of the parliament seats.809  
The reasons were different but almost all female MB candidates were 
placed at the bottom of the party list. In effect, an electoral seat that receives 30-
35 percent of the votes means that three candidates on that list would secure 
seats in Parliament.810 Being placed at the bottom of the list drastically reduces 
the chances of garnering at least 30 percent of the list’s votes; thereby reducing 
the number of women in Parliament. The situation was the same with other non-
Islamists and Islamist parties. The MB had a lot invested in the parliamentary 
elections soon after the issuance of the SCAF’s “Constitutional Declaration” in 
March 2011. Article 33 stated that  
“the People’s Assembly will assume the authority to legislate and 
determine the public policy of the state, the general plan for 
economic and social development, and the public budget of the 
state. It will also oversee the work of the executive branch.”811  
 
As a result, just like every other political party, the MB chose to play it safe and 
not place their female candidates - despite the high level of competence and 
experience in the political game among some of them - in the upper portion of the 
party lists.812  
The PA elections that took place in 2011 delivered a shock to the Egyptian 
masses and the world. With sixty percent of the seats allotted to Islamist 
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movements,813 the international community was forced to reassess its view of 
Egypt and entertain the possibility of an Islamist majority in Parliament that could 
change the course of Egypt’s political history and geopolitical standing. What was 
even more shocking was the low female representation as a majority of these 
elected few were FJP members. The representation of women in Parliament was 
calculated at two percent – resulting in one of the lowest representation of female 
politicians in the world’s governments.814  Such results were in line with the 
concerns of feminists that the call for women’s equality would be disregarded in 
favour of more pressing issues such as national and economic security after the 
revolution.815 That said, the FJP did successfully mobilize and educate Muslim 
Sisters, to represent the party in both the elections and in Parliament.  
The Democratic Alliance, which consisted of ten parties - including the 
FJP - had 80 women running in the PA elections; 76 of these women belonged to 
the FJP.816 The minority Salafist movement and its associated groups had ridden 
on the Brotherhood’s coattails and had started to mobilize to form a political 
group and a political agenda prior to the elections.817 Despite previously berating 
the MB for taking part in a political system, the Salafists proceeded to engage 
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politically themselves in a system that was not governed by the laws of Islam in 
their most fundamental form.818  
The Islamist faction of this electoral race managed to empower and 
support Egyptian women better than any leftist or secular party.819 However, the 
events that led to this representation within the PA were far from simple. The new 
election law stipulates that within every electoral race and within each 
Proportional Representation list, one female candidate must be included, but it is 
not necessary to place women in winnable positions on the list.820 Despite the 
fact that the FJP initially placed a large number of its female candidates in the top 
half of the list, a lot of the more politically-experienced women were placed in the 
bottom half of the list – due to agreements with other parties within the alliance, 
and due to the size and importance of the districts where they were running.821 
For instance, Dr. Manal Aboul-Hassan was placed fifth on the electoral list in the 
Masr el-Jadida district. Her name was originally listed as the third candidate, but 
was moved lower on the list due to the alliance that the FJP made with other 
parties such as the Labor Party, which desired the third position on the 
Democratic Alliance List.822 Ms. Nagafa Abdel-Mawla was sixth on the same list. 
However, Wafaa Mustafa Mashhour, daughter of the sixth Supreme Guide of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, was on top of the FJP list for the district of Assiut and Maha 
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Aboul-Ezz 823 was second on the list. The Sisters fared well in Alexandria as well, 
where the FJP placed a female candidate third on the party list.824  
The FJP were better equipped and ready to take on the challenges of the 
first democratic elections to take place in Egypt. 825 The FJP was able to provide 
the necessary training and support, and was better prepared to challenge the 
secular and liberal parties that might have had more political exposure and 
experience than the Sisters of the MB. The FJP’s confidence in its female 
candidates was obvious in the numbers that joined the election race and the 
percentage of women who occupied the top of the lists. Unfortunately, women 
affiliated with other parties did not fare well since their parties had decided to 
place the female candidates at the bottom of the lists. The Reform and 
Development Party placed only one woman in the seventh place on its list. The 
Free Egypt Party placed its only female candidate last. Only ten women were on 
the el-Wafd Party list – which is affiliated with the oldest political party in Egypt’s 
history.826 One the other hand, the Salafist el-Nour Party had fifteen women 
running in the elections. During the run-off elections between individual 
candidates, the MB won almost ten times more seats than Salafist parties.827 
Moreover, many Egyptians voted for el-Nour Party thinking they were casting 
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their vote for the well-known Islamist movement of the MB.828 During the FJP’s 
campaigns, Muslim Sister G.R. witnessed the following: 
“During the first and second phases of voting, I was stationed at the 
Nasr City area of Cairo and in Giza governorate, where many 
people insisted that the MB had two political parties: the FJP and 
el-Nour. The same group of people thought that the FJP already 
had so many votes, so they felt it was the right thing to do to cast 
some votes for the other MB party: el-Nour, as both are Islamist 
parties at the end of the day.”829 
 
Some have argued that if it were not for the competition from el-Nour Party, the 
FJP would have gained more votes. 830  After a long series of complicated 
calculations and fractioning of seats between party lists and individual seats, 
women occupied only eight seats out of 480.831 The remaining three women that 
joined the Assembly were appointed by the SCAF.832  
Soon after the PA elections, Amnesty International consulted all the 
political parties that participated in the elections regarding their views on certain 
laws and rights such as the death penalty and women’s rights. Colm O’Gorman, 
Executive Director of Amnesty International Ireland, stated that “some of the 
parties refused to commit to equal rights for women. With a handful of women 
taking up seats in the new parliament, there remain huge obstacles to women 
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playing a full role in Egyptian political life.”833 Amnesty International’s manifesto 
aimed to enlist the political parties to a ten-point agenda, which included a list of 
pledges to ensure that complete rights would be attained for all citizens in this 
new era of governing. Only two parties (the Egyptian Social Democratic Party 
and the Popular Socialist Alliance Party) agreed to all the pledges 
listed.834 Moreover, most parties signed the eighth pledge regarding putting an 
end to gender and religion based discrimination. However, a number of parties 
claimed that they could not “sign up to Amnesty International’s call for an end to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.”835 The 
Amnesty International report explained that several parties were not entirely in 
agreement with the ninth pledge, which called for “women’s rights to be 
protected, including for women to be given equal rights in marriage, divorce, child 
custody and inheritance.”836 The reason given for their reservations was that 
sharia law was not in cohesion with the pledge and its specific requirements. The 
FJP, the majority party in the PA and SC, was one of three parties not to respond 
‘substantively’, despite what Amnesty termed ‘considerable efforts’ to seek its 
views.837 
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The 2011/2012 The Legislative Assembly/Shura Council Elections 838 
The SC elections attracted less attention, due to the common belief that 
the Council was not important to Egypt’s government. Despite this lack of 
attention generally bestowed on the SC elections, as many believed that the SC 
lacked legislative powers or functionality, 839  the FJP was fully invested in 
succeeding. Most of the lists for each district were short, where the majority of 
the FJP female candidates were placed in the number three slot out of four 
places on every list.840 Ms. Maha Aboul-Ezz, head of ‘Ūsraty’ (My family) Centre 
and an FJP member, ran again in the SC elections, were she was number three 
out of four places on the party’s list for her district.841  
The same practice was applied to FJP member Ms. Amal Abdel-Kareem. 
In bigger districts or areas, FJP candidate Dr. Omaima Kamel was placed in the 
fifth slot of the party’s list; still considered the bottom of the list.842 On the other 
hand, el-Saqqari was given priority, where she was placed third on a list 
consisting of four places; as the FJP’s allied party - el-Hadara party - occupied 
the fourth place.843 The FJP managed to win 105 seats out of 180 in the SC 
elections, as Dr. Susan Saad Zaghloul - a FJP member - was announced as the 
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first woman to win in the elections as the counting of votes took place.844 In the 
end, the Islamist parties won a combined 83 percent of the contested seats.845 
The preceding survey proves that women’s empowerment is almost non-
existent in political parties; as women were only elected due to the presence of 
the quota system. Otherwise, most political parties believed that placing women 
on the party’s lists would not garner enough votes.846 Dr. Dina Shehata explains 
that the NDP had a women’s agenda due to Suzanne Mubarak’s efforts, while 
other parties did not factor in women’s participation outside the scope of the 
quota system.847 Furthermore, with the dissolution of the former First Lady’s 
initiative, the structure that women’s rights activists took so long to build has all 
but collapsed post-revolution, due to the NCW’s choice to work within the 
government and through the application of governmental means - thereby relying 
on practices of state feminism. Shehata concludes that women activists face a 
new challenge in the post-revolution era, where they must rebuild and garner 
support through the help of NGOs, and by engaging other social movements to 
re-establish its objectives and goals.848 
Abdel-Latif, explains that the MB leadership - usually comprised of the 
most senior members - has a Salafist and conservative view regarding women’s 
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activities; in that it should be kept to a minimum.849 Members of the Guidance 
Bureau did not agree regarding whether women should occupy leadership 
positions such as the presidency.850 For example, a male MB member who acted 
as the head of one of the Muslim Sisters Divisions in the Eastern Cairo region for 
ten years, describes his political and social views as being conservative, where 
he argues that women in Egypt need to work within the confines of what is 
permissible in this patriarchal society. 851 He stated that as long as women abide 
by social and cultural constructs set forth for them by society, they will not face 
any major obstacles. 852  Moreover, the older generation explained that their 
decision to exclude women from leadership positions was due to “a ‘religious 
choice’ (khayaar feqhee) and a ‘social reality’,”853 while the middle generation - 
who were also senior members within the organization - did not agree with their 
viewpoints. This was not the first time the different generations seem to hold 
different opinions on important issues. Following the violent reaction of the 
government against the MB in the Mubarak years, a deep rift began to form 
between the generations.854 The older generation wanted to halt all electoral 
activities and revert to the organization’s original mission; to continue and expand 
its da‘wa activities. However, the younger generation wanted to respond to the 
government’s crackdown in a different way, Older and younger generations could 
not agree on how to represent the MB in the public eye, especially when it came 
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to issues concerning the Coptic minority and women.855 Out of this frustration, al-
Wasat Party (Centrist Party) was formed by young Brothers who grew 
disillusioned by the negative image the MB had projected in the Egyptian society, 
and sought to create an image that was neither Islamist, liberal, socialist or 
capitalist.856  
El-Deiry’s comments during her 2005 electoral campaign raised a few 
doubts as to whether the Sisters do indeed desire a more public role and greater 
responsibilities amongst the MB men. El-Deiry argued that "violence against 
women and children in Western societies stems from going against the idea that 
men are superior to women.”857 Furthermore, she does not see her previous 
comment as branding her unfit to champion women’s rights as she vowed to fight 
against “men’s abuse of their superiority” if she was elected.858 In her opinion, 
her acknowledgment and acceptance of men’s superiority is not at all destructive 
to the women’s rights movement as long as children and future generations are 
taught that “the superiority of men also means the full respect of women’s civic 
rights and dignity."859 Furthermore, some Muslim Sisters like el-Deiry believed 
that if they attempt to assert their presence and expertise in an effort to join the 
men in higher administrative and executive positions, it may liken them to the 
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much-despised Western feminists.860 As mentioned before, these movements 
are perceived by Islamists as efforts to free women from the gender-assigned 
roles and constraints, such as their duties within the family, which the Sisters 
have consistently argued, may lead to individualistic ideologies that promote the 
degradation of an Islamic society.861  
The role and position of women within and outside of the MB is still a point 
of contention among the different generations existing within the MB. Yet, the 
MB’s general view on women’s political participation was more conservative from 
a religious standpoint than other political entities in Egypt before the 2011 
revolution. Nevertheless, it is not only the political stance of the Muslim Sisters 
that is up for investigation or scrutiny. Women in secular parties also lack 
representation in their parties, where they either have no decision-making power 
at all or they enjoy limited power at best.862  
With the changes in Egypt’s current political climate, and the formation of 
a new government free of Mubarak’s influences, the MB has been presented with 
new challenges. The reformation of the MB’s agenda in the absence of a 
restrictive government and the distraction of the security apparatuses by national 
security issues, can be both beneficial and detrimental to the Muslim Sisters’ 
position and their desire to adopt more visible and serious roles. Still, the MB 
may have only fielded the Muslim Sisters in the post-Mubarak elections 1- to 
improve their negative image in Egypt’s streets as an Islamist and conservative 
                                            
860 Abdel-Latif and Ottaway, 7. 
861 Ibid. 
862 Valentine M. Moghadam, “Towards Gender Equality in The Arab/Middle East Region: Islam, 
Culture, and Feminist Activism,” Occasional Paper for United Nations Development Programme, 
Chicago (2004): 34. 
 243 
movement or 2- to fulfil the quota system that was in place during the 2011 
elections. The challenge remains that the MB’s frame of reference is still the 
Islamic frame of reference, and the concern is that they may still depend on the 
dated patriarchal interpretations of hadiths and sunna on issues relating to 
women’s rights. Tackling women’s issues and realities in today’s Egypt solely 
within an Islamic framework, may not provide the MB organization with a 
comprehensive idea of the challenges women face; resulting in a limited 
knowledge of the serious problems women face in Egypt.863 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 The Muslim Sisters Post-Elections 
 
 The Muslim Sisters face obstacles posed by both the traditionalist outlook 
of Egypt’s society and the conservative environment in the MB. The MB 
organization is divided in terms of views regarding the political participation of 
women. While some members believe that the Sisters’ most important duty is to 
be carried out at home nurturing young minds, others insist that the Sisters 
should be treated in the same manner as the MB in terms of opportunities to 
participate in elections; where competence and qualifications are the deciding 
factors not gender.864 Abdel-Latif explains that the middle generation’s opposition 
was because the older generation “did not take into consideration the reality and 
context of contemporary Egypt and that it violated the principle of a civilian state, 
to which the MB has said it was committed.”865 Gamal Heshmat, a MB member 
and former MP, explained that the older generation’s stance “goes against the 
principle of citizenship, which makes everyone equal before the law and confers 
the right to be nominated and elected as a head of state.”866 Yet, the fact remains 
that while the men were continually rounded up by security forces before and 
during elections, the women were responsible for campaigning and overseeing 
other electoral obligations.867 Unfortunately, in many cases, the arrests continued 
in the postelection phase of the MB’s electoral activities.  
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The 2000 elections succeeded in garnering international attention. The 
Islamist MB organization’s effort at trying to reinvent its image in Egypt and 
abroad was spearheaded by the running of one female candidate. El-Halafawy’s 
struggle and steadfastness, in the face of continuous harassment and obstacles, 
only fed her resolve to continue her campaign trail. El-Halafawy might have lost 
in 2000, but the idea of the Muslim Sisters having descriptive and substantive 
representation took root and began to grow, as the MB readied itself for the 2005 
elections; which ended in the MB winning the greatest number of seats under 
Mubarak’s rule.  
With the impressive win of the MB in the 2005 elections, came a new 
wave of arrests and interrogations directed at MB members.868 Such incidents 
put the Muslim Sisters yet again in an accommodationist position as they placed 
the needs of the MB before the concerns of its female cadres and their agendas 
for female empowerment. In turn, the Muslim Sisters Division organized a 
campaign led by the daughters and wives of the 22 detained MB male members, 
to raise public awareness of the government’s unjust treatment of MB 
members.869 However, their activities during that trying period can be described 
as the political mobilization of forces in the face of an authoritarian regime. Such 
actions further undermined the MB’s argument that women are unable to occupy 
positions of power, especially that of the president, and that they needed 
protection from the aggressive security forces. The Sisters were in the line of fire, 
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without regard for their personal safety, whenever the MB deemed it necessary 
and pivotal to the organization’s political goals.  
As the Sisters were assigned more public positions and responsibilities, it 
highlighted the desire of some of the Sisters to take on such roles in spite of 
constraints by both the MB and gender-biased societal pressures. In effect, the 
Sisters organized street protests and sit-ins in 2006, and gathered finances to 
pay for their husbands’/fathers’/brothers’ lawyers and provide support for the 
prisoners’ families, as well as organized visits to those detained.870 In terms of 
political activism, the Muslim Sisters were visible forces on university campuses 
as well. When the state and its security apparatus banned MB candidates from 
participating in the student elections at Cairo University, all students belonging to 
the MB - both male and female - organized a series of demonstrations. To further 
cement their power and influence on campus, the MB formed a parallel 
assembly, ‘The Free Students Union’, to be able to nominate their own 
candidates alongside others who wished to join. Moreover, the first elected head 
of the Free Student Union was a young Muslim Sister.871 
In the summer of 2007, several MB MPs were arrested under the charge 
of “giving instructions to women and using them in political activities.”872 Abdel-
Latif points out that the MB was accused of “using” the MB women, and it was 
not perceived as possible that the Muslim Sisters would have willingly 
participated in electoral activities.873 Such an accusation reflected the view of the 
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government and that of many non-Islamist movements and organizations of the 
MB’s treatment of women. Moreover, a senior security official delivered a 
warning to the MB’s General Guide highlighting the MB’s “deliberate policy of 
placing women in street protests.”874 According to Abdel-Latif’s research, the MB 
received several more warnings of the same nature, where the security 
apparatus made it clear that the Muslim Sisters would no longer be “beyond the 
reach of the police” if their street campaigning strategies were to persist.875 
Consequently, the Muslim Sisters and the MB faced an incident that had not 
occurred since the Nasser regime. Three young women of the MB were arrested 
and detained for three hours at a police station in the City of Tanta after 
distributing leaflets supporting the MB’s candidate for Egypt’s SC midterm 
elections. This incident was met with outrage from the MB organization which 
condemned the government for its violation of the women’s rights to campaign 
for their candidates. The government asserted that the women were arrested for 
dispersing religious rhetoric for political reasons, which was illegal. The incident 
was deemed unacceptable by the MB stating that the arrest of the Muslim Sisters 
was a ‘red line’ that must never be crossed.876 A MB member rationalized that a 
patriarchal society such as Egypt’s may categorize and limit women in regards to 
their roles and responsibilities within a society, but the women’s protection is the 
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responsibility of all men; whether MB members, security officials or police 
officers.877 
  In the time that the MB occupied 88 seats in Egypt’s parliament from 
2005-2010, the MB members failed to stop or modify any piece of legislation that 
was presented.878 It has been considered that the Mubarak regime had struck a 
deal with the MB to award them enough seats to give the organization sufficient 
presentation in Parliament without posing a real threat to the Mubarak regime.879 
If such speculations were true, then the tactics implemented would have also 
served Mubarak’s international interests by showing the international community 
an image where the regime is more preferable than an Islamist takeover; this 
would discourage international players from pushing for political reform in 
Egypt.880 As mentioned in Chapter Three, the MB released a draft of its party 
platform in 2007 on the off chance that they were allowed to form a legal political 
party. Once again, the MB affirmed its stance against women or Coptic 
Christians occupying the highest position of power. However, the main 
divergence from the 1994 document was the MB specifying the position of 
Egypt’s presidency as opposed to the general reference to the no longer 
applicable position of el-imama el-kubra. The clause stated that the “duties and 
responsibilities assumed by the head of state, such as army commanding, are in 
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contradiction with the socially acceptable roles for women.”881 The MB party 
platform had a specific section entitled “Family and Women” that focused on the 
reforms and improvements the MB aimed to achieve in regards to empowering 
women in Egypt, both at home and at the workplace. The program included 
promises, presented by the MB if they were to form a political party and 
represent a majority in Parliament, such as: criminalizing both verbal and 
physical forms of violence against women, criminalizing forced marriages, and 
creating a law that punishes those who did not abide by those laws.882 However, 
while the MB party platform discussed its intentions to ensure that women are 
being empowered in the public and social life, the platform lacked the necessary 
steps and plans to guarantee women’s empowerment. The MB did not seem to 
fully realize the concept of women’s empowerment and the changes that need to 
take place within Egypt’s legislature and executive entities.883 
The tactics that the Mubarak government implemented, to further 
suppress the impact of the MB and other Islamist influences, mainly focused on 
passing new laws or amending old ones to guarantee that the MB has little or no 
chance to perform well in the 2010 elections. The Mubarak regime amended 
Article I of the constitution to define the country as a “state of citizenship”, 
thereby eliminating any reference to Islam as “the religion of the state”884 - an 
article that resulted due to the MB’s influence during Sadat’s reign. Prior to 
passing this amendment, the MB members and lawmakers walked out of the 
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legislative chamber, so as not to contribute in the vote for or against the 
amended Article I.885 It was a blow to the MB as a major Islamist movement to 
see their historical victory squandered. The MB originally saw their ability to 
influence the declaration of Islam as the religion of the state - during Sadat’s 
reign - as a small victory, and a step closer to the realisation of an Islamic state. 
In effect, this change by the Mubarak regime allowed women and the Coptic 
community to run for any position, including the presidency. Additionally, the 
Mubarak government approved the reservation of two seats in the People’s 
Assembly for women in every constituency (32 in total) in 2009. This law was 
implemented for the first and last time during the 2010 elections.886 A total of 64 
seats (thirteen percent) in the newly expanded 504-member parliament were 
allocated to women.887 Expectedly, this law received a negative response by the 
public and the MB; similar to the last time a favourable law for women was 
passed during Sadat’s rule. Even though the quota system may have given 
preferential treatment to women over men, where a seat was awarded based on 
gender not competency, it was perceived as a step backward for rights’ activists. 
Childs explains that quota laws do not factor in mitigating circumstances and 
variables such as:  
“The external political environment; extant institutional norms; the 
impact of party – affiliation, ideology and cohesion; differences 
among women representatives; representatives’ newness; 
institutional position, including front and back bench, and 
government or opposition membership; committee appointment and 
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leadership; women’s caucus presence; and the wider vagaries of 
policy making.”888 
 
 However, in the case of Egypt, that law guaranteed the representation of 
half of the country’s population; who are referred to as a minority based on the 
rights allocated to them within Egypt’s societal structure. The law was to ensure 
that a level of equality for women was to be recognized to further promote their 
role in society, as specified by the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women; signed by Egypt.889 The former 
secretary general of the NCW Farkhonda Hassan stated this this law was “a 
temporary solution to give women the opportunity to prove themselves as 
powerful representatives in the political arena, paving the way for people to start 
nominating women on their own free will.”890 However, the stipulations of the law 
were not the problem. It was the application of law that proved to be detrimental 
to women’s representation in Parliament, according to Dr. Walid Kazziha. 
Kazziha explains that the electoral system did not “allow a large number of 
women to be elected from opposition groups,”891 which affected the political 
balance by favouring a greater representation of female candidates within the 
NDP, due to ruling party’s efficient structure and political influence. State 
feminism has been a relevant phenomenon in Egypt during the Mubarak regime, 
where multiple actors within the NDP and outside of it - who may not even be 
                                            
888 Celis and Childs, 214-215. 
889 “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” UN Division for 
the Advancement of Women, accessed September 20, 2012. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ 
890Heba Fahmy, “Women’s Quota Sparks Fierce Competition ahead of PA Elections,” Daily News 
Egypt, November 7, 2010, accessed November 11, 2011, 
http://dailynewsegypt.com/2010/11/07/womens-quota-sparks-fierce-competition-ahead-of-pa-
elections/  
891 Ibid.  
 252 
women - were invested in the idea of the substantive representation of women; 
thereby supporting the implementation of such activities more frequently in 
Parliament, and in other institutions and alliances between the ruling party and 
institutions such as the NCW. In one governorate, for example, 131 women 
belonging to the NDP competed for two seats. Another governorate - Qena - 
which did not have a female representative since the 1970s, witnessed the 
nomination of nine female NDP candidates and sixteen female opposition party 
candidates.892 The same phenomenon was seen in other governorates as well; 
where the overwhelming majority of female candidates belonged to the ruling 
NDP.  
Participating in elections is the first step towards achieving these liberating 
qualities. When the quota system was introduced in the 2012 elections, over a 
hundred women registered themselves as candidates to run in a male-dominated 
race. Fathi, Head of the Association for Egyptian Female Lawyers (AEFL) 
explains that  
“Women's involvement in the political sphere had long been an 
Egyptian taboo that human rights activists complained marginalized 
females and women issues such as education and sexual 
harassment… For years, male members of Parliament have objected to 
the presence of female MPs and women were not allowed any space in 
Parliament.”893 
 
The quota system remains a contentious issue amongst Islamists, Islamic 
feminists, secular feminists and liberals; as some factions disagree over its 
necessity in encouraging women to participate in a traditional society. Moreover, 
                                            
892 Fahmy. 
893 “EGYPT: Women Breaking Culture Barriers in Upcoming Parliamentary Elections,” 
Ikhwanweb, November 12, 2010, accessed November 20, 2012, 
http://ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=27133 
 253 
analysts do not think the quota system is enough to affect a change in Egypt's 
conservative society. Nor do they believe the quota will necessarily change 
Egyptian society. Shadi Hamid, director of the Brookings Institution Doha Center 
asserts that  
"[Quotas] don't address the real structural problem, they don't get 
to the root of the problem -- that the culture in the Middle East 
now is not supportive of active women's participation, is not 
supportive of women's leadership in senior positions."894 
 
Furthermore, he concludes that due to an unchanging traditional society that 
when “there are free and fair elections, people in the Arab world don't vote for 
women."895 Also, Michele Dunne of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace explains that  
 "It may work in terms of getting women mobilized to run, [but] what 
that does in terms of the actual action of the assembly and whether 
it does something more profound to the society in terms of 
democratic values and the value of political participation and 
spreading those things in society, I'm not really sure. It's too early 
to tell."896  
 
However, the Alliance for Arab Women (AAW) reveals that with or without 
the quota system, women running in a male-dominated field such as 
parliamentary elections comes with grave consequences, where a woman’s 
reputation and social standing is at stake.897  An AAW explains that female 
candidates are "very easily slandered in the press. There are many accusations 
made against them about them having affairs, extramarital relations, that are not 
necessary true. Male candidates also face having bad issues brought forward 
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against them in the press, but it's usually not of a sexual nature."898 Manal Aboul-
Hassan of the FJP, have long since viewed the quota system as a tool for the 
Mubarak regime to garner more seats in the parliament through its NDP. As a 
result, when Aboul-Hassan ran in the 2102 elections, she ran for a non-quota 
seat against a male candidate from the NDP in protest against the quota system 
which she believed did nothing to encourage or empower women in the 
parliamentary race.899  
Such arguments of ‘equity’ have recently surfaced amongst the camps of 
secular feminists and Islamic feminists regarding the question of applying a law 
in the new constitution that would ensure the presence of women in Parliament 
via the women’s quota system of reserving seats in both the SC and PA. It is true 
that such a law would negate the idea of outlawing discrimination, but secularists 
have argued that in a traditional society like the one in Egypt, the quota would be 
the only foolproof way to guarantee a substantial female presence in vital 
governmental entities. Indeed, the 2010 elections saw the highest number of 
female candidates in Egyptian history to contest seats in Parliament. According 
to AEFL’s Fathi, in the past, it was unheard of that large numbers of women were 
wanting to run in parliamentary elections, as she described such female political 
activism as being ‘out of the question’ for a traditionalist society.900 However, 
when women like Fathi witnessed a banned organization such as the MB win 88 
seats in the 2005 elections, they argued “if a banned group managed to do so 
                                            
898 Sarah A. Topol, “Egypt Vote Saves Some Seats for Women,” Aolnews.com, November 7, 
2010, accessed November 20, 2012, http://www.aolnews.com/2010/11/07/egypt-vote-saves-
some-seats-for-women/ 
899 Ibid. 
900 “EGYPT: Women Breaking Culture Barriers.” 
 255 
then we can do it.”901 Islamic women activists, however, believe that women can 
empower themselves primarily through the harnessing of certain skills, such as 
becoming Islamic preachers, scholars, and politicians. By assuming these 
positions of authority, women can then encourage Muslim women to engage the 
public and challenge positions of authority that may endanger their rights and 
freedoms.902 In addition, both Islamic feminists and Muslim Sisters describe their 
activism - whether political, social or religious - as their duty towards the 
realization of an Islamic state. Women are able to contribute to society and its 
institutions in matters of Islamic jurisprudence and out of necessity to battle the 
authoritarian entity that is in place instead of the enlightened Islamic rule.903 
The MB was the one political entity - besides the old NDP - that was more 
than prepared to form a full-functioning party to participate in Egypt’s 2011/2012 
elections. The MB had a long and successful history participating under 
Mubarak’s regime armed with their tactic of “participation, not domination” so as 
not to invoke the regime’s wrath and military assault on the organization. 
Moreover, the MB had already prepared a rough draft of their party platform in 
2007 that was received with mixed reviews.904 In spite of the MB’s insistence on 
the need to empower women so they might acquire their rights in the public 
sphere, the MB stresses the importance that this mission will be realized so long 
as it did not conflict with society’s familial values. Also, the 2007 document 
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referenced Egypt’s “dominating negative social view regarding women,” where its 
traditional segments need to grasp the idea that women’s rights extend further 
beyond her primary right to an education.905  
From the day of the MB’s inception as a political organization, it was built 
and grew into the giant that is today by being a banned entity - by working 
underground and hiding from the limelight. As a result, it has always been a 
resisting force to an oppressive entity, and that is how its organization functions: 
as an opposing force. Now, and for the first time in the history of the MB, it is 
recognised as a legitimate organization and will have equal opportunity like the 
rest of the parties that have been struggling under the weight of the corrupt NDP 
for the past few decades. It could be argued that the MB’s impressive 
parliamentary win is due to the many followers and their feelings of sympathy 
that they have gained over the years, and sharing common ground with the 
oppressed masses against the corrupt regime. Now that the organization is fully 
‘legalized’ and there is no overbearing entity to hate and unite against, it is 
unclear whether the Egyptian people will re-align their priorities and political 
affiliations after the MB’s performance in the PA, SC and CA. The MB and FJP 
need to become two separate entities, instead of two structures working to uplift 
the other through political and economic means. However, such a task seems 
quite difficult, as the majority of the FJP members are from the MB, and the MB 
follows a strict hierarchical and educational framework. As one Sister explains: 
“being part of the Ikhwan is an all-encompassing project - it is who you are, how 
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you are brought up and how you identify with others.”906 Furthermore, for the FJP 
to be taken seriously and not be accused of bribing and intimidating voters and 
constituents, the MB charity functions should not be mixed with that of the FJP’s 
political campaigning efforts and its Nahda project.  
To most Islamist women, the fight is not one for equal rights, but for 
complimentary roles for men and women; to work together to further improve the 
state of the Egyptian society.907 These women are fighting for rights within an 
Islamist framework without defying any of the norms set forth by Islamic 
jurisprudence. Their vision for a better society does not necessarily include 
advocating a better representation for women in Egypt’s public life, but it includes 
working towards attaining a more Islamic country through affirming a woman’s 
strengths. This is most telling in the words and vows of the MB’s female MP Azza 
el-Garf for 2012. During her short assignment to Egypt’s new PA, she publicly 
stated her intentions to dissolve most of the pro-women laws passed during the 
Mubarak era (under the direction and encouragement of the former First Lady 
Suzanne Mubarak), claiming that they are un-Islamic and conflicting with the goal 
of establishing a more sharia-based society. Existing laws regarding issues such 
as banning female genital mutilation (FGM) and women’s divorce rights were 
criticized by el-Garf, as tools that further incited the fragmentation of Egyptian 
society.908 Moreover, the society as a whole seems to be still largely influenced 
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by archaic patriarchal norms – which is evident in an informal poll conducted 
before the PA elections by one blogger. Dalia Ziada reported that not one of the 
1,400 voters she interviewed would consider voting for a woman nominee in the 
upcoming presidential elections.909 
The PA held its first session at the end of January 2012, when the FJP 
was a visible force to be reckoned with. The FJP also selected its General 
Secretary, Mr. Saad el-Katatni, to assume the position of Parliament speaker, 
who is tasked with the responsibility of guiding the flow of the session and the 
topics to be discussed. As el-Katatni oversaw the activities of the MPs during the 
PA sessions, he pressured the FJP MPs to focus on getting everyone in the PA 
to work as a cohesive bloc, and dissuaded them from focusing on their own 
concerns and grievances to limit conflict and arguments. The FJP’s female MPs, 
who represented less than two percent of the PA, were unable to speak up as 
much as they would have due to el-Katatni’s requests. Three Muslim Sisters 
spoke at least once and were able to voice the grievances of their constituencies 
over the course of fifteen days and six sessions; a non-FJP female MP, Margaret 
Azer, included.910 MP Hamed - a FJP member - argued that if it were not for el-
Katatni’s strict instructions directed at FJP members, the Sisters would have 
spoken up on more occasions.911 
 
                                            
909 Laura Bohn, “Women and the Arab Uprisings: 8 'Agents of Change' to Follow,” CNN.com, 
February 3, 2012, accessed February 11, 2012, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/03/world/africa/women-arab-uprisings/index.html  
910 R.H., Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, February 9, 2012. 
911According to R.H., el-Katatni wanted to keep the focus on more pressing issues such as 
government spending and subsidies, economic issues etc. Ibid. 
 259 
The FJP Female Cadres and the FJP’s National Nahda Project  
From the inception of the FJP, the Nahda (Renaissance) Project has been 
active within the party’s offices and headquarters, and the FJP mobilized and 
devised strategies to present and unfold the project that aims to revitalise and 
rebuild Egyptian society. Seeing that the President Morsy’s party platform 
included the Nahda project, the FJP remains tied to the MB; which is tied to the 
President regardless of his resignation from his previous position as Chairman of 
the FJP.912  
Morsy has been marketing the ambitious plans of the Nahda project to 
jumpstart the rehabilitation process of a country that was impeded by the 
revolution and election season. The first steps to actualizing the Nahda project 
involved training the female cadres of the FJP, and inevitably, the female 
population of the MB.913 The leading figures of the Nahda initiative, such as el-
Erian, believe that training the women is especially important; as they will be the 
front of the party, presenting to society the “Islamic alternative to the secular 
vision imposed on Egypt for decades.” 914  The FJP launched their training 
activities in cooperation with the MB and the Egyptian Center for Monitoring 
Women’s Priorities (MARAM) and under the supervision of el-Erian, the head of 
the Muslim Sisters Division - Mr. Ahmed Shaarawi, and the Maram Center official 
Gaber Muhanna.915 The Maram center plans to conduct lectures and sessions 
once a week for three months to train 110 FJP women from all governorates in 
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Egypt.916 FJP officials deem this step necessary for the development of the FJP’s 
women’s skills and to further promote the party as “a major force that dominates 
the political scene in the coming phase of Egypt's history.”917 Prioritizing the 
expansion and development of the FJP is key in this training initiative. The 
initiative will focus on “popular presentation of the FJP’s vision of the Islamic 
project, the role of women in that project as a cultural initiative for the nation as a 
whole, and the political, media and development issues, as well as the most 
important family issues on the scene.”918 
Muhanna explained that this project was originally Morsy’s task prior to his 
decision to run in the presidential elections. The Nahda project was intended to 
support female entrepreneurship with the provision of health insurance and 
necessary services to female heads of households. It also aimed to develop 
policies that will be more family-friendly, to further enable women to support their 
families.919 Dr. Sabah Saqqari, head of the FJP’s Women's Affairs Committee in 
central and southern Cairo, explained that the FJP women would be assigned to 
numerous kiosks located in the centre of Cairo, to affectively advertise and 
inform the public on the Nahda project. Another plan, the FJP sought to 
implement, was the creation of a women leadership initiative to teach and inspire 
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the younger generation of girls in Egyptian society, according to Aboul-Hassan, 
head of the FJP Women's Affairs Committee in Cairo.920 
As the date for the 2011/2012 elections arrived, Egypt was yet to write a 
new constitution. The FJP, due to the years of training and experience of the MB, 
became the dominant force in the race, whereas other players such as the April 
6th movement, that dominated the streets and the Square during the 18 days of 
protests revolution, spent the ten months leading up to the first round of elections 
focusing on “the politics of protest rather than of party organization.”921 With the 
FJP winning 43.4% of the PA seats,922 they had the biggest representation of the 
Islamist wave in the government, and they are known to have a large female 
contingency within the 84-year old organization. 923  Author and political 
commentator, Alaa el-Aswany, believes that the MB’s feeble female 
representation in politics is nothing more than a pro-democratic façade since 
their accommodationist style throughout history reveals their tactic for of using 
whatever tools necessary in their pursuit of power.924 FJP female candidates 
running as independents did not win, strengthening the hypothesis that a female 
candidate’s affiliation with a traditional Islamist party and movement improves her 
chances of winning.  
The MB and the FJP have yet to establish a large reservoir, of competent, 
highly educated and experienced candidates, to match the magnitude of its 
                                            
920 Peter Goodspeed, “Egyptian Divisions Still Festering a Year After Revolt Outbreak” The 
National Post, January 25, 2012, accessed May 21, 2012, 
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/01/25/peter-goodspeed-egyptian-divisions-still-
festering-a-year-after-revolt-outbreak/ 
921 Brown, “When Victory Becomes An Option,” 5. 
922 Ibid. 
923 Abdel-Latif, “Women In Politics: Sisters in the Muslim Brotherhood.” 
924 Shabi, 6. 
 262 
movement within Egyptian society.925 In the same manner it was believed that 
there is a limited number of female MB members qualified to run in elections, the 
male cadres of the movement and its political party also suffered the lack of 
qualified members. Several MB candidates that were running in the 2011/12 
elections had only a religious background, when, in fact, the districts in which 
they ran required a grasp of economic and financial knowledge.926 As mentioned 
before, the PA and SC candidates were chosen through the utilization of the 
MB’s hierarchy structure, i.e. candidates applied through their ūsra, where the 
accepted applications “passed through four additional layers of MB leadership 
[and] where they were thoroughly vetted before being seen by the FJP's 
executive offices.”927 As Trager explains, this practice disproves the notion that 
the FJP and the MB are separate entities: “the former feeds off the latter’s 
organizational structure in most everything it does.”928 
 
The Muslim Sisters and the Press 
The Muslim Sisters who joined the FJP and won in Egypt’s’ parliamentary 
elections wasted no time in becoming highly vocal, as their names appeared in 
several media outlets on a regular basis during 2011 and 2012. After avoiding 
media outlets, the Muslim Sisters now flooded the newspapers and television 
channels. However, many view them as the mouthpiece of a looming and dark 
force that is desperately trying to portray itself as a liberal entity that aims to 
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rebuild Egypt in unison with non-Islamist forces.929 Moreover, the Muslim Sisters 
are viewed by the public as a supporting entity to the MB’s plan to undermine 
and override previously acquired women’s rights by trying to rewrite these 
rights.930 In effect, the Muslim Sisters have spoken out in response to some of 
these worries, where they have insisted that the FJP never intends to alter 
women’s rights laws, such as the acceptable age of marriage.931 However, both 
the Muslim Sisters and the male MB members have released several statements 
that have ‘muddied’ their viewpoint and stance regarding women’s issues, thus 
exposing themselves to accusations from non-Islamist parties and political 
analysts.  
In addition to the rise of the perceived threat of Islamists to women’s 
rights; a Constituent Assembly of 100 members was derived from the parliament 
for the purpose of rewriting Egypt’s constitution. This was proven as problematic, 
due to the overwhelming presence of Islamists in Egypt’s 2011/2012 Parliament. 
932 Neither women nor Copts were adequately represented.933 Still, newly elected 
female MP Azza el-Garf of the FJP believed that even though the low female 
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representation of women in Parliament may be viewed as an illustration of the 
Egyptian public’s views of women’s political competence; having even one 
female MP may “prove to be more efficient than a number of appointed ones who 
have no knowledge regarding women's affairs and their problems.”934 Dr. Manal 
Aboul-Hassan, the FJP candidate in Cairo, explained that the overwhelming 
participation of women in regards to exercising their right to vote is an obvious 
sign that the “only obstacle, to women playing a distinctive role during the 
previous 60 years, was the previous regime.”935 
 
Omaima Kamel’s Memorable Interviews and Quotes  
During and soon after the end of the parliamentary elections, the FJP’s 
MP Dr. Omaima Kamel applauded the participation and positive activism of 
women in engaging the new Egypt. She added that this type of social 
engagement should continue “to expand the females' role in Egypt and existing 
problems should be tackled including education and health issues to help women 
improve further their status.”936 However, Kamel also voiced her disapproval of 
the female representation in the outcome of PA and SC elections. Kamel 
expressed the party’s dissatisfaction as she pointed to the fact that women were 
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placed at the end of the various parties’ lists, merely to fulfil a legal obligation.937 
The FJP practiced that same tactic of placing women lower on their lists, but due 
to their overwhelming win and popularity, the women of the FJP were able to win 
seats only on the party lists and not on the individual lists. As a doctor, Kamel 
focused on her area of expertise; she asserted that 70 percent of health care 
providers are women and she called for solutions to the problems facing women 
in the workforce that may impede Egypt’s future development and encroach on 
women’s rights in the workplace.938  
Following the inauguration of the PA sessions, the female FJP members 
started to respond to media reports that stated that the underwhelming 
representation of women in the PA reflected a governing structure hostile to 
women’s rights. Redha Abdullah, an FJP MP in the PA, rejected these reports, 
which portrayed MP women as “a silent bloc with no real role in Parliament.”939 
Furthermore, she explained that women’s input in the PA should not be 
measured by how many times they appear on the government-owned television 
channel that provides a live broadcast of the assembly sessions, as there are 
several MPs deputies who never spoke during the televised sessions, but have 
had a major role within the PA.  
Soon after the elections of 2011/12, el-Garf spoke out against allegations 
put forth by several journalists that the new parliament was marginalizing the role 
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of women in Parliament and in society.940  Moreover, el-Erian asserted that 
women are not just meant to support men, as they have their own distinct role in 
society, arguing that “it is illogical [for the MB and FJP] to disable half of society’s 
resources and capabilities by limiting their role to support and assistance only.”941 
Another Muslim Sister in the PA, Ms. Hoda Ghania, argued that the female MPs’ 
roles in Parliament “should not be limited to women's issues only; adding that 
they must debate all issues of concern to the Egyptian citizen.” 942  
 
Azza el-Garf’s Media Attention  
The one FJP member, Muslim Sister and MP, who occupied several 
distinct headlines in local, national, and international newspapers, was el-Garf. 
Despite her political experience, she was not reserved in regards to voicing her 
conservative opinions. Her objections to banning practices such as FGM 
provoked Egyptians and encouraged them to deduce that outspoken Muslim 
Sisters agreed with the MB’s stance against laws they deemed harmful to 
women. Expectedly, el-Garf backtracked on those comments by stating: "None of 
these views that were in the media expressed my opinions…it was a campaign 
waged against me after I expressed my opinion in applying the rules of sharia in 
the family [unit]."943 She placed herself in a predicament in two main ways. 
Firstly, she opposed laws that were placed to protect women from violent 
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practices or abusive households such as FGM and khul‘ (the right for a woman to 
divorce her husband according to sharia), arguing that the former should be the 
women’s choice, and the latter promotes a higher divorce rate by giving women 
the right to divorce their husbands.944 She ignored the fact that the practice of 
FGM occurs only on young girls against their will. Secondly, she expected 
women to engage in the country’s political life even as she supported the 
society’s traditional and patriarchal practices.  
 El-Garf was not the only prominent female member of the FJP to not fully 
reject FGM, as Dr. Saqqari explained her views in an interview that “only a doctor 
can decide whether or not a girl is in need of the surgery.”945 This is problematic 
as reporter Shahira Amin explains that doctors, who perform the surgery for a 
hundred Egyptian pounds ($20-25) in impoverished towns in Upper Egypt, may 
have a financial incentive in operating; and doctors may want to preform more 
FGM procedures per day in light of Egypt’s deteriorating economy.946 This is a 
point that Saqqari and el-Garf did not address. Following an interview with el-
Garf, Topol summed up her persona as being a “strong female in the context of a 
movement whose ideology is wholly patriarchal.”947 Lastly, when el-Garf was 
questioned about her role as a woman in the PA, she responded by stating: 
“I should not be defined or set to a different standard based on my 
gender. I also have to deal with several challenges facing Egypt 
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and my district. Those may include - but not entirely focus - on 
women’s issues.”948 
 
El-Garf’s comments indicate that an Islamist framework – irrespective of the 
origin of its ideology (ex. Salafist, Wahhabi), supersedes any feminist or gender 
equality agenda. Like el-Ghazali, el-Garf would stand against personal status 
laws that provided Egyptian women with more rights. At the same time, she 
would fight for a less ‘religion-dependent’ representation of women in Egyptian 
political life; as she called for women  
“to be more insistent on taking part in the political life -- to make 
sure their votes are cast and that their demands are not ignored. 
A woman should be developed in all aspects: health, economy, 
and education.”949  
 
Expectedly, el-Garf’s vision for women’s empowerment must only become a 
reality after the woman has fulfilled her motherly duties. El-Garf asserts: “Our 
families are the future of our country.”950 The seemingly contradictory comments 
should not come as a surprise, as el-Garf, who joined the MB at the age of fifteen 
after meeting with el-Ghazali, is considered one of the icon’s many loyal 
students.951 El-Garf’s husband, MB member - Badr Mohamed Badr, echoes the 
same convictions regarding women’s representation in Parliament before the 
revolution. He states that: “the image of women in the past election was usually 
decorative, provided by the regime, but this time we actually went to villages and 
heard women from all classes."952 El-Garf focused on the provision of social 
services in her district. Additionally, with the revolution and the FJP’s 
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developmental programs, el-Garf has called for the restructuring of the education 
system as the curriculum has suffered “extensive deliberate damage and 
distortion.”953  
 
The Constituent Assembly 
As aforementioned, the outcomes of the PA and the SC affect the makeup 
of the future constitution for the new Egypt. The Constituent Assembly (CA) 
members are responsible for rewriting the constitution according to the 
constitutional declaration of March 30, 2011. 954  Because the PA is 
overwhelmingly Islamist, concerns regarding women’s and Coptic rights were 
raised within the Egyptian society.955 Normally, a nation would first write its 
constitution then engage in the democratic process of elections according to the 
newly amended constitution.956 In effect, these actions have been described as 
“picking the fruits of the revolution before actually nurturing it to ensure a 
bountiful harvest.”957 However, the SCAF - the interim government - decided to 
forge ahead with the elections, which after the rewriting of the constitution may 
be deemed illegal, and might be dissolved.958 Fifty members of the 100-member 
Constituent Assembly were selected from the PA and SC. Many argued that the 
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PA was not representative of Egypt, with over sixty percent Islamist MPs and 
only twelve women.959  
The CA’s main function was to draft a new constitution to be approved by 
the people in a referendum.960 The Assembly was given six months to complete 
its work after which the referendum will be held within 15 days. 961 In April 2012, 
the CA’s list of names was compiled, where 36 of the fifty MPs belonged to the 
FJP or the Salafist el-Nour Party. Specifically, 25 FJP members and eleven el-
Nour members made up the 36 Islamist CA members. The remaining fourteen 
seats were distributed amongst other parties and independents.962 The other 50 
members, hailing from different academic professional associations, were 
described as mostly personalities with Islamist leanings.963  
There were only six Coptic Christians to represent ten percent of the 
population, and six women to represent around half of the population. It is 
significant to note that one of the Christians selected was Rafiq Habib, the deputy 
head of the FJP. Two of the Christians were women, thereby representing both 
women and Christians and increasing the number of seats that can be assigned 
to other parties or individuals. Susan Zaghloul, a member of the SC and an FJP 
member, as well as Fatma Abu Zeid, the daughter of a prominent Brotherhood 
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Guidance Bureau member; represented the Muslim Sisters.964 Subsequently, the 
CA was dissolved when lawyers and activists filed lawsuits clarifying how the 
CA’s list of names is dominated by Islamist ones, and therefore was 
unrepresentative of the Egyptian peoples. 965 According to Mostafa el-Naggar, an 
MP and a member of el-Adl party, the non-Islamist MPs were unaware of the list 
of nominated names for the CA. El-Naggar explained: “the remainder of the MPs 
were blocked from knowing these names or their backgrounds and expertise, 
and only found out about the nominees for the first time when the ballots were 
being handed out to us.”966 Moreover, he described his shock at the minuscule 
number of nominees that were to represent Egypt’s female population and their 
concerns. When he questioned his colleague, who belonged to the Islamist 
majority, regarding this matter, he replied: “We cannot find women who are 
suitable to become members of the assembly.” 967 His comments are puzzling 
given the existence of several highly competent Egyptian women such as the 
secularist Dr. Nawal al-Saadawi and the Islamist Dr. Heba Raouf Ezzat, whose 
records were highlighted in previous chapters, who could have adequately 
presented women’s concerns and issues. It is interesting to note that even Al-
Azhar, which is considered the pinnacle of Sunni learning, had five seats 
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reserved and yet, withdrew from the first CA “in solidarity with liberals, churches 
and others.”968 
 
The Reshuffling of the CA Members and Representatives of the Egyptian Society 
  An amended list of CA members was introduced in June 2012, when PA 
speaker el-Katatni announced the names of its members. 575 Parliament 
members participated in voting, out of the 678 members, from both houses of 
Parliament.969  The list contained 33 members from eight political parties.970 
Additionally, seven members would be women, and seven members would 
represent Egypt’s youth and those injured during the January 25 revolution. Ten 
Islamic scholars were chosen to represent al-Azhar and other Islamic bodies, 
with only eight people to represent Copts - four from the different churches and 
four from political movements and public figures.971 Of the many FJP members 
present in the CA, FJP leaders el-Erian, and el-Beltagy were included in this 
endeavour, as well as several members from the MB’s Guidance Bureau.972 The 
CA’s list included other personalities from outside of the PA and SC such as the 
Chairman of the Lawyers Syndicate, the Chairman of the Journalists Syndicate 
and the Head of the Supreme Judicial Council, to name a few.973 Once again, 
women and Copts were underrepresented which further worried the public that 
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their rights would be curtailed, as the new CA was still overwhelmingly 
Islamist.974 
While the newer CA members were working to form a new constitution, 
many women’s rights activists were worried that rights previously granted to them 
would be revoked, prompting NCW head, Mervat Tellawi, to state that "women's 
rights must be set down in the constitution so they are not merely a gift bestowed 
by a president or parliament, that is then taken back when they leave.”975 She 
also pointed out that in a traditional society such as Egypt’s, the reinstatement of 
a quota system would ensure women were properly represented in Parliament. 
Some activists have even demanded a fifty percent female presence in the 
CA.976 However, FJP female member and CA member Ghaniya rejected such 
calls arguing that such demands go against the principle of equal rights 
irrespective of gender, class, race or religion. The initial draft of the new 
constitution included clauses against discrimination and in favour of equality. 
Ghaniya pointed out that the articles on equality are sufficient to ensure women’s 
rights. In regards to female political participation, she explained that the “societal 
culture and women’s endeavours are the main factors that should impact 
women’s presence on the political scene.”977 Ghaniya, thus, encourages women 
to be active in areas concerning public, charitable and social work.978 Due to the 
reaction to the early version of the laws being drafted, the process of writing the 
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constitution has also been criticized for taking place with a “lack of transparency 
and lack of representation of various groups.”979 The general public, meanwhile, 
seemed eager to move towards a level of normalcy after having tired of the ups 
and downs of the constitution drafting process. 
 
The Controversial Components of the New Constitution: The Islamization of Sate 
Policy  
In the initial stages of outlining the first constitutional draft, Egyptian 
society erupted as Islamist approaches within the CA demanded that certain 
women’s rights given in the Mubarak era are reverted to their original version.980 
Salafist CA members called for the lowering of the age of marriage, the legalising 
of FGM, the lowering of the age of parental custody of children and revoking the 
right for women to divorce. Soon after, a demonstration took place outside the 
SC building, where the CA meets to work on the new constitution.981 Secular 
women and women’s rights activists protested on the streets of Egypt and tried to 
garner support, which proved difficult as the majority of the population was still 
unaware of or uninterested in gender-related concerns such as the 
implementation of Article 68 (formerly known as Article 36); leaving women 
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rights’ supporters responsible for the burden.982 In addition, a press conference 
was held to protect Article 68 that may threaten women rights and would 
inevitably conflict with other articles of the constitution. 983 Specifically, Article 68 
proposed that the state “will reinforce gender equality in all spheres but in 
accordance with the interpretations of Sharia.”984 As mentioned before, it is not 
the issue that sharia will be implemented that is causing this level of grief; it is the 
issue of which interpretation of sharia will be used and to what extent; at the time 
of implementing these laws. Understandably, human rights groups fear that some 
interpretations of Islamic texts may undermine women rights, hence their 
opposition to the proposed article.985  
Women’s rights activists and minority groups are left alone to fend off and 
fight such proposals that “circumscribe and ‘qualify’ rights based on gender and 
religion.”986 Article 68 worried women rights activists who wondered if passing 
laws in accordance to some form of sharia interpretation would be used to re-
allow the practice of FGM and lower the age of marriage for women. However, 
Dr. Kamel, one of the seven women in the CA, asserted that Article 68 is a gift to 
women’s rights as it “ensures equality for women in every aspect of life.”987 
Furthermore, Kamel argued that the age of marriage is “not even mentioned, you 
cannot state an age in the constitution, this is a legislative issue not a 
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constitutional one.”988 Kamel also pointed out that there exist more pressing 
issues than those on which the liberals and seculars have chosen to focus: 
“What about women’s education and the fight against illiteracy… which is still 
rampant in rural Egypt? What about the struggle against poverty in a country 
where nearly half the population is impoverished?”989 The CA eventually dropped 
the article for the unforeseeable future.990 However, this decision angered many 
of the more conservative CA members who desired the actualization of Islamic 
law. 
As media attention continued to focus on the controversial articles in the 
new constitution, political analyst, Mariz Tadros, redirected the attention to the 
possibility that the constitution is the first step towards the Islamization of state 
policy; mainly through the major pitfalls in Articles 219 and 4.991 The combination 
of both articles, in the same constitution, produces a dangerous weapon that 
could be used to severely curtail women’s rights. Article 2 referred to abiding by 
the principles of sharia, whilst Article 219 further clarifies that Islamic 
jurisprudence is the basis of legislation. Article 219 is located in the section 
entitled “state and security affairs.” Tadros explained that the freedoms found in 
the constitution are:  
“qualified by the proviso ‘so long as they do not violate the 
principles [of the section] regulating state and society’, which in 
practice refers to article 219. This wording means that no rights or 
                                            
988 Abdoun, “Muslim Brotherhood Women Try to Assuage the Concerns of Women’s Rights 
Activists.” 
989 Khalaf. 
990 Abdoun, “Muslim Brotherhood Women Try to Assuage the Concerns of Women’s Rights 
Activists.” 
991 Mariz Tadros, “Egypt: the Islamization of State Policy,” OpenDemocracy, January 8, 2013, 
accessed July 23, 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/mariz-tadros/egypt-islamization-of-
state-policy  
 277 
freedoms are absolute, that all are contingent upon the 
interpretation of article 219.”992 
 
In practice, this article will be the basis for Islamizing any sets of state policy. For 
example, the MB-led Ministry of Education removed a picture of Doria Shafik 
from secondary history books because she was not veiled, due to the objection 
of several Islamist television satellite stations to the image.993 
The MB has time and again released statements assuring the Islamist 
currents that Islamic sharia law will be a central theme in Egypt’s new 
constitution.994 During the deliberations and negotiations that took place amongst 
the CA members, the MB tried to appease the liberal members by keeping the 
original wording of "principles of sharia," while explaining its boundaries by 
detailing that the idea of principles would include ‘the juristic rules’ of sharia; 
which has to be agreed upon by Islamic scholars through the use of ‘accepted 
sources’ of the Quran's interpretation.995 On the other hand, Salafist influences 
demanded a stricter wording where they advocated the ‘the rulings of sharia’ 
instead, in an attempt to pressure Egypt’s courts to abide by a narrower 
interpretation and implementation of sharia law.996  
The post-revolution time frame is unclear as to its direction and the type of 
government that will govern Egypt and will tackle women’s rights issues. The 
short-lived interim government represented by SCAF did not address any 
women’s rights issues; except to dissolve the women quota seats in Parliament, 
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and replace it with the requirement of having one woman per party list. 
Unfortunately, this was not reflective of a good start in the right direction for 
women’s rights, where SCAF should have further specified that women be 
placed in the top half of the lists, to guarantee a larger presence of women in 
Parliament. Moreover, the running of female candidates for the Salafist group al-
Nour, with pictures of flowers instead of their faces, is not an encouraging start 
soon after the dissolution of the Mubarak regime. 997  The disappointing 
presentation of women in Parliament has been partly attributed to the limited time 
given to new liberal and secularist parties to recruit and assemble their human 
resources, and to nominate the most experienced female political figures. Egypt’s 
electoral system still lacks an effective measure to even out the political arena for 
female candidates. The fact remains that the MB never had more than one 
female candidate listed in any of their party lists; be it the individual or party lists. 
In other words, the MB placed enough of their female candidates on their lists to 
fulfill the requirements of election participation. The lack of political experience is 
more often that not the reason provided by MB members to explain low female 
political participation, especially within the MB and FJP. However, almost all 
other parties positioned female candidates on the bottom half of the lists; also 
reducing their chances of success. The reason for such a tactic is that in all 
likelihood, no party list would gain fifty percent of the votes in any single 
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district.998 Furthermore, in Egypt’s traditional society, it is still difficult for a female 
candidate to overcome the prejudices in most districts outside the large cities of 
Cairo and Alexandria.999 In the meantime, the small number of female MPs may 
shed light on this issue during the constitutional drafting process, in an effort to 
improve female political participation through the implementation of favorable 
laws. Enas Mostafa - a Muslim Sister - asserted that “Egyptian culture has never 
encouraged women to participate in society, in media or politics and such things. 
There is this negative view of women in politics but this is not the fault of religion, 
it is cultural.”1000 It is worth noting that Egypt is ranked the 125th out of 130 
countries in regards to gender equality according to the 2010 World Economic 
Forum.1001 
Another aspect of low female representation in political roles within the MB 
and the FJP, are the Muslim Sisters themselves. For example, Muslim Sister, 
Dina Hussein, argues that rather than engaging the Egyptian society through 
political means: “Islam is telling me I am free to choose… I want to prioritise my 
family because family is our main strength.”1002 Furthermore, she believes that 
due to the fact that 90 percent of Egypt is Muslim, it makes sense for politics to 
be prescribed by sharia.1003 In conclusion, in spite of the aforementioned strong-
willed Muslim Sisters and FJP female personalities, the majority of the Sisters 
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shy away from the limelight, lack the required skills, or may rather prefer to focus 
on their families, whether by choice or under the directives of the MB.  
A year after the January 25 revolution - little has changed for the women 
who tested their equal standing with men when they brought down a corrupt 
government. As for the Muslim Sisters, they have become more vocal, more 
politically active and more confident to move forward towards the goal set forth 
by their political party and by the MB. Sondos Asem, a young Muslim Sister who 
edits the MB’s online English website, reiterates the same sentiments as her 
Sisters: “Women do most of the work on the ground, especially in campaigns. 
They are larger in numbers, and in influence in campaigns, they can be more 
convincing.”1004 Asem also revealed the impressive groundwork in which she and 
many other young Sisters participated during the presidency elections; she 
explained that she recently challenged herself and her friends to reach one 
hundred voters each, to ensure Dr. Mohammed Morsy’s win in the limited 
amount of time that was available.1005 However, their interest in partaking in 
political action may be due to their desire to collectively ensure political reform 
through piety and religious discourse. To many Muslim Sisters, democracy and 
the application of democratic practices are just stepping-stones towards the 
building of an Islamic society. The revolution may have made the goal of 
democracy more reachable, but to the Muslim Sisters, household duties are still 
prioritized. Fatma el-Zomor, a Muslim Sister, recalled a time when the women of 
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the MB were forced to operate underground and watch political events form the 
side-lines:  
“Before the revolution the Muslim Brotherhood had a red line - and 
that red line was the Sisters. They would not put them in the limelight 
because they feared for them. They had pledged that they would not 
allow the security services to arrest women.”1006 
 
According to Dialika Krahe, a journalist who has interviewed several Muslim 
Sisters, the Sisters may want to be liberated, but only within the confines of Islam 
as they are “women fighting for rights, but they are not interested in fighting for 
them against men.”1007 They are dedicating their time and talent to change the 
negative perceptions of the society in regards to the Islamist movement of the 
MB and its political unit - the FJP. By promoting female political participation 
through assigning very public roles to the Muslim Sisters, their plan to erase 
harmful stereotypes may work over the long term. However, the religious tide that 
has seemed to take over all political avenues in Egypt including the CA, is more 
determined than ever to revoke portions of Egypt’s Personal Status Law as the 
MB contends that the changes made to these laws over the past decade are 
against sharia.  
In 2012, with the rewriting of the constitution and the rebuilding of 
alliances with foreign powers, the fear that an Islamist movement as large as the 
MB will repress several strands of society, such as women, Coptic Christians and 
even Muslims who advocate a non-Islamist rule; or follow a different 
interpretation of sharia; seems more of a reality than fiction. The MB no longer 
has to accommodate any overseeing oppressive power. Moreover, Browers 
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explains that the fear will prove palpable when Islam is “legitimated as the source 
of political and social norms.”1008  Several analysts and academics, such as 
Hamzawy (2010), Ottaway (2003), Karam (2010) and el-Ghobashy (2005), have 
stipulated in the past that Islamist movements, particularly the MB, will modify, 
amend or even reform their public image and their agenda to appease the 
majority or the political consensus. One telling example of that is the MB’s 
continual tactic of forming alliances with parties that may not seem to share the 
same views regarding issues such as women’s rights, the implementing of sharia 
as the principle source of law, or Coptic rights. Particularly, it was Karam’s 
explanation that rang true in regards to the MB and its negotiation tactics with 
Egypt’s old authoritarian regimes, where gender discrimination was a 
characteristic that stood out when Islamists and non-Islamists came to the 
negotiation table, and what Karam described as a reminder of the bad old days 
of colonialism.1009 Karam further explained that when two right-wing entities need 
to find a temporary peaceful state of co-existence, moderate discourse is 
neglected, thereby disregarding women’s rights issues. In turn, a ‘third way’ of 
thinking never materializes, which gives way to a “vicious cycle, with the mute 
moderate discourse emerges a louder radical one, which in turn leads to further 
antagonisms and conflict.”1010 
Still, the FJP women have yet to prove they are able and ready to take on 
the pressures of rebuilding an unstable Egypt in the face of their overpowering 
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helicopter parent - the MB - and stand up against cultural biases that view 
women as ill-equipped to deal with the many obstacles and pressures of a 
governmental and parliamentary position.   
 
The FJP’s War on the NCW 
Besides the negative public response towards el-Garf’s comments, the 
active female members of the FJP joined their voices with that of the FJP and 
MB in attacking the NCW and everything it stands for. Soon after the elections, 
the SCAF issued a decree to restructure and appoint new members to the NCW, 
which the FJP have defined as the friends, confidants and associates of Suzanne 
Mubarak.1011 The FJP argued that the SCAF should not have proceeded with 
such changes without consulting with all political parties and stakeholders, 
arguing that the new NCW “would not serve the interests of the nation or fulfil the 
goals of the revolution as far as Egyptian women were concerned.”1012 Kamel 
described the NCW as a ‘token’ council that is unable to comprehend and grasp 
the real needs of Egyptian women and only serves as a “consultative council for 
the executive branch … with no power to implement its own decisions.”1013 In 
addition, she described the assignment and formation of the new NCW as being 
“shrouded in mystery and secrecy,”1014 adding that the problems that women 
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face are greater than what the thirty members of NCW are capable of dealing 
with.  
In retaliation to the secular ideologies brought on by the NCW onto the 
Egyptian society, Aboul Hassan - Secretary of the FJP Women’s Committee in 
Cairo - argued that "our (FJP) vision on the status of women is certainly superior 
to and more comprehensive than the limited Western view.”1015 Her statement 
came in line with the FJP’s warning to the NCW to refrain from involving further 
international agreements or treaties during their meetings with the UN, which in 
their opinion will inevitably lead to “more tension and strife in the Egyptian street, 
due to dubious policies on the basis of which [the] Council was founded.”1016 
According to a report on Islamist women’s activism, there is a focus by Islamist 
women to try and localise any ideas or laws pertaining to women to better suit 
the region’s needs and values.1017 In other words, laws imposed by CEDAW and 
the UN should be revised to become more Egyptian-friendly and inevitably more 
suitable to Islamic teaching. Expectedly, the report explained that most Islamist 
women activists impose the application of Western or ‘universal’ terminology 
such as gender, equality and feminism that may promote ‘a particular Western 
worldview’ which overlooks the much favored complementarity roles between 
men and women.” 1018 El-Beltaji stated that the Egyptian society “want integration 
and coordination of the roles of men and women, a shared responsibility, in 
                                            
1015 “Egyptians Demand a National Council for the Family,” IkhwanWeb, March 9, 2012, accessed 
April 16, 2012, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29765&ref=search.php 
1016 “Freedom and Justice Party Renews Call for National Consensus Government; Rejects 
Borrowing Policy, Women's Council,” IkhwanWeb, February 22, 2012, accessed August 14, 
2012, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29706&ref=search.php 
1017 Julie Elisabeth Pruzan-Jørgensen, “Islamic Women’s Activism in the Arab World,” DIIS Policy 
Brief (February 2012): 3.  
1018 Ibid., 3. 
 285 
accordance with a special Egyptian agenda, not an agenda imposed by the 
women’s office in the United Nations.” 1019 In effect, the FJP called for a unified 
entity that gathers the NCW and the National Council for Childhood and 
Motherhood into one council to represent the ‘family’, and that would reflect “the 
complementary roles of men and women.”1020 El-Beltaji further expressed that 
the new council for the Egyptian family should have a minimum sixty percent 
female representation in its members. 1021 Moreover, Kamel revealed the 
circumstances under which the FJP would cooperate and work with the NCW. 
The FJP will be in agreement with the organization as long as the new post-
revolution NCW represents all Egyptian women, Kamel explained, through 
reconsidering all decisions taken by the previous NCW, such as the CEDAW and 
personal status laws, and opening them up for public discussion “to achieve the 
goals and wishes of Egyptian women, and restore all their usurped rights.”1022 
The last issue in which the female FJP members engaged the media was 
the question of whether to return to the women’s quota system, and whether to 
include it in the constitution to ensure that women are better represented in 
Parliament. The aforementioned public personalities of the Muslim Sisters spoke 
out against it, with el-Garf asserting that that no longer will women be 
marginalized, where she called on the media to “end stereotyping women as 
victims with no roles.”1023 As the FJP female members channelled their opinions 
and agenda for the reformation of the Egyptian society starting with the family 
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unit, they revealed their activist side, but with a more Islamist framework and a 
less feminist one. Rather than fighting for equality rights between men and 
women, they are striving for the existence of ‘equity’. Such practices fall in line 
with the MB and FJP’s desire for a complementarity of roles, and in keeping with 
the obligations of a woman to her family and her society. 
 
The New Egypt: Inhospitable for Women Activists and Public Personalities?  
The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) published a report 
entitled “Women and the Arab Spring” in early 2012, which provided an 
assessment of women’s rights in all countries that have experienced a revolution 
or an uprising since 2011.1024 In the section on Egypt, a summary was given on 
women’s rights and their positions within governmental entities and parliamentary 
units during Mubarak’s reign and after the revolution. Women’s representation in 
Egypt’s government during Mubarak’s reign concluded with the presence of only 
three women out of 37 ministers. The Mubarak years witnessed a ‘slight 
increase’ of women in local councils from 1.6 percent in 2002 to 4 percent in 
2008. In 2008, Eva Kyrolos became the first woman mayor in Egypt. During 
Mubarak’s rule in 2007, female candidates made up ten candidates out of 609 
candidates, where one woman was elected.1025 Nine women were appointed to 
the 264-member SC, representing four percent of the entire parliament. In the 
2010 elections, 380 women ran for elections and 62 were elected to the reserved 
seats, in addition to the appointment of one woman by the president. In the end, 
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female representation amassed to twelve percent in Parliament.1026 The year 
2003 saw the first female judge to be appointed to the Supreme Constitutional 
Court. However, she was not allowed to hold any hearings, stripping her of any 
real legislative authority.1027 The ban on appointed female judges was lifted in 
2007, when thirty female judges were appointed to the civil courts, but not to any 
criminal courts or to the Office of the General Prosecutor; as the State Council 
(administrative court) deemed such an assignment contradictory to religious 
beliefs.1028 In regards to constitutional rights, the 1971 constitution that Mubarak 
adhered to, stated in Article 40 that “all citizens are equal before the law. They 
have equal public rights and duties without discrimination on grounds of race, 
ethnic origin, language, religion or creed.” The report points out that this clause 
did not contain any reference to gender or sex as grounds for discrimination.1029 
Interestingly, Article 11 of the old constitution references the pivotal role of 
Islamic law - and not sharia - in regards to women’s rights. The Article stipulated 
that the state would “guarantee harmonization between the duties of woman 
towards the family and her work in the society, ensuring her equal status with 
man in fields of political, social, cultural and economic life, without violation of the 
rules of Islamic jurisprudence.”1030 
Comparing Mubarak’s reign (which spanned over thirty years) to the two 
years post revolution seems an unfair and incomplete critique. Women activists 
under Mubarak’s rule had several outlets to contest and fight for better conditions 
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and laws for the female population, through institutions such as NGOs and the 
NCW. Following the 2011 revolution, the NCW has been under constant attack, 
and has been fighting off accusations by Islamists of trying to westernize the 
Egyptian culture and disintegrate the fabric of its Muslim society through secular 
laws and ideologies.1031 As for the status of NGOs in Egypt, many have closed 
down or were forced to terminate their activities, pending investigations on the 
nature of its funding and its activities. 1032  With the formation of a new 
government, and the reinvention of its structure, as well as the implementation of 
electoral laws detailing the type and formation of seats and electoral lists; two 
years is not a long enough span of time to work out the faults and drawbacks of 
these laws. Nevertheless, the report reviews the issues listed in the previous 
paragraph in the new Egypt. In regards to women in Egypt’s ministries: out of a 
total of 31 ministries, only two are headed by women.1033 In addition, the Minister 
of Local Development stated in June 2011 that he will refrain from appointing any 
women as mayors “due to the difficult times in the country,” and that he did not 
want to add to the already existing burdens and responsibilities put on women, 
which he believed could prove too much for them to handle.1034 As mentioned 
before in Chapter Six, the SCAF dissolved the old laws passed regarding the 
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reservation of parliamentary seats for women, and replaced them with a decree 
that required the placement of at least one woman on all electoral lists. However, 
the majority of female candidates were placed in the lower half of the lists, 
resulting in a two percent female presence in the PA. As for the post-January 25 
Constitution, the worry remains that the constitution will be guided by an Islamist 
agenda, thereby greatly affecting the future of women’s rights in Egypt.  
Egyptian women have a great challenge ahead of them. With the passing 
of the peoples’ uprising, many believed that a woman’s place in society would 
improve. Sexual harassment of women has been a growing phenomenon in 
Egypt over the past ten years. For example, a 2008 survey publicized that 83 
percent of Egyptian women had been sexually harassed, and 62 percent of the 
men surveyed admitted to harassing women, where 53 percent of them blamed 
the women for bringing it on themselves.1035 However, the reports of sexual 
harassment and abuse continued, and in some cases increased 
exponentially.1036 Cases of sexual harassment have discouraged many women 
activists from engaging the public or joining protests. Female journalists and 
even political candidates refrained from actively engaging the public on the 
streets whether through campaigning efforts or as part of protests and 
demonstrations. During the campaign season, while a candidate was addressing 
the public in the governorate of Qena, she was verbally and physically attacked 
when a male attendee shouted at her for not wearing a veil and being ‘un-
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Islamic’, as he threw his shoe at her.1037 Similar accusation have been hurled at 
female protestors and activists where they have been attacked for ‘betraying’ 
their traditional roles, insisting that a woman’s ‘rightful’ place was at home. A 
journalist was subjected to comments like "better for you to go home and feed 
your babies," and "go get married." Such discouraging opinions and attitudes put 
women in vulnerable positions where sexual assaults continued during their 
participation in public political protests.1038  
In an attempt to decrease the incidents of harassment directed at women, 
the military deployed female officers during the election season to guard polling 
places. Similarly in 2006, several incidents of sexual assault forced police 
officials in Cairo to increase the number of patrols to fight the increase of such 
incidents, but the process of criminalizing sexual harassment was never 
passed.1039 Several activists and protesters have suspected that these actions 
took place as part of opponents’ tactic in weakening the spirits of protesters and 
discouraging them from engaging in public political participation.1040 Furthermore, 
attacking female protestors is in keeping with an old tactic used by the Mubarak’s 
security apparatus, and which is still being used by the military, post-
Mubarak.1041  
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The fact still remains that society and the government are still unable and 
unequipped to deal with that form of ‘sexual terrorism’ and violence directed at 
one gender. Furthermore, due to the fact that such issues are considered a 
taboo, women do not report such incidents of harassment and sexual assaults, 
making it increasingly difficult to gather accurate information, assess the 
magnitude of the problem and present possible solutions or agendas to combat 
such aggression. As previously mentioned, the attack of female protesters in 
November 2011 prompted a protest held by female activists, to demonstrate 
against the use of force by the army on women.1042 However, many traditionalist 
strands of society saw this protest as an insult and a slap on the face of Egyptian 
men, where the women had to represent themselves and fight for their honour by 
marching in the streets, prompting the traditionalist public to view this action as 
testament to the absence of any ‘real mean’ in the country to reclaim their honour 
for them. 1043  Faced with the unwavering traditional and patriarchal society, 
women have to factor in the growing popularity of Islamist movements and the 
slow Islamization of Egypt’s streets.1044 On the other hand, seeing that a large 
portion of the population lives under the poverty line (where they live on less than 
two dollars per day), Egyptian women’s concerns currently focus on the 
availability of a source of independent income and rising rate of unmarried 
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women, in light of the financial crisis post-revolution Egypt faces.1045 According to 
some reports, almost five million Egyptian women are considered their families’ 
sole breadwinners, and more than 90 percent of young people remain jobless, 
where almost half of them are women.1046 
Irrespective of the tactics and endgame of the Muslim Sisters, they still 
represent a fascinating social and political group. Many of today’s Muslim Sisters 
are highly vocal and have become prominent public figures, in addition to the 
MB’s female youth that have welcomed the newfound freedom and desire for a 
more democratic Egypt. Muslim Sister, Nermin Hassan, explains: “The waters 
are stirring and we have started to think about what we know about women’s 
rights.”1047 Hassan was delegated with the task of teaching young Muslim Sisters 
how to treat their husbands and present themselves in the most suitable light. 
However, Hassan claims that this has changed after the revolution, where “there 
is no longer the language that says you should be obedient but more emphasis 
on complementing each other and that there should be no power struggle 
between men and women.”1048 Still, the Muslim Sisters reject the concepts of 
feminism on the basis of their understanding that it is mainly a Western one that 
aims to destroy the family unit, in which the MB’s historical organization is rooted 
as a structure and a way of life. Kamel frames the issue of feminism versus 
Islamism in the following question:  
“Is it equality or equity? That’s the issue. What the liberals care 
about is women’s freedom…men and women have the same 
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rights and responsibilities but I know that there are differences 
between men and women, it’s biological. Being a mother is a 
woman’s most important job, it’s fundamental, and so we speak of 
the protection of motherhood and child and the liberals don’t like 
it.”1049 
 
The Muslim Sisters are difficult for sociologists and political analysts to define: 
Are they Islamic feminists aiming to improve women’s status or are they just 
Islamists working from within the MB for the betterment and advancement of the 
MB’s vision of an Islamic ūmma? In addition to their new flurry of activities within 
the FJP, the Sisters have not neglected their da‘wa duties as the current first lady 
of Egypt, Naglaa Ali, continues to engage the public through da‘wa and social 
work.1050  Tohidi states that in general, women in the Muslim countries are 
“fighting and strategizing against two sets of pressures, one stemming from the 
internal patriarchal system and the other emitted by those forces seen as 
external, threatening people's national and cultural boundaries." 1051  Islamic 
feminism is a fitting idea to deal with both struggles, where women - analogous to 
the Muslim Sisters - are guided by their religious beliefs in trying to encourage 
and actualize the egalitarian ethics of Islam in their fight for women's rights. 
However, Tohidi makes a distinction in regards to women who mobilize within an 
Islamic framework; there are “those Islamic women who are genuinely promoting 
women's rights and hence inclusionary in their politics [and] those who insist on 
fanatic or totalitarian Islam."1052 Public personalities such as Fatema Khafagy, a 
board member of the alliance for Arab women, claims that the MB uses its 
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female members to enhance its image as a gender equality advocate. She 
explains: “the whole system is a strict hierarchal structure and the heads are all 
men. To me they look like an army, with men at the top taking decisions and 
women having to comply.”1053 On the other hand, Asem - the young Muslim 
Sister - views the MB’s methodology of giving orders and its chain of command 
as a positive attribute, clarifying that “the Muslim Brotherhood’s biggest strength 
is that they have very dedicated young people ready to implement the democratic 
decisions even though they might not agree with some of them. That’s why we 
win elections.”1054 However, such level of obedience worry several factions and 
many secular-minded women activists look at the Muslim Sisters with a hint of 
distrust, viewing them as an even bigger threat than their male counterparts. The 
chairwoman of the Alliance for Arab Women stated: “I can’t claim to understand 
them 100 percent but I think they have undergone some kind of 
brainwashing.”1055 
There is some doubt that the real motive for the MB in empowering the 
female members is nothing more than a ploy to address the fears of the secular 
Egyptian population and the international community. Such strong showing of 
politically active women may be one of the many reasons that the MB is looked 
upon as a more moderate Islamist movement; an entity that does not pose much 
of a threat in comparison to the more hard-lined Islamist currents of the Salafist 
community in Egypt. The new concern that has been occupying the minds of 
many Egyptians within Egypt and abroad is that an Islamist government will 
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breed a more conservative Egyptian society. Political sociology professor Dr. 
Said Sadek, explains that  
“having the Muslim Brotherhood in power will make the people more 
conservative not because of specific legislation, but because 
Egyptians are conditioned to follow their leaders and not challenge 
them or their beliefs. Hence, the fear is not from the ‘Ikhwanization’ of 
state institutions but from the ‘Ikhwanization’ of society, which is a 
slow but steadily growing process.”1056 
 
This scenario does not seem farfetched or unlikely. Similar sentiments were 
witnessed in Iran before the 1979 revolution, when Iranians from across the 
political spectrum joined Khomeini in his quest to rid Iran of all Western powers 
and influence. That a Muslim society sweeps away the imperialist influence 
seemed like the best solution for Iran. However, with Khomeini’s ‘liberation’ of 
Iran from the West, came the dissolution of women’s rights and freedoms. Once 
the Ayatollahs took power, the treatment of women took a negative turn as they 
viewed the modern woman as “a source of ritual pollution; for the radical lay 
thinkers, the apolitical Westernized woman was a duped agent of imperialist 
cultural hegemony.” 1057  As expected in political negotiations and in the 
transformation of direction and ideology of political power, the issues pertaining 
to women’s rights and family law were the first articles to be dismissed. The year 
1979 saw more than the revolution in Iran. By June 1979, Khomeini had 
suspended the Family Protection Law, put a stop to appointing women as judges, 
declared the act of divorce as only a man’s prerogative, banned women from 
enlisting in the army, forced women to wear the veil in the workplace, segregated 
                                            
1056 Abdoun, “Muslim Brotherhood Women Try to Assuage Concerns.” 
1057 Janet Afary, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
237. 
 296 
sports and educational institutions and schools, declared that married women 
could no longer attend high school and closed down day care centres to force 
working mothers to quit their jobs and retreat back into the home.1058  
The fate that met Iranian women gives little hope to Egyptian women 
today, as a MB member has become president. 1059  However, Ghandour 
assessed the position of women in Iran in 2011, more than thirty years after the 
revolution, and the results are not as negative as one would think. Today, women 
in Iran are more literate and more educated, and Iran has produced many female 
literary authors.1060 Much like the Muslim Sisters in the MB organization, Iranian 
women have yet to occupy senior positions in government or have a seat on the 
judicial bench. However, Khomeini’s government is the reason for the rising rate 
of literacy and level of healthcare. Ghandour pointed out that in spite of 
Khomeini’s Islamist idea of an Islamic nation, where women were confined to 
their duties of the household and family, difficult economic and political conditions 
that have been sprung on Iran in the past few decades have overshadowed the 
‘tired Islamist idea’ in the face of survival and prosperity.1061 Optimists such as 
Asef Bayat described modern Iran as a country that passed though “a phase of 
experimentation [where] the appeal, energy and sources of legitimacy of 
Islamism have been exhausted even among its once-ardent supporters.”1062 In 
the midst of trying to rebuild Egypt and appease the different political currents, 
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Egypt’s economic climate has been rapidly deteriorating, and the prospects of 
receiving funds are being threatened in the midst of political unrest.  
It is important to compare today’s Egypt with Iran thirty years ago, as 
many analysts and bloggers have made that comparison soon after the Islamists 
won a majority in the PA elections. A comparison between Egypt and Iran, 
although highlighted by the similar circumstances in which the two countries have 
shared, should not overlook the differences in the culture and history of each. 
The variables that affect feminism and Islamic feminism, like cultures and norms, 
play a great role in the direction one country may take that may not necessarily 
mimic that of the other country. It is too soon to tell whether Egypt will undergo 
the same experiences and trials, assuming the Islamist current continues to 
overwhelm the secular and liberal groups amidst the rewriting of the constitution 
and the PA re-elections. As the probability of the Mubarak regime being replaced 
with an Islamist one looms, many wonder if Egypt would transform to another 
Iran. One analyst in particular started to compare women’s rights advances in 
post-Khomeini Iran to that of Egypt’s female empowerment since the start of the 
20th century.1063  The comparison revealed many surprises, where when the 
amendments were assessed in regards to Egypt, the results were disappointing, 
as there existed a huge gap between the ‘in principle’ and ‘in practice’ of such 
laws.1064 Ghandour explained that Islamic law acknowledges the ‘equality’ of 
women and men in citizenship, but the penal code and its articles such as Article 
277 for example, stated that the “man is guilty [of adultery] only if he commits the 
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act at his marital home, a woman is guilty regardless of where the act takes 
place.”1065 The battle between the Muslim Sisters and advocates of feminism, as 
well as the arguments that erupt between Islamic feminists and secular feminists 
is an ongoing saga of accusations of narrow-mindedness and Western 
imperialism. However, the question of whether the Muslim Sisters and Islamic 
feminists belong to the same camp is yet to be established. Both the Sisters and 
Islamic feminists advocate a lifestyle of complementarity between the sexes, as 
opposed to secular feminists’ call for equality and the absence of discrimination 
based on one’s gender. Furthermore, the idea of equity versus equality is 
prominent in the rhetoric of Islamic feminists and the Muslim Sisters, where they 
believe a person should be assigned a position or role in society based on their 
qualifications and not their gender.  
 There still exists a real concern that women’s rights will end up taking a 
back seat in the liberal and secular groups fight against an Islamist-led assembly. 
As the Arab Spring report on women’s rights points out: “women’s rights are the 
first to be sacrificed by politicians seeking to hold on to power and to appease the 
most conservative factions.”1066 Until a final constitution is established, the future 
of women in Egypt remains hazy at best. Human rights activists and secularists 
need to keep in mind the example of Algeria and Yemen. When Algeria gained 
its independence from colonialist rule, and after their female population fought for 
that freedom, they were deprived of their rights, under a new form of authoritarian 
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rule.1067 Similarly, in Yemen during the 1960s, women fought several injustices 
alongside men, but when the opportunity for change came along, the new regime 
increased discrimination against women.1068 In the face of the Muslim Sisters’ 
optimism and high hopes for women’s equality and presence in Egypt’s political 
field, the rest of Egypt’s women are wary and anxious. Egyptian women have 
found themselves side-lined from the political process that is attempting to direct 
the new policies of Egypt, due to the nature of that process which has begun to 
take the form of an Islamist agenda. As for the actions and aspirations of the 
Muslim Sisters, only time will tell whether their goals will become more Islamic-
centred or more gender-associated. Moreover, the MB as an Islamist movement 
needs to be continually reassessed amidst Egypt’s overall political scene, which 
is repeatedly changing and where the power dynamics are always shifting. 
Preconceived ideologies of political Islam cannot be a deciding factor in 
considering the MB and Muslim Sisters’ political future in Egypt.  
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
In regards to women’s rights and their place in Egyptian society, the MB 
ensured that the Sisters were publicly represented in the FJP and Parliament. 
But do the Sisters represent all Egyptian women’s issues and concerns? More 
importantly, is the Egyptian society more accepting of female representation in 
Parliament without an over-protective parent - in the form of the MB and the 
FJP? The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain two fundamental issues: 1- 
are the Muslim Sisters seeking to ensure a better quality of life and the 
realization of equal rights for women, or at the very least; laws that ensure 
women’s rights will be protected? 2- Do their roles within the MB organization 
and party empower them as equal contributors to the Islamist movement? And is 
the importance of achieving women’s rights within an Islamic framework 
overshadowed by the Muslim Sisters’ focus and drive to fulfill al-Banna’s legacy - 
and that of the MB as a whole - of witnessing the birth of an Islamic ūmma within 
Egyptian borders, with sharia as its principal and only source of law? Both issues 
are controlled and largely influenced by the MB’s stance of female empowerment 
within the MB and within society. 
Cooke describes the term Islamic feminism as a “linking of apparently 
mutually exclusive identities” to create a radical act of subversion.1069 This raises 
the question of the role of the Muslim Sisters. Can they be labeled as Islamic 
feminists in their attempt to subvert the process of Islamizing society from within 
the largest Islamist movement? Are the Muslim Sisters trying to engage the 
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greater Egyptian society by creating a new self-positioning to include several 
identities and belongings? Or are their goals focused on Islamizing Egyptian 
state and society irrespective of the possibility of alienating existing multiple 
identities and affiliations in the process? Feminism has always been part of other 
discourses. In the case of Egypt, those discourses centred on religion and 
nationalism. By gendering these discourses, Egyptian feminists partook in the 
practice of positioning themselves within such a broad spectrum of gendered 
movements. Another major struggle that feminists currently face is the hegemony 
of cultural and traditional values and practices over the realization that certain 
rights and laws need to exist in a nation’s constitution and legal system. These 
laws are meant to protect women against discrimination and elevate their dismal 
status in their respective traditional societies. Seeing that these nation-states and 
the culture that accompany them were built on a long history of patriarchal 
practices, alongside its nature of patrilineal inheritance laws and family makeup, 
these traditional societies rely heavily on placing men in leading roles over their 
female counterparts; thereby making it more difficult for women to occupy senior 
public roles that superimpose or are even equal to that of men. The positioning of 
feminists within a religious movement is not new in the field of women studies. 
The Western world has witnessed feminist interpretations of sacred scripture 
within the Judean religion and Christianity. Such activism resulted in the 
accommodation of women in new religious roles as ministers and rabbis and 
‘unordained’ women as leaders of congregational prayer.1070 However, much like 
the Muslim Sisters, these religious feminists do not seem to influence their 
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secular society or government, as they seem more compartmentalized within 
their nation.1071  
 
In regards to the first issue: Are the Muslim Sisters seeking to ensure a better 
quality of life and the realization of equal rights for women, or at the very least; 
laws that ensure women’s rights will be protected? 
 Badran explained the rise of politically active Muslim Sisters as a reaction 
against the secularization of society, similar to the rise of secular feminism in the 
presence of religious conservatism.1072 This is in keeping with the rise of Islamist 
trends in Egypt starting in the 1970s to the present day. In essence, both secular 
and Islamic feminisms contain elements of each other, religious feminism may be 
incumbent on an Islamist paradigm, but both are able to work together and find a 
common ground in this broad discourse of feminism. The Muslim Sisters and 
their ideology and vision would be welcomed and shared amongst other feminists 
if it resembled that of a Muslim feminist, which according to Tohidi is welcomed 
within the spectrum of feminist discourse. 1073  This is conditional upon their 
contribution to the empowerment of women in their region or state, and when 
their rhetoric does not include religious structures, and is based on practices of 
religious and cultural tolerance. However, when they “cooperate with and serve 
as arms of repressive and anti-democratic Islamist states,”1074 they de-value the 
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experiences shared by other sisterhoods within a framework that welcomes 
divergent feminist discourses.  
The Representation of the Muslim Sisters - Childs and Krook mapped the 
substantive representation of women, where several bullet points help in further 
understanding the Muslim Sisters’ role within Egypt’s government and society, 
and their effect on both.1075 Of the most relevant points, the “Anticipated Effects 
of Increased Proportions of Women” assist in predicting the outputs of the 
Sisters’ increased public role, where either 1- women will form strategic coalitions 
with other women; 2- women will influence men’s behavior in a feminist or 
women-friendly policy direction; or 3- women will provoke a backlash among 
male legislators.1076 Unfortunately, as preceding chapters discuss, none of the 
above relationship dynamics were established, except that there was a backlash 
by the secular non-Islamic legislators - both female and male, during the course 
of the Sisters’ public role as MPs. The second test of the Muslim Sisters’ 
representation in Parliament would be their ability to contain and enable 
characteristics of legislative contexts through 1- Institutional norms, especially in 
legislative practices; 2- Positional power, especially in legislative committees; 3- 
Political parties, especially in terms of party ideology; and 4- Political climate, 
especially in terms of its relation to women’s empowerment.1077 During their short 
role in Parliament, the Sisters were not in support of several secular laws that 
aimed to protect women’s rights, but they have been highly vocal and effective 
within their political party. However, their influence in the party did not carry over 
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to parliamentary actions or legislative issues. Moreover, their role in the CA did 
not serve more than a picture of tokenism, where they were not as vocal as they 
could have been due to time constraints, and external factors of trying to approve 
the constitution in as little time as possible. Their role during that time period was 
complementary to that of the studies of tokenism where the ‘tokens’ comply with 
the expectations set forth by the dominant majority; which in this case was the 
FJP and other Islamist parties that dominated the CA membership.1078  The 
Sisters’ other option would be to become marginalized if they did not accept their 
positioning within the CA, which did not help their efforts of empowering all 
Sisters within and outside the MB. Childs and Krook point out that critical mass 
theory literature explains that as “women grow more numerous in legislative 
chambers, they will increasingly be able to form strategic coalitions with one 
another to promote legislation related to women’s issues.”1079 However, that is 
not a likely scenario with the Sisters who seem to be at war with secular 
influences in legislation in regards to women’s rights. On the other hand, Childs 
and Krook point out scenarios where increased participation of women may 
eventually result in influencing men’s behavior to dedicate more time and effort to 
women’s issues. Naturally, this may result in a negative and opposite reaction, 
where male legislators may retaliate and create obstacles and diversions that 
obstruct women’s policy initiatives and push them further from the inner positions 
of power. In respect to a patriarchal society, a lower number of female 
representation may be better than a higher presence, as the limited number of 
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women may work more efficiently and focus on women-centric policies, without 
threatening or undermining male domination in the legislative process.  
The MB is the oldest Islamic movement that is built on a conservative 
ideology and practice, it has yet to seat a woman in its highest offices. The MB, 
nonetheless, viewed the assignment of women in more senior positions in its 
political wing - the FJP - as equally empowering and encouraging to the 
advancement of women’s rights in an Arab society; via an Islamic reference. 
However, the Muslim Sisters who have taken on more public roles that require 
more of their time and effort still have to report to male members of the FJP and 
MB. The FJP female members who occupy senior positions only assume 
seniority over other women, within the different branches of the FJP’s women 
committee across Egypt. Additionally, the FJP Muslim Sisters were preoccupied 
with initiatives and projects under the MB’s Nahda plan that was complementary 
to their gender, i.e. issues of social services, children’s education curriculum, and 
household concerns. The majority of the two percent female representation in the 
recently elected PA belongs to the FJP.1080 In the meantime, the affairs of the 
Muslim Sisters within the organization seem unchanging. A male MB member 
assigned as the head of a Muslim Sisters Division explained that if the Division 
were to be placed within the hierarchy and a woman were to be assigned as the 
head of the Muslim Sisters Division, the Sisters will always need to rely on the 
male MB members to oversee and execute certain functions and activities.1081 In 
regards to the FJP, when a senior official was asked whether a woman would 
                                            
1080 Refer to Appendix E. 
1081 A.M.A., Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 31, 2012. 
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ever be allowed to occupy a senior position such as the presidency, he answered 
that the FJP would give women full support to do so, but doubted that any 
woman would succeed in garnering enough support among the people, due to 
the traditional nature of Egyptian society.1082 However, in other ultra-conservative 
societies, such as Yemen, the MB branch witnessed internal elections allowing a 
woman instead of a man to head the women’s division.  
 
The second issue focuses on the following questions: 2- Do the roles of the 
Sisters within the MB organization and party empower them as equal contributors 
to the Islamist movement? And is the importance of achieving women’s rights 
within an Islamic framework overshadowed by the MB’s mission and vision for 
the state?  
It is pertinent to acknowledge the Muslim Sisters’ political work in Egypt’s 
streets through engaging the public and possible MB voters. The Sisters may 
have been absent from the public view during the electoral seasons; but they 
have been at the core of the MB’s campaigning activities. In the course of 
Mubarak’s presidential run, more than 44,000 Muslim Brotherhood students were 
victimized on university grounds and were regularly arrested. 3,200 Brotherhood 
leaders were banned from traveling, 11,000 Brothers were forced to resign from 
their jobs, and most MB members were prevented from performing the 
compulsory military service. 1083  These arrests took place during the MB’s 
attempts to reach out to Egypt’s civil society. Furthermore, the MB members 
                                            
1082 A.S., Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 24, 2012. 
1083 “32,000 Muslim Brothers Detained Under Old Regime Emergency Law,” IkhwanWeb, June 2, 
2012, accessed June 11, 2012, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30044&ref=search.php 
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faced excessive police force and strategic arrests of those who criticized 
Mubarak (which also included non-Islamist personalities), under the allegations 
of posing a security threat. The Muslim Sisters have made themselves known to 
the public and within the MB’s patriarchal organization, through their skills in 
securing votes and winning over the public with their campaigning skills. Their 
efforts focused on engaging all civil society outlets, which has been a common 
practice by several Islamist movements within the Middle East. The inclusion of 
civil society is neither a support of democratic reform or as part of the MB’s 
accommodationist tactic. According to Brower’s, it is a tactic to “restore solidarity 
among the Islamic community and to assert that group’s authority as the source 
and basis of legitimate rule.”1084 Such methodology and agenda in engaging the 
Egyptian society for specific nation-building purposes that center on an Islamist 
framework, further attests to the MB’s unwavering goal of Islamizing Egypt. They 
rationalized that “appropriation of civil society discourse in articulating this 
program has in turn forced a reinterpretation of Islamic ideas about political and 
social life.”1085 Brower’s research reveals that this annexation of civil society 
outlets have been used by leaders of two major socio-political Islamist 
movements in both Sudan and Tunisia over the past decade. For example, 
Browers explains Ghannouchi’s concept of civil society as one that “relies upon 
Western liberal political institutions supported by an Islamic community and 
infused throughout with an Islamic ethos.”1086 Similarly, the MB has been utilizing 
certain institutions to further their message and social movement. However, the 
                                            
1084. Browers, 137. 
1085 Ibid. 
1086 Ibid. 
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major concern comes into play when one of these Islamist movements are in a 
position of power, a position that Egypt’s MB now enjoys with a majority power in 
Parliament and a senior MB member in the position of Egypt’s president. Islamist 
movements have turned against women’s rights in the past, much like 
authoritarian regimes, once they are in a position of power.  
The problem with Islamizing state policy or state rule is that it focuses 
largely on issues pertaining to morality, family issues, the public arena and 
cultural and educational influences; as is the case in present day Egypt and 
Tunisia. The role of the Muslim Sisters has been significant in regards to 
preserving and enhancing the religious element in Egypt’s everyday life, where 
sharia is only concerned with protecting the family nucleus from foreign laws and 
intervention for the betterment of the Islamic society as a whole. In effect, the 
Muslim Sisters affect state policy in regards to the issues in which Islamist parties 
are mostly invested. However, it is unclear whether the Muslim Sisters support 
these laws or rules due to their conviction, or whether they decide to conform to 
their movement and party at the expense of their struggle for empowerment. For 
example, Moghadam poses this question in regards to women and gender 
activists in Iran:  
“Can the activities of reformist men and women-who situate 
themselves within the broad objectives of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and seek the improvement of the status of women-be 
described as constituting an Islamic feminism? Or are they 
reinforcing and legitimizing the state's gender policy?”1087  
 
If an Islamist-leaning government continues to thrive in Egypt, will the Muslim 
Sisters - as members of the ruling party - be considered at the forefront of an 
                                            
1087Moghadam (2002), 1142. 
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Islamic feminist construct? Or will they, first and foremost, legitimize the ruling 
party’s policies irrespective of their implications on gender policies and whether 
they apply new and improved interpretations of sharia? If the Sisters were to act 
in keeping with Islamic feminism and its mission statement of re-examining 
interpretations of sharia, they must execute these endeavors independent from 
their movement and not under its Islamist rule, so as to not confuse their 
intention with their political affiliation. Islamist governments have been failing on 
both the economic front and in areas concerning efficient government 
administration. Unfortunately, the Islamist ethos hinges upon marginal state 
issues such as modesty, sex segregation and Islamizing state education through 
the re-writing of school curriculum and enforcing religious instruction in schools. 
This has been the case with Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party.  
 
Where do the Muslim Sisters Stand in Respect to Islamic Feminism?  
Al-Ghazali was seen as the champion for Islamic feminism, due to her 
long history in feminist organizations that centered on an Islamic ideology. Al-
Ghazali’s MLA and her inclusion in the Muslim Sisters at a later stage in her life 
is testament to that. However, her affiliation to the formidable MB organization 
blurred her loyalties and commitments to many. It is not clear if she was an 
Islamic feminist or just an Islamist like the MB members. According to the 
information presented in preceding chapters, al-Ghazali is the only Muslim Sister 
who claimed allegiance to both camps during different episodes of her life. As for 
the Muslim Sisters of today, their loyalties seem to lie wholly with the MB. In 
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contrast to other Islamist feminists, the Muslim Sisters did not try to engage the 
MB or Islamic clerics in an attempt to reinterpret dated Islamic fiqh, to ascertain 
whether the laws and influences that were in effect centuries ago, may have 
been tainted with a patriarchal stance of society and religion. Islamic feminists 
such as Ezzat and Kazim encourage women to educate themselves in matters of 
Islamic jurisprudence and Quranic texts to offer a less patriarchal interpretation of 
certain hadiths; which many Islamic movements such as the MB and Salafist 
groups use, in adopting harmful practices that affect women’s freedoms and 
rights. Instead, after the approval of el-Garf and Kamel was cited in several 
media regarding the practice of FGM ‘to a certain degree’, they later denied it 
and tried to direct the public’s attention to more pressing issues that plague 
Egypt’s women like healthcare, security and access to education. Further, el-Garf 
stated that "these issues (of FGM) do not bother anyone, we have bigger issues.” 
1088 This further highlights what this research work had initially set out to explain, 
that any feminist - Islamist or not - struggles against two major challenges. 
Whereas Western feminists had to fight back against the archaic notion of male 
superiority and patriarchy, women of the Middle East need to battle traditions that 
encourage such patriarchal behaviour; and against the fear of losing the Muslim 
identity in the face of Western encroachment and globalization. Many - such as 
Qasim Amin – believe that the advancement of the Middle Eastern society starts 
with the liberalisation of the Arab woman.  
Islamic feminists consider female political participation to be inseparable 
from the process of innovation and contemporary Islamic thought in the Islamic 
                                            
1088 “Egyptian Sisters of the Muslim Brotherhood Rise with Conservative Vision.” 
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context. Political participation is a prominent issue as it could represent the point 
of release of Islamic nations from their state of deterioration. A more visible role 
for women encourages developmental efforts and steps towards governmental 
and political reform; forcing society to re-evaluate the dated laws and Islamic 
jurisprudence that restrict women’s mobility and activism that is crucial in 
spinning the wheels of change.1089 The main issue with Islamic feminism is that 
women, not religion, should be the focus and center of its theory and practice. As 
Islamic feminists lose sight of their goal to empower women and attack social 
and gender inequalities in favor of imposing new interpretations of Islamic 
scripture and practice, Islamic feminism becomes more of a fundamentalist 
option than an ideology based on the belief in women’s rights and equality. The 
belief that only Islam would realize women’s rights and nothing else becomes 
problematic. This seems to be the ideology of the Muslim Sisters as they combat 
UN conventions and Unicef’s international laws that protect women’s and 
children’s rights within a non-Islamic framework. The Muslim Sisters stand by 
and support the archaic practices of FGM and support the MB’s decision in 
regards to their goal to ensure women’s rights as long as it does not contradict 
with Islam and the traditions and culture found in Egypt. For example, a young 
Muslim Sister stands by her conviction and that of the MB, that Islam will provide 
women with the rights that Islam bestowed upon her and protect her from 
incidents of violence and repression through the utilization of the MB’s civil-
                                            
1089 Jaafar Abdul Rahman, Review of al-Mar’a wal ‘amal ’al-Siyasi: al Ru’iya al-Islamiyya [Women 
and Political Action: Islamic Vision] by Heba Raouf Ezzat, Dirasat Mujtama‘iya [Societal Studies], 
accessed January 10, 2013, http://societal.societystudies.org/ssc/2/Women_Political.htm  
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society outreach activities.1090 Also, she argues: “Islam empowers women in both 
their households and in society. Men and women are both entitled to the same 
level of respect, social status, and protection under the law.”1091  
 Abdel-Latif’s research article on the Muslim Sisters has been the only 
piece of research available which documents the Muslim Sisters desire to speak 
out and escape the MB’s male rule and fight for a better representation within the 
MB. Abdel-Latif had interviewed several Sisters who wanted to be included in the 
MB’s Guidance Bureau and Shura Council, and to be given more public roles 
that required more responsibilities. Moreover, el-Halafawy asserted that there are 
Sisters who have demanded a representation of the MB women in the Guidance 
Bureau, but el-Halafawy has long since left the organization stating vague 
reasons. However, in today’s post-revolution Egypt, these sentiments are not 
visible.1092 The Muslim Sisters have been outspoken and vocal in their demand 
for an improved Egypt free from corruption and tyranny, as they occupied more 
active positions within the FJP, the PA and the SC.1093 However, none of these 
vocal women have articulated their desire to contest for seats within the senior 
offices of the MB. Despite many claims that the MB will revamp its structure to 
include the Muslim Sisters Division within its organizational structure,1094 this has 
yet to materialize. Furthermore, there has been no mention of replacing the head 
of the Muslim Sisters Division with a woman instead of a man. Resistance to this 
                                            
1090 Asem.  
1091 Ibid. 
1092 Khalaf. 
1093 Refer to Appendix E and F for the exact number of Muslim Sisters in the PA and SC. 
1094 For a clearer picture of the division of the Muslim Sisters Division from that of the MB’s 
organizational structure, refer to Appendix A and D. 
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idea might be due to the fact that if a woman replaces a man as head of the 
Muslim Sisters Division, she will automatically be awarded a seat on the 
Guidance Council. This is an idea that has yet to be accepted by the more 
conservative older generation, who represent the majority of the MB’s Bureau. In 
effect, the Muslim Sisters have continued their long legacy of accommodating 
and assisting the MB’s activities and projects, well into the post-revolution days.  
As Islamists and secularists fight over the direction and content of the new 
constitution, the main contention surrounds the clause that stipulates that men 
and women are equal, so as long as this equality does not contradict Islamic law. 
Such a vague article of the law could lead to many breaches of women’s rights, 
as it could allow right-wing conservatives to restrict women's rights by imposing 
an archaic literal interpretation of sharia law. Several prominent Muslim Sisters, 
such as Kamel, who is a member of the president’s advisory team, have 
defended the wording of that clause. Kamel explained her reasoning - and that of 
the MB and FJP - behind supporting this clause, as she explained that sharia law 
gives men certain rights that are not applicable to women. Laws such as 
polygamy and inheritance laws give men a greater share due to their natural 
responsibility as heads of households.1095 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1095 “Egyptian Sisters of the Muslim Brotherhood Rise with Conservative Vision.” 
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Closing Statements 
Middle Eastern countries irrespective of the majority religion have different 
opinions regarding women’s rights and the question of gender equality. 1096 A 
majority of these nations’ populations may view the idea of equal rights as 
favorable, but in Egypt they are a slim majority: only 58 percent favor equal 
rights, and 36 percent oppose it. Only 53 percent of Egyptian men support equal 
rights.1097 According to the survey conducted in the first half of 2012 on a sample 
size equal to two percent of Egypt’s population; many Egyptians support the 
general idea of gender quality but are less enthused in regards to “gender parity 
in politics, economics, and family life,” where they believe men make better 
politicians and leaders. 1098  
The Muslim Sisters’ stance is a vague one at best. Analysts such as 
Abdel-Latif and Ottaway formulated that the Sisters are aiming for demanding 
roles within the MB and are fighting for senior positions in the organization; 
thereby reflecting their Islamic feminist roots and demands for more equality 
within an Islamic framework. However, the Sisters in a post–revolution era have 
been supporting the MB on many opinions and laws that are detriment to 
Egyptian women’s well-being, under the pretense that these existent laws are in 
                                            
1096 This point includes a much wider discussion and comparison of secular and modern laws and 
nation-states with pre-modern (before the formation of nation-states and establishment of 
citizenship rights) Islamic jurisprudence and sharia, and how both camps interpret concepts of 
freedom, citizenship and equality. See Ebrahim Moosa, “The Dilemma of Islamic Rights 
Schemes,” Worlds & Knowledges Otherwise (2004):1-25, accessed March 23, 2013, 
 https://globalstudies.trinity.duke.edu/wp-content/themes/cgsh/materials/WKO/v1d1_MoosaE.pdf  
1097 “Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life: Few Believe 
U.S. Backs Democracy,” Pew Research Center, (July 10, 2012): 2, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-
islam-in-political-life/  
1098 Ibid. 
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contradiction with sharia and an Islamic way of life: the endgame of the MB for 
Egypt. Almost all of the Sisters that were interviewed over the course of this 
dissertation described their loyalty and admiration for the MB’s dream of an 
Islamic ūmma, which many believe will happen once Egypt regains its power and 
presence in the Muslim region. Moreover, the control of Egypt by the MB seems 
very much a reality for many of the Sisters who have boasted that admirers and 
supporters greatly outnumber that of the members of this Islamist 
organization.1099 It is interesting to mention that Browers described the Sisters’ 
support and loyalty to the MB as a tactic of repression by the MB, where the 
organization has forced its women to rethink the whole idea of civil society in 
Egypt; by diverting all their attention and energy towards the importance and 
sanctity of the family unit and the role of women in upholding them.1100  In 
essence, Browers reveals that this reformulation of thinking and living is a sort of 
prelude to the “exclusion of women from the realm of civil society - and from a 
central role in the ūmma - on the part of the Islamists as well.”1101 As for the FJP, 
Kamel has insisted that the Sisters are well on their way to become more 
politically active within the FJP, explaining that the MB is now pre-occupied with 
placing "the cornerstones for the right path toward democracy within its political 
party, including bringing more women into the leadership... [which will take] a few 
years,"1102 due to the lack of experienced female cadres within the MB’s political 
front who could occupy serious positions in the FJP.  
                                            
1099 G.R. Interview by Mona Farag. MP3 recording. Cairo, Egypt, January 17, 2012. 
1100 Browers, 156. 
1101 Ibid. 
1102 “Egyptian Sisters of the Muslim Brotherhood Rise with Conservative Vision.” 
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The Muslim Sisters today have proven themselves quite adept in 
engaging the public and politically participating in governmental entities such as 
the parliament and ministries. This thesis has shed light on their many qualities 
and their ability to mass mobilize and gain people’s trust and vote at times of 
national elections, for the advancement of the MB, and not necessarily for the 
advancement of women’s rights, or for the provision of a better quality of life for 
Egyptian women and children. However, if it were not for their long affiliation and 
inclusion within the formidable MB - an organization that dictates the educational 
curricula taught within MB homes - these Muslim Sisters could have taken on a 
more Islamic feminist stance, in challenging dated and masculine-infused 
interpretations of the Quran, sharia and hadiths. If the Sisters were to take on 
such a task, they could work to ensure that Islam would be fairly utilized in 
safeguarding women’s rights to be fully realized within the socially and culturally 
acceptable framework of Islamic jurisprudence. As Childs points out, the 
influence of ‘token’ members of Parliament or society such as the Muslim Sisters 
is not controlled by their numerical standing, the Sisters can still affect the power 
dynamics within Parliament and within the MB, by utilizing their specialized 
abilities in influencing decision-making in regards to women and children’s issues 
on a sub-state and state level. If the Muslim Sisters were to succeed in that and 
fully adopt the methodologies of Islamic feminism, maybe then they can find a 
common ground with the remainder of Egypt’s feminists and activists by creating 
a space where Islam and its re-interpretation becomes compatible with the 
emancipation of Egyptian women. Feminism and gender activism need to be 
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rooted in the mores and norms of the locale in which it exists. For example, the 
Muslim woman is viewed negatively by Western activists as the latter do not fully 
comprehend what a woman’s trials and tribulations are within an Islamic or 
Middle Eastern paradigm. The Muslim Sisters are placed in a unique position; 
they can bridge the gap between secular and Islamic; West and East, if they 
choose to work outside the confines of a strict hierarchical Islamist organization. 
However, the possibility that the Muslim Sisters may experience a backlash from 
their organization and be labeled as traitors of the Islamic cause and their 
brethren is quite palpable, and may halt any tactics that may have been 
discussed over the course of Abdel-Latif’s and Ottaway’s research effort. In 
conclusion, the chances of empowering women - whether Muslim Sisters or 
otherwise - is slim under a religious fundamentalist rule. Both secular and 
Islamist strands of feminism need to participate in a show of solidarity to be able 
to negotiate a new path to women’s empowerment within Egyptian state and 
society. 
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Appendix A: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Hierarchical Structure1103    
  
 
 
 
                                            
1103 Richard P. Mitchell, The Society Of Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
164.  
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Appendix B: Sample of Questions Asked During Interviews  
 
Questions posed to Muslim Sisters and Muslim Brothers  
Closed-questions: 
• How long have you been part of the MB? 
• How did you enter the organization? What or who was an influence? 
• What were the reasons behind you joining the MB? 
• When did you join the FJP? What is your role in the FJP? 
• What is your occupation? Academic qualifications? Position in MB and/or 
FJP? 
• The Muslim Sisters have been in the forefront of the FJP’s campaigns and 
initiatives, why in your opinion has that tactic been important for the party 
and the organization? 
• How does the MB and FJP support its female members in engaging the 
political sphere via the organization or the party? 
• What role did the FJP female candidates support and/or occupy in the 
party? And how does it differ from the FJP’s male members? 
• Why is there an absence of female representation in the MB’s Guidance 
Bureau and Shura Council? Does that mean that the senior positions 
within the party will only be reserved for its male members as well? 
• Why did the MB women engage the political activity of running for 
elections starting from the year 2000 and not before that? Why the 2000 
elections? Was the MB trying to send a message or revolutionize its public 
image in Egypt and abroad? 
• Women usually join the MB via a male relative/spouse’s membership, has 
that changed now that there is no overbearing regime to worry about 
persecuting the Muslim Sisters? What are the requirements a woman 
must fulfil to join the organization now? 
• Will any of the Muslim Sisters ever be allowed to occupy a senior position 
within the PA, such as head of the Agriculture committee or Industry 
committee? 
 
Open-ended questions:  
• Describe your activities in the MB before the revolution.  
• Describe your experience during the 18 days of the revolution. 
• How do you feel the MB has changed after the revolution without an 
oppressive regime present? 
• How was your experience in the 2011/2012 elections? Can you provide a 
comparison to your experiences in elections that took place before the 
revolution? 
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• Explain and describe the steps you took to prepare for your campaign, 
such as electoral activities of garnering votes, engaging your 
constituencies on the street, attending workshops and s training sessions 
• Do you think the role of women in the MB will change whether minimally or 
drastically in this new era that Egypt is witnessing?  
• Discuss the obstacles and opportunities presented within the MB’s 
generational shifts and tensions?  
• How do you assess and describe the impact and work of Zaynab al-
Ghazali? Why has there not been a Muslim Sister as politically active as 
she was? 
 
Questions posed to analysts/ academics/ politicians: 
• What reasons would you attribute to the electoral contestation of Muslim 
Sisters during the 2000-2010 elections?  
• Why did the MB not depend on the Muslim Sisters to run in elections 
preceding the 2000 elections? 
• In post-revolution Egypt, do you think the Muslim Sisters will be given 
more important roles within the MB and FJP? 
• Would you differentiate the role of the Muslim Sisters in the MB from the 
FJP? i.e. will the Sisters gain more privileges and responsibilities in one 
entity more than another? 
• In your opinion, does the MB and/or the Sisters rate issues of human 
rights and women’s rights high on their priorities agenda? Will they take 
the necessary measures that protect those rights or will they buckle down 
from the pressure coming emanating from the Salafist front or other 
influential political groups? 
• How will the present dominant rule of the MB affect women’s rights in 
Egypt? 
• Do you believe the Muslim Sisters will be allowed to take a seat in the 
MB’s senior echelons of its Guidance Bureau and Shura Council? Or will 
they remain hidden still in the post-revolution era? 
• What do you think were the main reasons for the MB’s win in the PA and 
SC elections? Comment on the two percent of female MPs in PA and the 
fact that 70 percent of the female representation in the PA are FJP 
members? 
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Appendix C: The Number of Female Parliamentarians from 1976 – 2005 1104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1104 El-Adly, 46.  
 
Election Year No. of 
Women 
Elected 
No. of 
Women 
Appointed 
Total  
Parliamentarian  
Percentage of 
Female - 
occupied 
Seats in 
Parliament 
1976 4 2 6 1.6% 
1979 33 2 35 9 % 
1984 37 1 38 8.25 % 
1987 14 4 18 3.9% 
1990 7 3 10 2.2% 
1995 5 4 9 1.6% 
2000 7 4 11 2.5% 
2005 4 5 9 2% 
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Appendix D: The Muslim Sisters’ Organizational Chart 1105  
 
 
 
 
                                            
1105 Dahlia Abdel-Raheem, “Khitat al taharok bayn al tajamou‘at al nisa’iyya,” [The Mobilization 
Plan amongst the Female Congregations] 6th of October Weekly Magazine, October 25, 2009, 28. 
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Appendix E: The 2011 People’s Assembly Elections Results1106 
* Ten additional seats were appointed by SCAF, which included three women. 
 
                                            
1106 “Results of Egypt’s People’s Assembly Elections: Guide to Egypt’s Transition,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, accessed February 1, 2012, 
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/25/results-of-egypt%E2%80%99s-
people%E2%80%99s-assembly-elections 
Name of 
Party/Bloc  
Number of Seats  Percentage of Seats  Number of Women 
in each Party/Bloc 
Democratic Alliance 225 45.2  
Freedom and Justice 
Party 216 43.4 
4 
al-Karama 6 1.2 - 
al-Hadara 2 0.4 - 
Labor Party 1 0.2 - 
Islamist Alliance 125 25 - 
al-Nour 109 21.8 - 
Building and 
Development Party 13 2.6 
- 
al-Asala 3 0.6 - 
al-Wafd 41 8.2 3 
Egyptian Bloc 34 6.8 - 
Al-Tagammu Party 3 0.6 - 
Egyptian Social 
Democratic Party 16 3.2 
1 
Free Egyptians 
Party 15 3 
- 
Reform and 
Development Party 10 2 
1 
al-Wasat Party 9 1.8 - 
Revolution Continues 
Alliance 8 1.6 
- 
Egypt National Party 5 1 - 
Egyptian Citizen 
Party 4 0.8 
- 
Union Party 3 0.6 - 
Freedom Party 3 0.6 - 
al-Adl Party 2 0.4 - 
Democratic Peace 
Party 2 0.4 
 
Arab Egyptian Union 
Party 1 0.2 
- 
Nasserite Party 1 0.2 - 
Independents 25 5 - 
TOTAL 498 100 9 !
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Appendix F: The 2012 Shura Council Elections Results1107  
 
 
* There are no official statistics regarding women’s representation in the 180 
elected seats. The President appoints the remaining seats. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1107 “Results of Shura Council Elections,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed 
February 1, 2012, http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/29/results-of-shura-
council-elections  
Name of Party/Bloc  Number of Seats  Percentage of Seats  
Freedom and Justice Party 105 58.3 
al-Nour Party 45 25 
al-Wafd Party 14 7.7 
Egyptian Bloc 8 4.4 
Freedom Party 2 1.1 
Democratic Peace Party 2 1.1 
Independents 4 2.2 
TOTAL 180 100 !
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